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Introduction 
 
‘In unorganized trades the individual workman, applying for a job, accepts or refuses the 
terms offered by the employer without communication with his fellow-workmen, and 
without any other consideration than the exigencies of his own position. For the sale of 
his labour he makes, with the employer, a strictly individual bargain. But if a group of 
workmen concert together, and send representatives to conduct the bargaining on behalf 
of the whole body, the position is at once changed. Instead of the employer making a se-
ries of separate contracts with isolated individuals, he meets with a collective will, and 
settles, in a single agreement, the principles upon which, for the time being, all workmen 
of a particular group, or class, or grade, will be engaged.’ 
 
   Sydney & Beatrice Webb, (1920: 1) 
 
‘The social function [of coordination] follows from the strategic advantages of class sol-
idarity in the labour market. Coordinated bargaining prevents the distinct bargaining 
units of either of the two sides of industry from being played off against one another. For 
employers, this means that coordinated bargaining protects them from ‘whipsawing’ un-
ion tactics aimed at confronting the employers individually or group by group. For la-
bour, bargaining coordination aims to contain the risk that competition in the labour 
market prompts employees to undercut existing collective agreements and thus to un-
leash a ‘race to the bottom’. The economic function of macro coordination refers to its 
relevance as means of governance. This requires the bargaining parties to concert bar-
gaining in a way that aligns the bargaining outcomes with such macroeconomic impera-
tives as employment and price stability.’ 
   
Franz Traxler (2003b: 195) 
 
While under severe pressure during the last four decades, collective bargaining still constitutes 
the main regulatory process by which labour markets are governed in Europe. Collective agree-
ments between trade unions and employer associations still determine the wages, working time, 
holidays, etc., for approximately 60 percent of the employees in the European Union 
(Commission, 2012). On the one hand, collective bargaining puts a floor under terms and condi-
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tions of employment and collective bargaining is therefore rightly regarded as a centrepiece of 
the European Social Model. Through collective representation and bargaining, workers are argu-
ably protected from some of the social risks that labour markets entail. On the other hand, collec-
tive bargaining can be beneficial for employers. Internationalisation of markets has increased the 
need for coordination across industries due to macroeconomic concerns for price stability and 
employment. Integration of product markets means that cost levels within a country must not 
exceed those of competitors in other countries. This gives impetus for actors to moderate wages 
across industries using collective agreement as a ceiling for wages. As such, coordinated collec-
tive bargaining makes the dual promise of reducing social risks for workers and curbing costs for 
employers.       
The topic of this dissertation is the creation and maintenance of social order in relations be-
tween employers and employees in labour markets. It focuses on a specific mechanism of social 
order – collective bargaining between trade unions and employer associations – and how this 
mechanism resolves conflicts resulting from scarcity between interdependent organised actors. 
Employees depend on employers for employment that will give them income and the intrinsic 
values of having a job, while employers depend on employees for their labour power in generat-
ing revenue. While employers and employees therefore share interests in the employment rela-
tionship, there is nevertheless a ‘structured antagonism’ between them (Edwards, 1986) due to 
their opposing interests over the price of labour power and the concrete exercise of labour power. 
Furthermore, companies and their employees are also in conflict with each other because they 
depend on each other for value creation. Across industries, employers struggle over scarce labour 
and the cost of products and services. Thus, the income for one employer constitutes the cost for 
another. Therefore, collective bargaining as a conflict resolution mechanism does not only create 
social order in relations between employers and employees, but also in relations between com-
panies.         
At the core of the dissertation we find the employment relationship as defined in Industrial Re-
lations (IR). IR can be defined as a multidisciplinary field of study. The field focuses on the reg-
ulation of work and employment and broadly comprises the legal, political, economic, social and 
psychological aspects of that regulation. The employment relationship is therefore understood as 
a legal, economic and social ‘contract’ between employer and employee that defines the terms 
and conditions of labour and also attempts to define how labour power is exercised. This rela-
tionship is relatively new, originating from the modern liberal nation state with individual liberal 
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freedoms, private property, and the gradual separation of production from ownership of capital 
(Pedersen, 2011; Commons et al., 1918). Its history is therefore ultimately political and institu-
tional, formally inscribed in law in the form of contracts and agreements but never fully speci-
fied due to the ‘human element’ of labour power. As such, labour is a ‘fictitious commodity’ 
because its use and its seller are embodied in one person (Polanyi, 1944; Edwards, 2003). The 
consequences of the employment relationship are fundamental as an allocator of, most notably, 
wealth, prestige and meaning for employees and as an allocator of labour power and costs for 
employers. The social order in employment relations is, in other words, ‘high politics’ for inter-
dependent labour market actors. The focus of this dissertation is on the political and economic 
aspects of the employment relationship, that is, how social order is created through collective 
bargaining that produces a ‘web of rules’ (Dunlop, 1958) with distributive consequences for the 
involved actors that are at once in conflict with each other and interdependent on each other.        
If collective bargaining as a regulatory process hinges upon the ability of parties to reach 
agreements, institutions that facilitate this should be pivotal. Throughout the Western world, in-
stitutions for conciliation, mediation or arbitration (CMA) by third parties exist to help unions 
and employers settle in bargaining (Brown, 2004). The role of CMA is an old theme for IR. 
Third parties can help bargaining parties come to settlements by conciliating, mediating or arbi-
trating in conflicts over the terms and conditions in collective agreements. In particular, IR 
scholars in the USA have studied the impact of mediation on collective bargaining processes and 
outcomes. Kerr (1954) noted that besides instilling rationality – as opposed to emotion – in bar-
gaining, mediators could also be used as scapegoats to help bargaining leaders legitimise unpop-
ular settlements with their constituencies. The legitimacy of a nonpartisan proposed settlement 
could facilitate agreements, as envisioned by George Simmel (1950). Stevens (1963) noted that 
mediation becomes an institutionalised part of collective bargaining around which bargaining 
actors orient or reorient their interests. Importantly, the behaviour of mediators and the condi-
tions for mediation, including the institutions of mediation, could be the key to understanding 
how bargaining actors reach settlements and thus produce order in an otherwise conflicting rela-
tionship. Nevertheless, in empirical work the effects of mediation on bargaining results have 
largely been deemed less consequential than the intensity of the bargaining conflict and the expe-
rience of negotiators (Kochan and Jick, 1978; Kerr, 1954; however see Kolb, 1983). In other 
words, the role of third party intervention should not be overestimated. Case studies of non-US 
countries like Denmark or Norway, however, led Walter Galenson to conclude that mediation 
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was ‘the crucial stage of collective bargaining’ (1955: 177 - translation from the Danish ver-
sion). How can this be? 
One crucial difference between the US and European studies is that European collective bar-
gaining is very often coordinated across industries, which in turn means that conflict resolution 
and third parties in Europe potentially intervene into a categorically different type of conflict. 
Stokke (1998: 54), in reviewing the US-based research on third party intervention, notes that: ‘… 
many studies of wage bargaining and conflict resolution do not consider aspects of the bargain-
ing structure and the interest states have in substantive bargaining results’. As noted, the social 
order of collective bargaining does not only entail conflict resolution between employers and 
employees but also conflicts between companies. Consequently, third party CMA in coordinated 
collective bargaining takes on a different set of challenges. The essential challenge is how to 
solve coordination problems between interdependent industries when markets internationalise 
(Traxler, 2003b). I.e. if the price of one company’s products or services is the cost of another, 
labour cost hikes become problematic for companies that cannot externalise costs to consumers 
due to international competition. This fundamental condition in open economies seemingly ne-
cessitates coordination of collective bargaining. In turn, the coordinative capacity of third parties 
becomes more salient. However, upon review of some of the most frequently cited works on 
bargaining coordination, third party intervention is scarcely mentioned (e.g. Traxler, 1995; 2001; 
Calmfors and Driffil, 1988; Ferner and Hyman, 1998; Eichengreen and Iversen, 1999; Iversen, 
1999; Soskice, 1990; Wallerstein, 1999).    
 
The primary aim of this dissertation is therefore to investigate the role third party institutions in 
bargaining coordination.  
 
I pursue this aim by drawing on the disciplines of political science and sociology while engaging 
with the fields of industrial relations and comparative political economy. As a point of departure, 
I study national configurations of collective bargaining institutions that, based on their perceived 
positions in markets, are able to govern how collective organisations interact and resolve con-
flicts to produce joint regulation of employment. By using the word ‘configurations’, I want to 
highlight how relations between different sets of institutions, most notably bargaining structures 
and mediation institutions, produce combined effects on agency. I focus on the organisational 
level of interaction, and I stress that these organisations act purposefully to maximise their inter-
13 
 
ests based on their perceived position in markets. I argue that organisational interests are contin-
gent upon market structures, but that these structures are a matter of perception and that such 
perception is ultimately social. From Dunlop (1958), I agree that the dependent variable in IR is 
ultimately the ‘web of rules’ or regulation of employment that collective bargaining produces. 
By framing my study object this way, I contend that regulatory outcomes are contingent upon 
collective market actors and the ways in which institutions mediate market pressures. I agree 
with neo-institutionalists in arguing that there will be feedback effects between processes, out-
comes and institutions – i.e. that in repeated bargaining rounds, institutions can affect processes 
and vice versa, processes can affect outcomes and vice versa, and institutions can affect out-
comes and vice versa – which calls for a historical, rather than a static, perspective on collective 
bargaining (Pierson, 2000; Thelen, 1999). 
I restrict my studies to private sector collective bargaining, which is where I find the most in-
teresting dilemmas of how to couple concerns for decent terms and conditions of employment 
with pressures for competitiveness. Moreover, it is first and foremost the private sector that is 
characterised by the predominant trends of liberalisation, internationalisation, new production 
forms and economic volatility, which makes it a test bed for observing how collective bargaining 
actors in general reacts to such trends. Admittedly, the current fiscal crisis and austerity pro-
gramme have put public sector bargaining into a similar context, but these developments are 
nevertheless trailing those in the private sector (cf. Bach and Bordogna, 2011). Moreover, the 
regulation of collective bargaining is markedly different between public and private sectors, 
which warrants focusing on only one in cross-comparative work to reduce dimensions for com-
parisons. I concede that the relations between private and public sector bargaining are important 
in understanding the dynamics of coordinated bargaining, but nevertheless find it prudent to 
make analytical restrictions. When required, I refer to the interplay between private and public 
sector bargaining systems.  
The national configurations of bargaining institutions can formally be found in the following 
elements (cf. Stokke, 2002, 672):  
 
1. Procedural by-laws and bargaining traditions by the labour market parties 
2. Legal regulations for engaging in industrial action. 
3. Bargaining structure (levels of bargaining and bargaining coverage)  
4. Procedural rules for conciliation, mediation and arbitration (CMA) 
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5. Ad-hoc state intervention in bargaining  
 
The first and second elements define the procedural rules for collective bargaining, i.e. the rules 
of the game.  The third element, bargaining structure, belongs to the orbit of social partners and 
how they internally and externally structure collective bargaining horizontally (e.g. between sec-
tors and occupations as well as industries) and vertically (e.g. between union confederations, 
union federations, regional/local unions and company level union representation) (Traxler 
1995).Only the fourth and fifth can be characterised as direct third party intervention in the bar-
gaining process. The crucial difference is that CMA attempts to safeguard the bargaining auton-
omy of parties, albeit to varying degrees with arbitration being the strongest intervention. Con-
versely, state intervention suspends bargaining autonomy. In this dissertation, I focus on the 
fourth element. Taken together, the five elements can be seen as configurations of conflict regu-
lation systems which to this day are inherently country-specific despite internationalisation of 
financial, capital and indeed labour markets (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). Furthermore, I argue that the 
five elements have causal impacts on each other as some institutions are either substitute, com-
patible or complementary to others (Boyer, 2005). 
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1. Puzzles, research questions and papers 
In this section, I briefly provide an overview of the puzzles that have motivated the dissertation. I 
hereby want to locate the specific papers by presenting the specific gaps in our knowledge that 
the dissertation is trying to fill.   
The first puzzle appeared when comparing bargaining rounds in Sweden and Denmark which 
have occurred since the decentralisation of bargaining in the 1980s and 1990s. Some scholars 
argued that the Swedish and Danish bargaining systems had converged onto a German pattern 
bargaining system, in which manufacturing sets the pattern for other industries to follow 
(Iversen, 1996; Swenson and Pontusson, 2000). Bargaining at industry level in a monetarist eco-
nomic policy regime would privilege wage moderation around the exposed sector, thus recali-
brating the centralized peak-level bargaining sought by exposed employers in the ‘golden’ post-
war decades (Swenson, 2002). My initial analysis, however, showed that there were notably 
more defections from the pattern in Sweden than in Denmark. This seemed odd, given the prom-
inence of large Swedish manufacturing companies operating in tight globalised product markets 
like the automotive industry. Moreover, Swedish organisations were involved in a discursive 
battle over who should set the pattern (Medlingsinstitutet, 2009) and over how to promote soli-
daristic wage bargaining for low-paid workers (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012). There was very little 
of that in Denmark. Previous studies have remarked that Swedish employers are much more ag-
gressive towards unions than Danish employers (Pestoff, 1995; Wallerstein and Golden, 1997; 
Due and Madsen, 2000; Thörnqvist, 1999). While useful for explaining adversarial relations be-
tween unions and employers and occasional centrifugal dynamics in Swedish bargaining, I nev-
ertheless found this reasoning incomplete for explaining why employers in, e.g., retail and fi-
nancing would agree to defect from wage moderation. Instead, the relations between bargaining 
structures, cross-class coalitions and mediation institutions seemed more promising (Stokke, 
1998; Elvander, 1974; 1988; Swenson, 1991). On a more general level, the causal mechanisms 
of coordination in collective bargaining seemed unclear despite recent attempts to clarify it (most 
notably Sisson and Marginson, 2002; Traxler, 2003b; Traxler et al., 2008; Thelen and Kume, 
2006). The first puzzle led me to ask the following research question: 
 
How is bargaining coordination created and sustained?  
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The second puzzle appeared as I observed that some countries have strong institutions for concil-
iation, mediation and arbitration (CMA) while others have very weak institutions. Like previous 
Scandinavian studies of primarily centralised bargaining systems (Stokke, 1998; Galenson, 1955; 
Elvander, 1974), I found an intimate link between bargaining structures, mediation institutions 
and coordination of industry-level bargaining in Sweden and Denmark. At the core of this rela-
tionship is the preoccupation about social control over collective bargaining. Nils Elvander’s 
hypothesis (1974) about a relationship between fragmented unions and strong third party inter-
vention therefore seemed worthwhile investigating more broadly. I pursued this puzzle by inves-
tigating and comparing 17 Western European countries. The analysis constitutes – to my 
knowledge – the first attempt to explain the existence of strong CMA in Western Europe. A 
strong motivator for studying CMA is furthermore that it has been somewhat neglected in com-
parative IR, in which it is often seen as a second-order institution. Accordingly, there was very 
little theorisation about strong CMA to work from. In addition to Elvander’s hypothesis, the 
most comprehensive comparative study to date, edited by Valdéz Dal-Ré (2003), proposed a 
relationship between labour court tradition and strong CMA. If specialised labour courts prevail 
in conflicts of rights, we should expect weak CMA because social partners also have a tradition 
for resolving conflicts of interests in bargaining independently of third parties.  
The second puzzle led me to ask two interrelated research questions:  
 
How has CMA been institutionalised in different countries?  
Why do some countries have strong institutions of CMA?  
 
The third puzzle was at once driven by extraordinary economic circumstances but also by the old 
adage in IR that economic cycles affect collective bargaining. It was impossible to study collec-
tive bargaining without considering the international financial and economic crisis which began 
in 2008 and the effects of market pressures on bargaining processes and outcomes in Sweden and 
Denmark. As such, the crisis constituted a ‘natural experiment’ (Gerring and McDermott, 2007) 
in which I could investigate the effect of major external shocks (the treatment) on two similar 
countries (the patients). While the market pressures – most notably a decline in orders and pro-
duction levels – were very similar in Sweden and Denmark, the bargaining processes and out-
comes were not. This provided an empirical puzzle. I realised that national configurations of 
bargaining institutions would not suffice to explain differences. Instead, I investigated the idea 
17 
 
that institutional linkages between bargaining institutions, labour market policies and employ-
ment protection legislation could inform the analysis of collective bargaining responses to eco-
nomic crisis (cf. Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Kristensen and Lilja, 2012). This idea has also been 
highlighted recently in the literature on flexicurity, i.e. combinations of labour market flexibility 
and social security (Wilthagen and Tros, 2004; Madsen, 2006).  
The proposition that collective bargaining is related to development of flexicurity constitutes 
the final puzzle of the dissertation. Often, flexicurity studies focus on macro-level policies, such 
as active and passive labour market policies together with employment protection legislation 
(Burroni and Keune, 2011). By combining low employment protection with comprehensive ac-
tive labour market policies and high income security in the case of unemployment, labour mar-
kets can be dynamic without eroding employment and socioeconomic standards (Madsen, 2005; 
Viebrock and Clasen, 2009). This point, however, neglects the pivotal role played by collective 
bargaining in regulating important measures for flexibility and security, such as wage flexibility, 
working time flexibility and functional flexibility vis-à-vis in-job income security, in-house em-
ployment security and work-life balance (Ibsen and Mailand, 2009). These items are, indeed, 
often regulated by collective agreements. By making framework agreements at the industry level 
on a broad range of issues related to flexibility and security, collective agreements can foster 
balances of flexibility and security, and they can do so in a decentralised but organised manner 
(Traxler, 1995; Andersen, 2005; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004). They provide flexibility because 
company-level bargaining determines the actual wage, working time and work organisation; and 
they provide security because they stipulate minimum standards and ensure negotiated agree-
ments on flexibility (Ilsøe, 2010). But does collective bargaining actually contribute to flexicuri-
ty in this manner across different institutional contexts that rely less on collective bargaining as a 
regulatory process? The third and fourth puzzle led me to pose the following research question:  
 
What explains the outcomes of collective bargaining coordination under different institutional 
and economic conditions? 
 
The first research question is not limited to the role of mediation in bargaining coordination, and 
I do not pretend that mediation is the only factor creating and sustaining bargaining coordination. 
The second and third research questions directly address the role of CMA in different countries 
and the reasons why we see different institutions across countries. The fourth question addresses 
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the ways in which bargaining coordination outcomes differ according to the institutional context 
and economic conditions. Accordingly, the five papers of the dissertation shed light on bargain-
ing coordination from different angles, mediation being one that has often been overlooked.         
The five papers in the dissertation are therefore independent pieces of research and relate to 
the puzzles and research questions in different ways. As such, they are self-contained and fill 
different gaps in somewhat different research fields. Nevertheless, they all relate to the issue of 
collective bargaining coordination, its institutions, its processes and its outcomes.   
 
1. Did mediation save coordinated bargaining? A comparative case study of pattern bar-
gaining in Sweden and Denmark  
(questions 1 and 2) 
The paper compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark from 
the time of decentralisation. The historical-comparative case study shows that confed-
erate bargaining has been replaced with a pattern bargaining system based on cross-
class alliances in the exposed manufacturing sector. In contrast to conventional litera-
ture, the paper stresses the importance of mediation institutions in institutional change. 
By pegging settlements to the pattern, mediation institutions of both countries have a 
necessary role in solving collective action problems in pattern bargaining. Their capa-
bilities, however, differ, which is reflected in more frequent defections in Sweden. De-
fections in Sweden, moreover, appear to be driven by unions’ continuing stress on 
wage solidarity, whereas Danish unions have refocused on supply-side issues.  
(Accepted for revise and resumbit in British Journal of Industrial Relations) 
 
2. In search of control – Conciliation, mediation and arbitration in collective bargaining 
of Western Europe (questions 2 and 3) 
All Western European countries have developed particular systems of third party inter-
vention – understood as conciliation, mediation and arbitration (CMA) – which have 
varying capabilities to intervene in collective bargaining. The purpose of the paper is to 
explain strong CMA across 17 Western European countries using the fuzzy set qualita-
tive comparative analysis (fsQCA) method. It looks at the formal strength of CMAs 
and attempts to deduce explanatory paths to strong CMA in collective bargaining. Two 
hypotheses are considered and extended: the neo-corporatist hypothesis by Elvander 
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that low governance capacity by unions is related to strong CMA, and the legal tradi-
tion hypothesis by Valdés Dal-Ré that normal civil courts in labour matters are related 
to strong CMA. The analysis shows two causal paths to strong CMA: the Nordic and 
the Mediterranean. The former combines high union power, high governance capacity 
and absence of civil courts. The latter combines low governance capacity, high union 
power and weak regulation of industrial action. None of the conditions were consist-
ently necessary for strong CMA, although high union power figures in both causal 
paths. This supports the neo-corporatist hypothesis by Elvander, while we do not find 
support for Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypothesis. Looking closer at deviant cases and the Nor-
dic path, it is suggested that control over collective bargaining – and not legal tradition 
– is the main mechanism behind strong CMA. 
(Submitted for review in Socio-Economic Review)  
 
3. Bargaining in the crisis – a comparison of the 2010 collective bargaining round in the 
Danish and Swedish manufacturing sectors (question 4) 
The economic crisis weighed heavily on the 2010 collective bargaining rounds in the 
Danish and Swedish manufacturing sectors – the pattern-setting sectors in both coun-
tries. This paper analyses and compares the bargaining rounds from agenda-setting to 
signing, pointing to the significant differences in bargaining structures, processes and 
output. On the whole, the crisis seems to have had little effect on the Danish bargaining 
system due to a strong centralisation on the employer side through the Confederation 
of Danish Industries, union moderation and the coordination of bargaining areas by 
Denmark’s mediation institution. Conversely, the bargaining round in Sweden puts a 
question mark over the viability of the whole Swedish bargaining system. Union coor-
dination was shattered when the white-collar unions broke ranks and concluded agree-
ments before the LO unions. But more importantly, Teknikföretagen – the biggest em-
ployers’ federation – quit the Industrial Agreement after the negotiations and, once 
again, Swedish social partners are being forced to readjust the procedural framework 
for collective bargaining.  
(Published in Transfer – co-authored with Søren Kaj Andersen Jesper Due & Jørgen 
Steen Madsen) 
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4. Striking a balance? Flexibility and security in collective bargaining (question 4) 
Often neglected in existing studies of combinations between labour market flexibility 
and security – so-called flexicurity – is the question of how collective bargaining con-
tributes to the development of flexicurity. This is despite the continued resilience of 
this form of regulation in many European countries. The paper compares sector-level 
bargaining and flexicurity in the printing and electrical contracting industries of Den-
mark, Spain and the UK to assess this link. In line with prior research, the paper finds 
that Danish agreements contribute significantly to flexicurity. Somewhat against con-
ventional expectations, however, are findings in the UK and Spain. In the UK, agree-
ments contribute significantly despite a hostile context for collective bargaining. In 
Spain, due to the heavy influence of legislation, the contribution is more modest but 
nevertheless notable. This overall finding gives strong evidence for the proposed link. 
The article goes on to discuss whether a positive contribution is facilitated by certain 
institutional and relational conditions. 
(Published in Economic and Industrial Democracy – co-authored with Mikkel Mai-
land) 
 
5. Three approaches to coordinated bargaining – a case for power-based explanations 
(question 1)  
This article reviews and discusses three different theoretical approaches to the study of 
coordinated collective bargaining which posit three different causal mechanisms for 
coordination. Rational choice posits power relations based on resource-dependence; ra-
tionalist institutionalism posits rules of the game; and discursive institutionalism 
stresses shared meaning structures. It is argued that each approach is based on different 
views of coordination involving exercise of power where some actors make others do 
what they otherwise would not have done. Coordination could therefore have negative 
distributional consequences for coerced actors. The paper goes on to show examples of 
the three approaches from Sweden and Denmark which are regarded as crucial cases 
for ‘Sinatra-inference’: If theories of coordination stressing power and negative distri-
butional consequences can make it in Sweden and Denmark, they can make it any-
where. The article accordingly rejects notions that coordination is purely cooperative 
and makes a case for placing power at the heart of coordination studies. This does not 
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preclude elements of cooperation but it shows that cooperation is conditioned by power 
relations.  
(Accepted for publication in European Journal of Industrial Relations)  
 
This introduction proceeds as follows. Firstly, I sketch selected views of social order in social 
science theory in order to place the specific focus of my dissertation in the broader theoretical 
landscape. Secondly, I review the literature on collective bargaining coordination and third party 
intervention. I start from the founding fathers of IR – John R. Commons and the Webbs – over 
Mancur Olson’s collective action problem and the solutions which corporatist writing prescribed, 
and I end with recent contributions by comparative IR and political economy that study coordi-
nation under intense international competition. Mediation has figured sporadically in the litera-
ture. I therefore go on to review the literature on mediation, beginning with the early writings on 
mediation from the US with a focus on company level mediation. Because this literature does not 
address the potentially systemic effects of mediation, I proceed to give accounts of the coordina-
tive effect of mediation using institutionalist theory. I conclude the theoretical section by show-
ing how theories of institutional change should be incorporated into analyses of the links be-
tween mediation and bargaining coordination and how my analyses fit the existing literature. 
Thirdly, I present the research methods and data used in the studies. The analyses are primarily 
qualitative comparative case studies using both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs. I ex-
plain in some depth the fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) as this is the most 
technical method. I furthermore argue for within-case analysis and triangulation of different 
sources of data to support causal argument from cross-case analysis. The data is then presented. 
The analyses are primarily based on interview data and documentary data which I present to-
gether with reflections on data selection. Finally, I conclude the introduction by outlining the 
main empirical and theoretical contributions of the dissertation to the study of collective bargain-
ing coordination. In the concluding section, I also highlight some limitations of my study that 
invite future research.     
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2. Foundations of social order in the social sciences 
The purpose of this section is to sketch some theoretical foundations for the study of social order. 
In doing this, I intend to place my specific focus on order in collective bargaining in the broader 
theoretical landscape. Obviously, I do not intend to give a comprehensive account of these mas-
sive works on social order, and I concede that my reading of them is restricted to my specific 
purposes. Differences between authors are consequentially stylised.   
The issue of social order is as old as the social sciences. Durkheim (1964) writes, ‘… society 
becomes more capable of collective movement, at the same time that each of its elements has 
more freedom of movement. This solidarity resembles that which we observe among the higher 
animals. Each organ, in effect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And, moreover, the 
unity of the organism is as great as the individuation of the parts is more marked’. The need for 
collective solutions – or organic solidarity – arises with the division of labour between actors as 
we come to depend more on others. Interdependence forces us to coordinate actions and create a 
social order in which we can cooperate. For Durkheim, society integrates interdependent parts 
into a whole, and social order is thus marked by cooperation. Specialisation will, in turn, force us 
to coordinate our activities in order not to upset the whole on which each individual depends.  
In contrast, Collins (1994: 85) sums up an alternative approach based on conflict: ‘Conflict is 
not merely just one factor among others, it is an expression of the very multidimensionality of 
things, the plurality of different groups, interests, and perspectives that make up the world’. Dif-
ferences, accordingly, do not create solidarity due to interdependencies but rather due to conflicts 
between actors that pursue their divergent interests and views of the world. Marx and Weber saw 
the rise of social order as an issue of conflict and domination. Marx defined the two opposed 
classes of production, capitalists and the proletariat, in terms of ownership of the means of pro-
duction (Marx, 1999). As such, social order rests on private capital ownership, which forces la-
bour into dependency on employment at the will of employers. Moreover, legal order would re-
flect this material base, which could only be overthrown by revolution and collectivisation of the 
means of production. Failure to realise domination by the proletariat resides in the ‘false con-
sciousness’ of the dominated class. Weber, on the other hand, gave a specific role to legalism in 
the production of social order in modern society. As such, social order could be institutionalised 
through a rational-legal authority which monopolised the use of legitimate force, i.e. the modern 
state (Weber, 1946). Through a body of generalised rules that cover all individuals equally, dom-
ination would become legitimised in the eyes of the dominated, similarly to domination via tradi-
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tion or charismatic leaders. To this end, a bureaucratic structure based on rational-legal princi-
ples would institutionalise domination, and political struggles for government in any political 
system (including collective bargaining systems) are basically a struggle over the legitimate 
forms of domination. The Weberian effect of formal institutions resides in legitimate domina-
tion. And while ownership of the means of production is important in this regard, it is not the 
only determinant of political struggles.  
Starting from a different vantage point, George Simmel (Simmel, 1950) stressed the im-
portance of going from dyads of actors to triads. For Simmel, triads were the basis of society as 
they fundamentally transform the social relationship between two parties by introducing an in-
termediary relationship from actor A to B through C. This creates the basis for group formations. 
Specifically for our purposes, a neutral/nonpartisan third party can be at the basis of social order 
for the following reasons. Firstly, a third party carries with her a promise of creating order out of 
conflict without stripping bargaining parties of their autonomy. In a world of free collective bar-
gaining, this promise is obviously intriguing. Secondly, ‘… because of the non-partisan, each 
party to the conflict not only listens to more objective matters but is also forced to put the issue 
in more objective terms than it would if it confronted the other without mediation. For now it is 
important to win over the mediator.’ (Simmel, 1950: 147). As such, third parties compel bargain-
ing parties to see with the eyes of the other, thus creating the basis for consensus where there was 
conflict. Thirdly, creating a unified mediation institution will counter divide and rule tactics of 
either side of the bargaining table, as the objective role of the third party will treat cases uniform-
ly according to a ‘general rule’ and not on an independent basis (Simmel, 1950: 164). 
Weber pointed out that social order requires institutionalisation and legitimacy and that the 
modern state – through its monopolisation of legitimate force – had achieved social order by the 
rule of rational law. This highlights the independent impact of formal regulation on actors’ be-
haviour and is thus at the basis of more recent theory of bureaucracy and institutions. Moreover, 
it highlights that institutions are not neutral but entail domination and thus resolve underlying 
conflicts in a certain manner. More recent theory shows that order is not external to actors but 
internalised by actors through cognitive and normative schemes. Foucault (1997) assigns a piv-
otal role to the state in defining the specific rationality by which actors are governed in a society. 
A specific ‘governmentality’ (Dean, 1999) based on political struggles over ‘the meaning of 
things’ constitutes what it entails to be an actor in certain settings, for example ‘the worker’ in a 
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company (Taylor and Bain, 1999). This, in turn, is the basis for social order since actors know 
their role in the order and become productive agents within that order.   
From economics, the issue of social order is approached in a different manner. Two essential 
issues from economics are relevant for this dissertation. Firstly, from game theory we learn that 
‘spontaneous order’ can occur when actors realise the gain from trading with each other and no 
important transaction costs are incurred. Order and cooperation is achieved because of the ‘shad-
ow of the future’ in which actors learn that they will face each other again and therefore should 
not cheat or harm the other (Axelrod, 1984). Conversely, new institutional economics (NIE) ar-
gues that in situations where transaction costs are high and actors might not meet again – for 
example in modern capitalist markets – institutions are needed to secure the terms of interac-
tions, i.e. certain actions which are allowed and certain ones which are disallowed, e.g. cheating. 
Order thus arises from rules of the game or institutions that make interaction possible because 
they ensure actors that they will gain from interactions with others (North, 1990). In other words, 
they reduce transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). By doing so, institutions produce order that 
leads to efficiency because it allows trade.    
The sources and functions of order are presented in the table below. To reiterate, social order 
has been treated as a Durkheimian function of interdependencies due to the need for cooperation 
in the division of labour (Durkheim, 1964). Each part of society relies on other parts of society to 
survive, which creates the ‘organic solidarity’ of order. Others pertaining to the conflict tradition 
have underlined that order entails domination. Marx (1999) explains domination via capital own-
ership, while Weber (1946) stresses the importance of legalism and institutionalisation of domi-
nation. Simmel stresses the role of third parties in resolving conflicts between parties as the basis 
for social order and thus the foundation of society. Recently, some scholars have stressed how 
actors internalise social order through internalisation of a specific governmentality (Foucault, 
1997), and they stress how the state especially produces a certain kind of domination that is both 
coercive and productive. Finally, NIE shows how, in a reality of transaction costs, order is based 
on institutions that make trade possible.   
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Table 1: Sources and functions of order 
 Durkheim  Weber Simmel Foucault NIE 
Source of 
order 
Interdependence 
between actors 
Institutions and 
legal authority 
Triadic relation-
ships 
Cognitive and 
normative schemes 
Institutions 
‘Function’ 
of order 
Organic solidarity Domination Conflict resolution Domination and 
production 
Enabling exchange 
 
All these approaches are potentially relevant for the study of social order in labour markets 
through collective agreements and will form a theoretical background for different parts of the 
dissertation as I elaborate in the papers. Specifically, however, I aim to show that mediation as a 
social form of interaction (Simmel, 1950: 21) can be vital in the production of social order be-
tween employers and employees. However, the focus of the dissertation is not the micro-
sociology of mediation as a social form of interaction. Rather, I see a link between Simmel’s 
work and Weber’s stress on a ‘body of generalised rules’, which in turn opens the way for insti-
tutionalisation of domination through specific third party institutions. Institutions are sometimes 
regarded as having Durkheimian or Williamsonian functions of producing either solidarity or 
efficiency, respectively (Thelen, 2012). There is no doubt that the NIE and Foucauldian perspec-
tives on institutional order are right – in their own specific ways – in arguing that order is effi-
cient. However, I also wish to stress the ‘Weberian’ function of institutions, that is, how they 
create domination between actors through power (Moe, 2005). I argue that mediation therefore 
has to be contextualised in view of its specific institutional foundations and practices. Indeed, 
collective bargaining in itself is a conflict resolution procedure (Flanders, 1968), and this places 
institutions, understood as the rules of the game or the humanly devised constraints on interac-
tion, front and centre for studies of collective bargaining as a mechanism of social order (North, 
1990). Third party intervention is accordingly another part of the institutional configuration that 
shapes collective bargaining processes and outcomes, but one that we need to understand better.   
 	
 
 
26
3. Collective bargaining as a mechanism of social order1 
This section reviews the literature of collective bargaining, from the founding scholars who were 
preoccupied with labour standards, to studies of horizontal coordination of bargaining and the 
preoccupation with national economic efficiency. I then proceed to show how coordination can 
be institutionalised before I outline how mediation as an institutionalised process of bargaining 
can facilitate coordination. Finally I propose how theories of institutional change might help us 
understand how horizontal bargaining coordination is created, sustained and changed. Through-
out the section I refer to the dissertation papers and how they relate to the literature.     
 
Foundations of Industrial Relations   
The purpose of this section is to present selected works that have defined IR as a field of study, 
from Commons and the Webbs and onwards. At the end of the section I outline which key ele-
ments from these works I apply in the analyses of the dissertation.       
IR early on defined itself as a field of study in opposition to the view of labour markets by 
classic economics. More than merely an expression of supply and demand, labour markets 
should be studied as they actually were instead of relying on abstract modelling. This position 
still holds true today (Kaufman, 1993; Colling and Terry, 2010). Commons (1909), studying 
shoemakers in the USA, was one of the first to put the actual regulation of market transactions at 
the core of labour market studies. He traced the various ways shoemakers protected themselves 
from market competition by restricting production and entry of inferior workmen into the trade, 
e.g. through cartelisation. He also showed how new technology and product market integration 
was able to erode this protection and that the constant product market developments required 
new regulation – something that did not resemble classic economics. By tracing the shoemakers 
through time, Commons portrayed trade unions as a defender of labour rights.  
In the UK, Sydney and Beatrice Webb (1920: 79-795) were preoccupied with the ‘labour 
problem’ and how to sustain a decent living for workers through legislation. Considering differ-
ent alternatives for different categories of workers, the Webbs preferred a ‘Common Rule’ by 
legislation of terms and conditions under which no worker would be forced to work. On top of 
this, the method of collective bargaining by trade unions for each trade should be used to ensure 
labour’s share of the economic surpluses being generated. The Webbs foresaw that common reg-
ulation would force employers to invest in productivity to remain profitable and that it would 
therefore be possible to combine decent work conditions with competitiveness. In both accounts, 
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social order in labour markets was achieved through collective action of rule-making by econom-
ic actors or governments that would ensure workers a fair share in an otherwise unequal ex-
change. Ultimately, the exchange was unequal due to the bargaining power of the few employers 
who owned machines and bureaucratic structures vis-à-vis the many workers who owned only 
their labour power (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980; Marx, 1999).  
The classic studies of Commons and the Webbs founded the IR field and its focus on collec-
tive bargaining as a rule-making procedure for regulating the employment relationship. There 
was, however, little theorisation in IR research, and it was typically focused on concrete work 
rules, the role of technology in work organisation, union behaviour and collective bargaining 
processes and outcomes (Kaufman, 1993). Dunlop (1958) proposed a ‘General Theory’ of IR 
which tried to square the circle in a scientific manner. IR should be seen as a subsystem of socie-
ty producing order in labour markets. For Dunlop, the dependent variable in IR is the ‘web of 
rules’ governing employment. Three sets of actors produce these webs: employees and their or-
ganisations (e.g. unions), employers and their organisations (e.g. employer associations), and 
governments. Rule-making is conditioned by the technological context, the market context and 
the power status of individuals in a given society. A given ideology binds the system together. 
Dunlop thus prioritised production of order and how different elements had a function in that 
order – resembling Talcott Parsons’ theory of social systems (1951) and Durkheim (1964). 
Moreover, the IR system matures when it functionally differentiates itself and finds ways to re-
produce itself in response to changing circumstances (Dunlop, 1958: 30). 
‘Across the pond’, scholars at Oxford University/University of Warwick from the 1950s to the 
1980s, most notably Hugh Clegg and Alan Flanders, studied the institutions of collective bar-
gaining (1976; 1968: respectively). Less devoted to any grand theory of IR in society, the British 
IR school tried to develop a middle-range theory of collective bargaining (Ackers, 2011). By 
comparing union behaviour under collective bargaining in six countries, Clegg (1976) showed 
that the most decisive factor for union behaviour was the structure of collective bargaining de-
fined as the extent of bargaining in labour markets and the level of bargaining, be it single-
employer, multi-employer or multi-industry bargaining. Importantly, the bargaining structure 
would affect the locus of power in trade unions, i.e. power would reside at the level where bar-
gaining takes place. Decisive for the structure of bargaining were employer recognition of unions 
and statutory regulation of collective bargaining. Keith Sisson (1987) reversed the question and 
asked how employers behave under collective bargaining. Sisson highlighted that the sine qua 
 
 
28
non reason for employers to bargain collectively was the neutralisation of conflicts at the work-
place by restricting bargaining to determination of terms and conditions. Market relations are 
bargained, while the managerial prerogative at the workplace is secured, which is a finding that 
echoes Dahrendorf’s hypothesis (1959: 269) that industrial conflicts would be institutionally 
isolated, ‘… robbed of their influence on other spheres of society’. Hence, the Oxford/Warwick 
school pushed the study of collective bargaining towards institutions and the ways in which sys-
tems or structures of collective bargaining have enduring effects on the behaviour of organised 
labour and capital. Conflicts are institutionalised, and the institutions of collective bargaining 
become the centrepiece for IR research (Ackers, 2011). 
More recently and due to considerable spells of institutional changes, most notably decentrali-
sation of wage bargaining, scholars at Massachusetts Institute of Technology proposed a strate-
gic choice perspective of industrial relations2 (Kochan et al., 1984; Kochan et al., 1994). Similar 
theoretical notions about strategic choices can be found in Sisson (1987) and Due et al. (1993). 
In the strategic choice model, management or employers play a more active role as opposed to 
being reactive to union demands for collective bargaining. It was thus acknowledged that em-
ployers can change the institutions of industrial relations in their favour but that this is contingent 
upon the economic and technological context. The supposedly shared ideology that binds sys-
tems between unions and employers together (Dunlop, 1958) is, in other words, nothing more 
than employers’ pragmatic consent to a specific situation of markets, technology and union pow-
er. Moreover, the authors argue that actors operate at different levels that together constitute an 
industrial relations system and that diverting attention to, for example, business strategy planning 
by company headquarters and macro-level economic and social policies will foster different em-
ployer interest in collective bargaining to a large extent. The strict focus on collective bargaining 
institutions is thus broadened to other strategic business areas and policy fields that impinge of 
the regulation of work and employment (Kochan et al., 1994: 17).  
It is beyond the scope of this introduction to discuss these works in any meaningful way. In-
stead, I wish to selectively focus on what I find most valuable for my analyses. From Commons 
and the Webbs, I take the notion that labour markets cannot and should not be studied as purely a 
function of supply and demand of labour power. In other words, we need to focus on concrete 
regulatory processes between market actors that strategically interact based on certain rules, that 
is, institutions. From Dunlop, I take that the ultimately, the dependent variable, or outcome, of 
interest is the ‘web of rules’ that govern employment. Three actors are pivotal in shaping these 
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webs; workers and their organisations, employers and their organisations, and the government. 
They do not interact to produce rules purely based on their strategies but are also conditioned by 
technology and markets. For example, technology will shape the skill level requirement of cer-
tain jobs that in turn will influence collective bargaining processes and outcomes. However, in 
contrast to Dunlop (1958) I do not see these rules as purely functional or integrating of the IR 
system. Rather, I follow Weber in seeing conflicts and institutionalisation of power relations 
between actors.  
I take from the Oxford/Warwick school that bargaining structure, i.e. the levels, coverage and 
depth of bargaining, is pivotal in distributing power among actors both within and across classes 
of labour and capital. Moreover, I take from this school that collective bargaining is used to es-
tablish market relations while attempting to exclude unions from managerial relations. By these 
means, conflicts in employment relations are ‘compartmentalised’ to a certain arena, viz. the 
collective bargaining arena with its own proper conflict resolution mechanisms that influence 
how and on what terms conflicts of interest are resolved in collective bargaining. Finally, I side 
with Kochan et al. (1984; 1994) in that collective bargaining systems cannot be seen in isolation 
from strategies at the macro-level. For example, macro-level economic policies that are adverse 
towards union wage demands can severely limit the strategies of unions in collective bargaining. 
Similarly, I agree that employers are not necessarily active supporters of collective bargaining 
and that they can be very strategic in pursuing managerial control should circumstances allow so. 
Therefore the notion of a shared ideology – as posited by Dunlop (1958) – should be replaced by 
multiple ideologies based on different worldviews about the regulation of employment that are 
potentially conflicting.  
In ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, ‘Bargaining in the crisis’, ‘In search of con-
trol’ and ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’, I use these foundations to analyse bar-
gaining coordination with specific attention to third party intervention. I take as a point of depar-
ture that collective bargaining to a large extent compartmentalises conflicts, excluding conflicts 
over the organisation of work, i.e. managerial relations. Conflicts pertain to market relations over 
the terms and conditions of paid employment. In turn, and as I show in the following section, 
control over market relations become a key concern during the 20th century as international trade 
and economic integration increases interdependencies between actors within national bargaining 
systems. With my papers, I wish to show that third party intervention obtains a specific role in 
collective bargaining when coordination of bargaining becomes an economic prerogative. In 
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contrast to incomes policies, it acknowledges the bargaining autonomy of social partners while at 
the same time inducing discipline on the part of especially – but not exclusively – powerful trade 
unions. Therefore, in a context where unions have enjoyed high legitimacy, third party interven-
tion can be beneficial in creating order in market relations without stripping actors of their bar-
gaining autonomy. In order to make this argument, however, we need to know why the control 
over market relations becomes important and what is at stake for different actors. 
           
Coordination as an economic prerogative 
In this section, I outline the historical background of coordination as an economic prerogative 
and how it has been treated in selected works. The purpose is to present the main conflicts of 
interest in collective bargaining and how they are potentially solved through coordination.  
As collective bargaining between unions and employer associations proliferated across West-
ern advanced democracies during the 20th century, so did scholarly interest in the economic ef-
fects of collective bargaining. One explanation for this was World War II and the need for eco-
nomic planning experienced during war times. The large role of US government intervention in 
manpower activities during World War II underscores the importance of planning in employ-
ment matters (Baron et al., 1986). During the booming post-war years, labour scarcity became a 
threat to price stability and growth. The threat of wage inflation persisted in driving up labour 
costs and ultimately production costs, as goods and services became increasingly expensive, 
eventually resulting in rising unemployment – as illustrated by the Phillips curve (Borjas, 2000). 
Wage moderation became the name of the game in Keynesian full-employment policies. Collec-
tive bargaining could alleviate this: Instead of providing a wage floor, collective agreements be-
come a wage ceiling (Swenson, 2002). The influential books by Mancur Olson (1965; 1982), 
however, pointed out the intrinsic collective action problem in this: Collective agreements are a 
collective good that are non-rival and non-exclusive. Once established, individual actors can 
enjoy them at no cost to other actors, and it is impossible to exclude individual actors from en-
joying them. This makes it easy for individual actors to free-ride, i.e. stop contributing to the 
production of the collective good. Put differently, once a ceiling on wages is established, indi-
vidual bargaining areas can settle higher and thus reap comparative advantages. 
In a context of growing international trade, the collective action problem in wage bargaining 
becomes acute due to interdependencies between those industries which are exposed to interna-
tional competition and those which are not. Exposed sectors cannot pass on increasing labour 
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costs to consumers as they are operating in international markets – they are price takers, so to 
speak. Sheltered sectors, on the other hand, operate in home markets in which they are price set-
ters and can somewhat cartelise prices through collective agreements (Traxler, 2003b). Increas-
ing labour costs can therefore be passed on to consumers, including exposed companies, without 
reducing demand due to lack of competition. In turn, pay hikes in sheltered sectors constitute an 
increased external cost on exposed sectors; i.e. free-riding on wage ceilings constitutes a nega-
tive externality for exposed companies. Conversely, sheltered sectors in Western economies are 
increasingly dependent on the wealth generated from international trade and exports. As a corol-
lary, wage moderation and its positive effects on growth and unemployment in a national econ-
omy can only be achieved through some sort of coordination between exposed and sheltered 
sectors due to their interdependence. Collective bargaining not only instils a certain order be-
tween employers and employees, but also between companies of different industries. As Com-
mons (1909) demonstrated long ago, product market integration would spur the need for new 
control measures to protect the very actors involved in markets (see also Polanyi, 1944). 
The interests in coordination of collective bargaining, nevertheless, differ and can give rise to 
cross-class alliance between capital and labour organisations (Swenson, 1991; Swenson and 
Pontusson, 2000). In tight product markets with low skill requirements, employers are usually 
interested in using collective agreements ‘to take wages out of competition’, while unions pursue 
standardised rates for employment (Swenson, 2002). Swenson uses the term ‘cartelist’ employers 
for those who aim to cartelise the product market with the use of unions and collective bargain-
ing. In slack product markets with high skill requirements, employers are interested in paying 
above market rates to attract the best and the brightest. Occupational unions representing these 
workers are easy to persuade. These employers are called ‘segmentalists’. Finally, employers in 
tight product markets with high skill requirements are interested in flexible wages due to flexible 
production systems but are wary of giving bargaining a free hand due to their interest in cost 
control. In other words, they wish to control the wages of others but want some leeway in setting 
their own wages in order to attract highly skilled labour. Swenson (2002) calls these employers 
‘solidaristic’ because they aim to coordinate bargaining around collective wage moderation. By 
coupling skill requirements with the issue of exposure to international competition, Iversen 
(1996) shows that sheltered sectors with segmentalist employers are privileged in the sense that 
they can easily externalise pay hikes to consumers. Moreover, they have an interest in doing so 
in order to attract labour. Conversely, employers in sheltered sectors with low skill requirements 
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will have an easier time rejecting pay hikes, but this is contingent upon the strength of trade un-
ions representing low-skilled workers. Employers and unions in exposed sectors – both for low-
skilled and high-skilled workers – have an uniform interest in coordination between industries to 
curb costs through wage ceilings but also to put a floor under wages.           
These fundamental conflicts of interest and coordination problems spurred numerous publica-
tions on the relationship between the organisation of interest representation and macroeconomic 
outcomes, most notably inflation and employment (e.g. Olson, 1982; Bruno and Sachs, 1985). 
Corporatism seemed to offer a solution. By centralising bargaining structures and therefore deci-
sion-making power in encompassing organisations, pay hikes are internalised. Centralisation, in 
other words, disciplines capital and labour (Schmitter, 1974). This led scholars to propose that 
the beneficial effects of collective bargaining structures would monotonically increase with the 
degree to which organisations are encompassing (Bruno and Sachs, 1985; Cameron, 1984). As 
such, the Swedish model of solidaristic wage bargaining in the 1950s-1970s was exemplary due 
to its compression of wage structures resulting in economic growth and equality. Calmfors & 
Driffil (1988), however, challenged this view and presented the ‘hump-shaped thesis’. They ar-
gued that wage moderation could be achieved either through complete decentralisation of bar-
gaining, whereby market discipline would moderate wages, or through encompassing and cen-
tralised bargaining, whereby pay hikes are internalised. Intermediate bargaining at the industry 
level, on the other hand, would have negative effects on wage moderation due to negative exter-
nalities as noted above.          
Soskice (1990) argued that, rather than centralisation, what matters is coordination between 
bargaining units. At the core of this argument is compliance by different actors at different levels 
to similar bargaining results that moderate wages. Iversen (1999) and Traxler et al. (2001) 
showed that both horizontal and vertical coordination are necessary for wage moderation. Verti-
cal coordination means that lower level bargaining, say at the industry and company level, com-
plies with higher level agreements within bargaining units. Without this, wage drift and wage 
inflation spirals might occur. With greater centralisation there is a greater risk of vertical compli-
ance problems as decisions become remote for the concerned actors (Traxler and Brandl, 2012). 
Horizontal coordination between separate bargaining units means that similar bargaining results 
prevail across different industries. In centralised peak-level bargaining, wage moderation be-
comes an internal political issue according to the median affiliate (Traxler and Brandl, 2012). 
Peak-level confederations that are dominated by exposed sector organisations have a chance of 
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dominating the sheltered sector organisations. Vertical and horizontal coordination, moreover, 
interact. If vertical compliance is low, horizontal coordination can break down as some industries 
want to catch up with wage drift in other industries. Vertical compliance thus becomes necessary 
for horizontal coordination to work. In turn, Traxler & Brandl (2012) and Brandl (2012) show 
that coordinated intermediate level bargaining can actually work as long as vertical compliance 
mechanisms are effective. This result refutes the ‘hump-shaped thesis’ by Calmfors & Driffil 
(1988).     
Decentralisation of wage bargaining to a mixture of industry and company-level bargaining 
involves a recalibration of collective agreements at industry level that now take on the form of 
‘framework agreements’, which establish procedural or substantive boundaries for company-
level bargaining – so-called ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler, 1995; Sisson and Marginson, 
2002) or ‘centralised decentralisation’ (Due et al., 1993). In the absence of peak-level solidaristic 
wage bargaining, workers in slack labour markets and tight product markets (often due to inter-
national exposure) run the risk of downward pressure on wages and coercive comparisons by 
employers (Hancké, 2000). In other words, there is a risk of both negative externalities and a 
‘race to the bottom’ of labour standards. For some scholars, the key players in averting this situa-
tion are employers and unions in the exposed manufacturing sector (Iversen, 1996; Traxler et al., 
2008; Swenson, 1991). Comprising both low-skilled and high-skilled workers, they share an in-
terest in solving both problems of negative externalities and the race to the bottom. By installing 
controls over company-level bargaining through framework agreements at industry level, there is 
both room for flexibility and control over wages. Relative wage differentials can be used to at-
tract highly skilled labour – but within reason – while the floor under wages secures low skilled 
workers. The two interrelated issues of vertical and horizontal coordination are, nevertheless, 
complicated by the erosion of peak-level bargaining during the 1980s. A new system of coordi-
nation, or order, has to be built around wage moderation, flexibility and equality that caters to the 
interests of the exposed industries but that is also legitimate in the eyes of sheltered sectors that 
retain their bargaining autonomy (Due et al., 1993; Traxler et al., 2008; Kjellberg, 2009). This is 
what I call a challenge of institutional design in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’. In 
the next section, I show how the different approaches can help us identify the relevant dimen-
sions and causal mechanisms inherent in coordination. 
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The phenomenon and institutionalisation of coordination 
The purpose of this section is to define the phenomenon of coordination using institutionalist 
concepts. By showing the different dimensions of coordination I go on to delimit my study of 
coordination. Finally, I present some selected works on how coordination in bargaining is creat-
ed and sustained and what I take away from these works regarding the causal mechanisms inher-
ent in coordination. In order to get an idea of the phenomenon of coordination, the basic frame-
work by Sisson and Marginson (2002: 200) is instructive. These authors distinguish between the 
level, forms, processes and depths of coordination, thus identifying the relevant dimensions of 
the phenomenon as seen in table 2 below, which I have adapted slightly.  
 
Table 2: Dimensions of coordinated bargaining as a process 
Levels 
 
Coverage 
‐ Single employer 
o Division 
o Group 
‐ Multi-employer 
o Single-sector 
o Multi-sector 
Agency 
‐ Associational 
‐ Non-associational 
‐ Trade unions 
‐ Work councils 
Geographical reach 
‐ Sub-national 
‐ National 
‐ Cross-border 
Forms 
 
‐ Unilateral 
‐ Joint 
o Bipartite 
o Tripartite (e.g. social 
pacts) 
‐ State-imposed 
o Incomes policy 
 
Processes 
 
‐ Information exchange 
‐ Benchmarking 
‐ Target setting 
‐ Pattern bargaining 
‐ Synchronised bargaining 
‐ Discourse formation 
 
Depth 
 
‐ Substantive issues in agreements 
 
 
Levels basically encapsulates the bargaining and organisation structures of coordination in a giv-
en country, i.e. who (workers and employers) is covered by coordination and where. Clearly, the 
nature of coordination – and the problems of collective action – differs between single employer 
coordination to multi-employer coverage and so on. Likewise the agency, i.e. the organisation 
structure, matters as different traditions for organisation of employers in associations and work-
ers in trade unions apply. Also here the nature and problems of collective action differ. Finally, 
geographical reach is of interest as coordination can happen both within and across borders – 
although the latter is obviously less common.  
Three forms can be distinguished. Unilateral coordination involves singular efforts of either 
employers or trade unions to coordinate wages, terms and conditions. In joint coordination, the 
bipartite sub-form is the typical form of coordination in Europe where employer associations and 
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trade unions conclude, e.g., framework agreements which are then implemented at workplace 
level with more or less discretion – so-called ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler 1995). In the 
tripartite form, government actively participates in facilitating agreements, e.g. by exchanging 
wage moderation for changes in employment/social policies or giving tax breaks in social pacts. 
Finally, state-imposed coordination involves government intervention of wage bargaining direct-
ly through statutes.  
Turning to processes, the authors identify five types ranging from highly informal to more 
formalised. Information exchange can be a more or less routinised activity of employers, trade 
unions and even workers. Information is constantly exchanged in collective bargaining as an 
essential tool for knowing where the other bargaining areas are and where the cost norm ‘is 
heading’. Benchmarking is a more formalised process which focuses on systematic comparison 
on given indicators. This process is widely used in the European Union, but can also be used in 
bargaining coordination as social partners try to navigate the muddled knowledge of the labour 
market across different companies, occupations, sectors and countries. Target setting is also a 
formalised process involving name-giving to certain aims for coordination, e.g. a wage claim 
securing real wage growth while avoiding wage-push inflation. Pattern bargaining – the primary 
focus of the paper ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ – involves pattern setting and 
pattern taking by certain industries. Synchronised bargaining refers to bargaining in several bar-
gaining units simultaneously around some common bargaining platform. Finally, in addition to 
the original framework, ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’  shows the importance of 
the process of discourse formation, in which actors define their shared problems, e.g. inflation or 
wage inequality, in discursive games prior to or during negotiations (Pedersen, 1989).   
Lastly, depth refers to the substantive issues covered by coordination. It matters whether coor-
dination only includes wage increases or also non-wage issues like working time, pension, holi-
days, training and education, etc. The inclusion of non-wage but cost-driving issues in bargain-
ing complicates coordination across sectors, but it can also facilitate agreement through package 
deals (Scharpf, 1997).  
Building on the framework of Sisson and Marginson (2002), the object of coordination in this 
dissertation, viz. its analytical dimensions, can be summarised as seen in the table:  
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Table 3: Object of coordination 
Levels Forms Processes Depth 
Multi-employer/ 
Multi-industry 
 
Employer associations/trade 
unions & union cartels 
 
National (w. reference to 
cross-border) 
Joint bipartite w. state in 
procedural role as conciliator, 
mediator (not arbitrator) 
Information exchange 
Target setting 
Pattern bargaining 
Mediation 
Wages and non-wage issues 
 
 
 
I focus on multi-employer/multi-industry horizontal coordination with reference to vertical coor-
dination when applicable. The level of analysis is both organisational for industries and national. 
I analyse coordination that is bipartite but in which the state plays a crucial procedural role 
through third party intervention by means of conciliation and mediation. I do not consider arbi-
tration, except in ‘In search of control’. The processes of coordination include information ex-
changes between parties, target setting through public deliberation over the scope for wage in-
creases, pattern bargaining with manufacturing going first and, of course, mediation. I do not see 
these processes as being mutually exclusive as real coordinated bargaining processes entail more 
than one process, as I show in the papers on Swedish and Danish bargaining. The depth of coor-
dination includes both wage and non-wage issues, which have become very important in the 
wake of wage decentralisation and the broadening of scope to social and employment policy 
issues (Due and Madsen, 2006; Trampusch, 2007).   
Turning to the question of how horizontal coordination is created and sustained, some main 
contributions can be noted for their analytical relevance for this dissertation. It is beyond the 
scope of this introduction to review all relevant literature, and in ‘Three approaches to coordinat-
ed bargaining’ , I treat the different theoretical approaches more thoroughly. Firstly, Katzenstein 
(1985) argues that the solution to this challenge lies in corporatist decision-making itself. Study-
ing seven small open economies in Europe, he argues that they ‘… adapt domestically to eco-
nomic change imposed by an international economy that they cannot hope to control… …the 
relations between business, the unions and the state are organized in a manner that compromises 
the logic both of unmitigated market competition and of decisive state intervention… [it is] the 
politics of neither liberalism nor statism but corporatism.’ (Katzenstein, 1985: 200). For Katzen-
stein, it is economic vulnerability that lies behind the ability to coordinate. While this work is 
generally useful to identify a certain political dynamic in small European states, it is nonetheless 
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too broad to specify what goes on in collective bargaining coordination. As such, it can be used 
as a theoretical canvas for more specific approaches.  
Secondly, Traxler et al. (2008) study pattern bargaining in Austria. The authors argue that the 
process is characterised by power, latency and non-intentionality. Power relations should be such 
that the exposed sector yields power over other sheltered sectors: ‘As bargaining is a process of 
interest intermediation, we can rule out preponderance of values, which are incongruent with 
interests. This leaves compulsion as a determinant of compliance, aside from interests.’ (Traxler 
et al. 2008: 40). Therefore, power is a necessary condition, and it is based on the size and im-
portance of the exposed sector for the economy together with organisational density and concen-
tration, the latter prerequisite akin to the median affiliate thesis under centralised bargaining. I 
discuss this concept of power in the ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ paper. Mer-
gers by unions and employers associations, respectively, in manufacturing strengthen this power 
(Iversen, 1996; Marsden, 1999). Secondly, the exercise of power must be latent and non-
intentional in order not to compromise bargaining autonomy of other bargaining units. In the 
absence of higher-order authority, power over other bargaining units should not be too manifest. 
Finally, the exposed sector must show self-constraint – also true in company-level bargaining – 
even though it typically has higher productivity increases relative to other sectors due to capi-
tal/labour ratios. In this way, counter claims in subsequent wage bargaining by other sectors can 
be avoided.      
Thirdly, the approach taken in Due et al. (1993) is ultimately institutional showing how the 
bargaining relations between social partners in Denmark are institutionalised. They side with 
Sisson (1987) and Swenson (1991) in arguing that employers were the key drivers for bargaining 
centralisation due to the risk of union ‘whipsawing’ tactics under company-level bargaining in 
the early 20th century. Furthermore, they give special priority to a relational view in which un-
ions and employer associations derive legitimacy from their interrelations, which in turn prompts 
them to pursue strategies that reinforce collective bargaining. In the wake of peak-level bargain-
ing, they argue that a strong cross-class alliance between merged employer associations and 
merged unions in manufacturing created a new system of industry-level bargaining – so-called 
centralised decentralisation – which paradoxically compromises both decentralisation and cen-
tralisation. It is centralised because of concentrated interest representation in manufacturing and 
because confederations retain a coordinative role in bargaining to ensure horizontal coordination 
around the key bargaining sector. An analysis by Iversen (1996: 423) concurs. Moreover, media-
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tion plays an important role in Due et al.’s analysis, as I show in ‘Did mediation save coordinat-
ed bargaining’. The bargaining model is decentralised because wages and working time to a 
large extent are negotiated at company level. Moreover, their concept of ‘centralised decentrali-
sation’ involves a cultural reproduction of industry-level bargaining practices at the company 
level. This can only be achieved through strong shop stewards who are trained by unions in con-
sensual bargaining (Due et al., 1993; Kjellberg, 2009). Additional controls on decentralisation 
reside in specific procedural requirements for company-level bargaining. For example, the peace 
obligation precludes industrial action while the industry-level agreement is in force. Moreover, 
local agreements can only be renegotiated every year. Finally, cases of company-level conflicts 
are referred upwards to local branches, organisation headquarters and ultimately the conflict reg-
ulation systems – the labour court and industrial arbitration tribunals. Accordingly, it is a special 
case of the ‘organised decentralisation’ that Traxler writes about (1995). 
Fourthly, other Scandinavian scholars have pointed out the ways in which discourses on how 
the economy works affect bargaining coordination (Pedersen, 1989; Elvander, 1989). In what is 
called the ‘negotiation economy’, organised actors strategically interact having been conditioned 
by a shared discourse that provides a common understanding of socioeconomic problems (Peder-
sen, 2006: 248). Based on welfare economics, all political decisions, including collective bar-
gaining, are measured and judged according to whether they contribute positively to the econo-
my at large. This discourse defines both what is desirable and how to get it. Historically, the dis-
course arises from the small state/open economy trajectory (Katzenstein, 1985) and governmen-
tal inquiries that define interdependencies and control of externalities as the keys to success. In 
addition, it gives great importance to government collectivisation of risks through the welfare 
state, while accepting ordered voluntarist industrial relations – akin to the Rehn-Meidner model 
(Erixon, 2010). In turn, it becomes extremely difficult for actors to ‘argue’ for policies that are 
opportunistic, e.g. defection. It simply doesn’t make sense. In times of economic crisis, actors 
will investigate and eventually rally around new prescripts that can restore the ‘economy-wide 
imagination’ through collective actions. This is why centralised bargaining was replaced by a 
competitive pattern bargaining system that allowed for flexible wages and wage moderation at 
the same time. Negotiation (not markets), coordination (not unilateral action) and collective ad-
aptation (not stasis) are the key regulatory processes through which society as a whole prospers 
(Pedersen, 2006: 250; Katzenstein, 1985: 200).         
39 
 
Finally, Culpepper’s (2008) account on changes in wage bargaining in Ireland and Italy also 
employs the role of ideas in bargaining coordination and the role of government. According to 
his study, the transition in Ireland to social partnership and the end of scala mobile indexation in 
Italy was sparked by crucial common knowledge events in which the actors realised new ways of 
pursuing their exogenously given interests. By mimicking the logic of wage bargaining in small 
open economies like Austria and Norway, Ireland – also a small open economy – was able to 
restore cost competitiveness and secure workers’ income. In Italy, credible inflation forecasts 
paved the way for coordinated industry-level bargaining. This changed the preference order of 
social partners on bargaining institutions because they were endowed with new common 
knowledge, which reset mutual expectations of each other’s actions (Culpepper, 2008: 8). New 
assumptions about how the economy works made actors realign to bargaining coordination, and 
since the knowledge is inter-subjectively shared, it becomes very hard for individual actors to 
argue against it – let alone defect from its logic.     
The approaches to horizontal bargaining coordination thus differ in the causal mechanism 
leading to order in collective bargaining: power differentials, institutions regulating relations 
between social partners, and discourses, respectively. I address these different approaches in 
‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , but here I want to draw out two points. Firstly, I 
find the use of discourse or ideas instructive in making sense of actors’ framing of problems to 
solve in coordination. If unions and employers share perceptions of, for example, wage inflation, 
then coordination around wage moderation will, ceteris paribus, be easier. This does not imply 
that material interests are inconsequential and that studying meaning structures is the only legit-
imate goal in studies of bargaining coordination. It simply means that the framing of actors’ in-
terest is based upon certain ideas about how the world works and what is desirable for bargaining 
coordination. As noted in the beginning, unions can frame bargaining coordination in terms of 
equality because different industries will receive more or less the same, while employer associa-
tions can claim control over wage developments. I find the balancing of these concerns to be one 
of the most interesting aspects of bargaining coordination.       
Secondly, while I find Traxler et al.’s (2008) and Iversen’s (1996) argument about power dif-
ferentials important, I believe that the point of departure for any study of bargaining coordination 
should be institutional. Power differentials based on the economic importance of the exposed 
sector, as well as organisational power in terms of density and concentration of manufacturing, 
cannot fully capture the political process of coordination. Traxler et al. (2008) remark that the 
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system of pattern bargaining in Austria is not formalised anywhere, but this does not preclude 
the role of institutions as the foundation for coordination. Arguably, different systems of coordi-
nation can be more or less formalised, but as Traxler (Traxler, 2003a) himself argues, other insti-
tutions like erga omnes clauses or industrial action regulation can work as preconditions for co-
ordinated bargaining. However, with the exception of Due et al. (1993), third party intervention 
in collective bargaining does not figure prominently in institutionalist accounts of bargaining 
coordination. It is to this issue that I now turn. 
  
Mediation as a coordinative process 
The purpose of this section is to present theories of mediation in collective bargaining and to 
couple insights from behavioural approaches with institutionalist approaches to mediation. This 
leads to an outline of the underlying framework for understanding how mediation purpose and 
capabilities can influence horizontal bargaining coordination.     
I find it analytically instructive to regard third party intervention both as a behavioural process 
and as an institutionalised process. This does not mean that the two are distinct, but rather that 
they emphasise different conceptual aspects of intervention in collective bargaining. The behav-
ioural approach focuses on the techniques, strategies, tactics, personal qualities, styles, etc. of the 
third party (e.g. Carnevale, 1986; Kressel and Pruitt, 1985). This is usually the approach adopted 
by US-based studies, which also comprise ethnographic observation studies of bargaining pro-
cesses (Kolb, 1983), surveys of mediation practices and success (e.g. Kochan and Jick, 1978), 
and case studies (e.g. Rojot et al., 2005), together with many prescriptive works on how to inter-
vene successfully (Bingham, 2004; Fisher and Ury, 1981; Vindeløv, 2008). The institutionalist 
approach, on the other hand, stresses the formal conditions for interventions, i.e. the mandates, 
capabilities and purposes on which intervention is based. In the paper ‘In search of control’, I 
strictly abide by a narrow institutionalist approach to calibrate formal strength of third party in-
tervention across 17 European countries. However, in the other papers, I mix the two approach-
es.  
To paraphrase Galenson (1955) and Due et al. (1993), third party intervention can be the cru-
cial stage of collective bargaining as it is the last stage of bargaining in which parties have not 
yet caved in to the demands of the counterpart. In coordinated systems, this makes mediation 
even more important. However, the importance of third party intervention hinges upon the man-
dates and capabilities of the intervener: What are his or her powers? In formalistic institutionalist 
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terms, the key dimensions used to categorise third party intervention are: 1) the capability of 
settling disputes, and 2) whether interventions are compulsory or voluntary to the bargaining 
parties. Stokke (1998) summarises this in the following stylised matrix: 
 
Table 4: Categorisation of third party intervention 
 Agreement a result of parties w. 
third party help 
Agreement a result of proposal 
by third party 
Agreement a result of third 
party decision 
Voluntary 
  
Voluntary conciliation Voluntary mediation Voluntary arbitration 
Compulsory  
 
Compulsory conciliation Compulsory mediation Compulsory arbitration 
 
Conciliation refers to activities that bring conflicting parties back to the bargaining table, typical-
ly at a bargaining impasse. Conciliatory activities include, for example, information sharing, 
deliberation and persuasion, but the third party cannot propose settlements. The bargaining par-
ties more or less have control over the process, but they have complete control over the proposals 
and counterproposals. Mediation also consists of conciliatory activities, but in mediation the 
third party is able to propose settlements that parties can decide on. They do not have to accept 
mediator proposals, and more often than not, they settle on their own. In other instances, howev-
er, simply because the mediator has the capacity to make a proposal, bargaining parties antici-
pate this and try to influence the direction of the proposals. This obviously enhances the power 
of the mediator, as I will elaborate below. Arbitration involves the possibility of making binding 
awards to the parties, i.e. giving the third party final decision-making power. The competence of 
the third party to make binding awards ultimately rests on the perceived legitimacy of the third 
party, as Weber would argue. In free collective bargaining, compulsory arbitration in conflicts of 
interest is rather rare, as I show in ‘In search of control’.  
Voluntary arrangements involve an offer of third party assistance to bargaining parties that 
have reached a stalemate in bargaining. They can decline this offer. Some systems require that at 
least one party makes a request for third party assistance. Compulsory arrangements obviously 
compel parties to accept third party intervention. Systems differ on whether compulsion requires 
certain processes to happen, such as a notification of industrial action or simply a bargaining 
impasse.        
As noted above, the literature and theory development on mediation behaviour is primarily 
US-based although there are notable exceptions. Does this make it ill-suited for horizontally co-
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ordinated bargaining systems? No. In the following I will show how the mediation literature can 
be of value to studies of bargaining coordination.  
Kerr (1954), one of the leading IR scholars of Dunlop’s generation, contends that the media-
tor’s primary technique is reducing irrationality in the bargaining situation. This is similar to 
Simmel’s argument. Kerr goes on to argue that mediators typically insist on establishing and 
referring to common information on key economic circumstances for bargaining, e.g. inflation 
rates, productivity rates, unemployment rates, wage drift, revenue of companies, etc. If bargain-
ing has a ‘logic of information’ (Culpepper, 2002; Coase, 1937) by which agreements can be 
achieved when parties exchange vital information, then mediators are helpful in this regard 
(Fisher and Ury, 1981). This also involves gaining the confidence of bargaining parties, for ex-
ample through separate meetings (Kolb, 1983). In this way, the actual limits of the bargaining 
positions can be known, and the mediator – through the virtue of knowing each side – can figure 
out where the common ground is. As I show in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , 
information, however, is not necessarily neutral, and the ordering of different types of infor-
mation becomes pivotal. Thus, if mediators give great weight to international wage differentials, 
this will be helpful for the exposed sector. Conversely, if mediators give great weight to domes-
tic wage differentials, this might undermine wage moderation. The ‘Did mediation save coordi-
nated bargaining’ paper shows that this issue is largely solved institutionally in Sweden and 
Denmark.    
Thomas C. Schelling (1960) provides a very influential contribution to the issue of mediation. 
He argues that ‘focal points’ in negotiations alleviate a situation in which parties have a multi-
tude of possible agreements. Focal points fix the negotiations to certain areas of the agreement 
zone, which greatly reduces the number of possible agreements. Schelling (1960: 144) argues 
that third parties can help in this regard: ‘When there is no apparent focal point for agreement he 
or she can create one by his power to make a dramatic suggestion’. This is a kind of agenda-
setting power that will force bargaining parties to focus on a specific agreement zone. Moreover, 
mediators can do this by referencing a specific piece of information, as noted above. For exam-
ple, the mediator can reference wage increases in neighbouring countries and indeed in the man-
ufacturing agreements, provided these have been settled first. A focal point is thus set by the 
mere communication of the mediator. As I show in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ 
and in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , this technique is directly institutionalised 
in Swedish and Danish mediation through the sequencing of bargaining areas and by pegging the 
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mediator proposals to the cost norm agreed to in manufacturing. In this way, there is nothing 
‘dramatic’ about it.      
A fourth technique is time management and setting deadlines after which conflict is inevitable. 
By setting short deadlines, parties are forced to figure out a solution, and the risk of imminent 
conflict might persuade them to make larger concessions than they would otherwise be willing to 
make. In coordinated systems this is usually achieved by setting uniform deadlines on agreement 
periods; i.e. agreements expire and are renewed simultaneously (Sisson & Marginson, 2002). 
Mediation then typically commences at a predetermined time in order to end all negotiations on a 
common date. By referring to other bargaining units that have already concluded negotiations, 
mediators can put pressure on the remaining units. A related technique is making the positions of 
bargaining parties known to the public (Kerr, 1954). While very controversial, such public ‘nam-
ing and shaming’ (or the threat thereof) can discipline bargaining parties as they endure public 
scrutiny for defections from the common rule. As noted in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bar-
gaining’, there is now a possibility for ‘public deliberations’ in Swedish manufacturing if a bar-
gaining unit has not settled along with the others. Therefore, if a bargaining party wishes to de-
fect, then the reasons for this must be publicly known and potentially scrutinised.     
Mediators also play a role in intra-organisational bargaining of unions and employers associa-
tions as ‘scapegoats’ (Kerr, 1954; Walton and McKersie, 1965). By proposing a settlement that 
is highly unsatisfactory for the constituency of a bargaining party, this bargaining party can shift 
the blame to the mediator. In reality, the proposal is the only feasible bargaining result, but the 
constituency is asking its leaders for more; i.e. there is no overlap between the inter-
organisational and intra-organisational agreement zones. If mediators present a ‘take it or leave 
it’ proposal, constituencies are left with the difficult choice of approving the result or commenc-
ing industrial action. Leaders, on the other hand, can blame mediators and thereby retreat hon-
ourably (Koefoed Bjørnsen, 2006), saying that they did everything possible and that now only 
conflict remains. Leaders – with their privileged knowledge from the bargaining table – try to 
convince their constituency that conflict entails great risks and that the potential benefits are 
minimal now that the other party can adopt the mediator proposal as a fair solution. However, 
the blame for this situation is squarely placed on the mediator. The scapegoat role is present in 
both Denmark and Sweden and is often used in horizontal bargaining coordination when union 
leaders in booming industries accept wage moderation to the discontentment of their constituen-
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cy. Conversely, employer associations use mediators as scapegoats when their constituency de-
mands wage reductions due to tight product markets, as we show in ‘Bargaining in the crisis’.     
The success of different techniques on settlement rates has been attributed to many different 
factors. Kochan & Jick (1978) survey a large number of mediation processes and try to explain 
success of mediation with sources of impasse (the nature of conflict), mediator strategies and 
characteristics, and procedures for mediation. They end up concluding that mediation is second-
ary to the experience of negotiators. Kolb (1983) is more positive on the impact of mediators, 
arguing that there are two types of mediators: dealmakers and orchestrators. The former actively 
makes suggestions to bargaining parties on how to make offers and counteroffers and will even 
manipulate parties to reach agreements. The latter view their role as assisting parties to reach 
agreements and encouraging parties to explore common ground, rather than actively telling them 
what to do. Both are influential for bargaining settlements but in different ways and with differ-
ent experiences of mediation by the parties. Recently, conflict studies of international relations 
have shown that non-neutral mediators, i.e. parties with a specific settlement in mind, are more 
effective in producing agreements (Carnevale and Arad, 1996). This is because they are more 
focused and have a clearer sense of direction in the mediation process. Moreover, they are typi-
cally facing an incentive structure – not necessarily pecuniary – that binds them to the politically 
defined goal. As I show in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ this issue is actually 
essential in horizontal coordination, albeit in different ways for Sweden and Denmark.  
The issue of neutrality in mediation is directly linked to its institutionalised purpose. Two ma-
jor purposes of mediation in coordinated bargaining systems can be identified (Stokke, 1998). 
The first is the procurement of labour peace (Brown, 2004). It almost goes without saying that 
third party intervention in collective bargaining is designed to avoid labour conflicts. Labour 
peace is regarded a collective good in itself as work stoppages constitute loss of economic activi-
ty and potential loss of income3. If labour peace is the primary purpose, it follows that we should 
expect a mediator proposal, ceteris paribus, to reflect the interests of the stronger party because 
otherwise it is doomed to be rejected. Secondly, third party intervention can have explicit politi-
cal-economic purposes; that is, a certain kind of agreement might be built into the mandate of 
mediation. For example, mediation might be designed to protect the weaker bargaining party to 
avoid bargaining results that effectively crush one party. Alternatively, it might be designed 
simply to be split evenly between opposing parties’ demands. Finally, mediation might be de-
signed to protect macroeconomic stability, which brings us closer to the aims of horizontal coor-
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dination. As I show in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, Sweden and Denmark for-
mally differ on this point. In Denmark, mediators are formally restricted to secure labour peace, 
but de facto they are involved in wage moderation. In Sweden, mediators are formally responsi-
ble for sound wage developments. Thus, in contrast to US-based literature on mediation at the 
workplace level, mediation in coordinated bargaining systems takes on systemic purposes. 
Based on bargaining theory (I primarily build on the insigts of Elster, 1989a; Crouch, 1993; 
Walton and McKersie, 1965; Scharpf, 1997), we can now arrive at a theorisation of the coordina-
tive effect of mediation in horizontal coordination. I illustrate the effect of mediator purpose with 
a decision tree (see below) that explains the strategic decision points which parties in sheltered 
sectors face with different mediation institutions. The decision tree therefore spells out the logic 
on which my analyses in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and ‘Bargaining in the 
crisis’ are based on. In doing so, this section elucidates my papers by showing theoretical expec-
tations of the coordinative effect of mediation. The crucial distinction is made between neutral 
mediators whose only purpose is labour peace, regardless of the outcome, and biased mediators 
whose purpose is to broker settlements in line with sound wage developments which, in this re-
gard, conform to the manufacturing norm.  
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Figure 1: Decision tree for privileged alliance 
 
Payoffs: [employer; union] 
Employer  Union 
Costs  Benefits  Costs Benefits 
Concession:                                   5 Manufacturing norm:                  20 Strike:                                           5 Manufacturing norm:                     15
Strike:                                           10 Scapegoat if neutral mediator:   2 Transaction cost mediation:    1 Benefit of breaking norm:             15
Cost of neutral mediation:          5   Government intervention:     20 Scapegoat if biased mediator:        2
Transaction cost of mediation:  1    
Government intervention:       15    
Employer payoffs  Union payoffs 
1  20 (union concedes)  30 (employer concedes) 
2  19 (biased mediation without strike)  29 (neutral mediation without strike) 
3  16 (neutral mediation without strike)  25 (employer concedes after strike) 
4  15 (employer concedes)  24 (neutral mediation after strike) 
5  9 (biased mediation after strike)  16 (biased mediation without strike) 
6  6 (neutral mediation after strike)  15 (union concedes without strike or mediation) 
7  5 (employers concede after strike)  11 (biased mediation after strike) 
8  ‐ 5 (government intervention)  – 5 (government intervention) 
9  ‐ 10 (bargaining relation breakdown)  – 10 (bargaining relation breakdown)  
 
Figure 1 – developed with the kind help of Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen – shows the stylised deci-
sion tree model of bargaining and mediation for the privileged sheltered alliance in which there 
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are nine possible outcomes. Supposing that the exposed strategic alliance in manufacturing goes 
first in bargaining and sets a cost norm, employers and unions in privileged industries can of 
course agree in line with the norm, giving hypothetical payoffs of [20 for employers; 15 for un-
ions]. This is the baseline for the actors in the privileged alliance. In accordance with the theory 
outlined above, unions with market power have an interest in defection and threaten with indus-
trial action. Employers now have two options. They can simply concede and agree with the un-
ion outside the norm [15;30] or threaten with a lockout. In the latter case, unions can either con-
cede to the strategic norm, which will be criticised by rank and file [20;15], commence the strike, 
or agree to mediation with the employers. In biased mediation, the settlement will not exceed the 
norm [19;16] but unions can use mediators as scapegoats for not settling above the norm. In neu-
tral mediation, conversely, unions can use their market power and threaten to decline the pro-
posed settlement if it is not superior to the norm, and employers can use the mediator as a scape-
goat, thus offsetting some of costs of defection [16;29]. Together with employers conceding 
[15;30], neutral mediation without a strike is the Nash bargaining solution (Scharpf, 1997) with 
total payoffs of 45 – the only, albeit important, difference being the distribution of payoffs 
(Elster, 1989a).   
Some belligerent employers might decline mediation and prefer conflict, which leads to a 
strike by unions. For employers, continuation into industrial action is a uniformly bad solution 
compared to first step mediation, but it could be used to lower the payoffs of the union, which 
might be a goal in itself in adversarial relationships (Crouch, 1993). When industrial action is in 
force, several options exist. Mediators might take over at this second step to settle the conflict. If 
biased, the outcome will mimic the norm (if unions accept), but the parties will have suffered 
from industrial action [9;11]. Alternatively, in the case of a neutral mediator, unions will come 
out on top [6;24], but the payoff is still inferior to what it would be had there been no strike. Al-
so, employers can concede after defeat in industrial action due to market power of unions [5;25]. 
Accordingly, mediation is preferable for employers in case of a strike. Government intervention 
is another possible outcome, but the payoffs are negative for both parties, who will lose bargain-
ing autonomy [-5;-5]. Finally, breakdown of the bargaining relationship is, of course, also an 
option, but it is rather unlikely due to the mutual negative payoffs [-10;-10]. For unions, there is 
also a cost of striking, but it is negligible if mediation is neutral or employers concede. For union 
officials, the strike might, however, gain them organisational support from the rank and file 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965), and the probability of employers conceding after a strike (if me-
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diation is not successful) should be high since government intervention [-5;-5] and breakdown of 
bargaining relationship [-10;-10] are not viable options for any of the parties.  
Unions can therefore reason by backward induction (Elster, 1989a) that they will get no more 
and no less from mediation than the manufacturing norm if they do not strike a bilateral deal. 
Therefore, they have to either resort to industrial action or convince employers to concede and 
break the norm. However, with a first step neutral mediator, the settlement will, ceteris paribus, 
reflect the bargaining power of the parties and give the second-highest payoff for unions. For 
employer representatives, neutral mediation might then actually be the optimal strategy, as the 
blame for defection from the norm can be transferred to the mediator, i.e. the scapegoat function 
of mediation. If unions want to minimise the risks in industrial action, they might want to ‘help’ 
their employer counterpart by using mediators as scapegoats.   
For privileged sector unions, going outside mediation and into industrial action might make 
sense in market terms, but institutionally this possibility can be severely circumscribed. In other 
words, we need to consider the decision-making procedures of parties on which neo-corporatism 
has intensely focused (cf. Baccaro and Simoni, 2010). Mediation institutions, however, also im-
pinge on the decision about engaging in industrial action through its capabilities. First of all, alt-
hough there is no binding award as in arbitration, mediation is often compulsory. This at least 
slows down conflict, and mediation typically involves a restriction of industrial action during the 
mediation process. This can include a mandatory notice period for industrial action, extension of 
mediation period or a cooling-off period (Stokke, 1998). Similarly, the mediator can compel par-
ties to engage in real negotiations; that is, they have to exhaust all possibilities for a compromise 
before choosing the outside option. Via such procedures, pattern followers are compelled into 
mediation and cannot go it alone until the mediator has proposed at least one settlement. Fur-
thermore, and this is crucial, mediators can affect final decision-making on proposed settlements. 
This can, as noted above, be done indirectly by publicising the proposed settlement, thereby ex-
posing potential defectors, or directly by choosing the procedure for decision-making, most 
commonly through balloting or competent assembly. Indeed, the balloting procedures are vital 
for understanding differences between Sweden and Denmark. Note that compulsory mediation 
does not entail binding awards as in arbitration but rather capabilities that raise the costs and 
lower the feasibility of defection. Stipulating the internal ratification process of bargaining par-
ties is highly controversial but has been a cornerstone of the statutory procedural framework for 
industrial relations in many countries (Baccaro and Simoni, 2010; Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003; 
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Flanders, 1974). In ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and in ‘Bargaining in the cri-
sis’, I show just how important these mediator capabilities are in Sweden and Denmark. 
  
The challenge of institutional change  
The sections on the role of coordination and mediation herein might give the impression that 
institutions have invariant effects and that they are stable. However, the development in collec-
tive bargaining – not least in Sweden and Denmark – are by no means characterised by stasis. 
Arguably, we need to explain the effects of institutions in a dynamic way that incorporates how 
and why institutions change over time. The purpose of this section is accordingly to outline se-
lected perspectives on institutional change and locate my papers in this strand of literature.      
In ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, I argue that the crisis of centralised peak-level 
bargaining in Sweden and Denmark posed a challenge of institutional design. Unions, employer 
associations and governments had to change the bargaining system in order to restore wage 
moderation and introduce flexibility while preserving some level of equality. In addition, they 
had to do this without compromising the tradition of voluntarist industrial relations, in which the 
state mainly provides a statutory procedural framework for bargaining and stays out of substan-
tive regulation (e.g. Ibsen and Stamhus, 1993; Kjellberg, 2009). The challenge was one of insti-
tutional change without the dismantlement of the particular small open economy corporatist way 
of doing politics that Katzenstein (1985) writes about. I argue – along with Elvander (2002), Due 
et al. (1993) and Stokke (1998) – that the solution can partly be found in reconfiguring conflict 
regulation both between bargaining parties and inside bargaining parties, most notably through 
mergers. In ‘Bargaining in the crisis’, I also argue that this process might not be complete in 
Sweden, which seems to be trailing Denmark in some respects, most notably on the issue of de-
fections from the manufacturing norm. However, I also show in ‘Did mediation save coordinated 
bargaining’ and in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’  that the stability of the bargain-
ing system in Denmark comes at the cost of bargaining autonomy and wage disparities. I give 
special attention to how mediation institutions in Sweden have changed both in form and func-
tion from a relatively weak institution to an important ‘institutionalised part of bargaining’ 
(Stevens, 1963). I furthermore argue that the Danish mediation institution has changed its func-
tion because the actors use it differently now compared to how they used it during centralised 
bargaining.    
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Two points can be drawn from this overall argument. Firstly, the declarations of the death of 
the Swedish and Danish models made by some scholars were exaggerated (e.g. Lash, 1985; 
Pestoff, 1995) – as is also shown in other accounts (e.g. Pontusson, 2011; Thelen, 2012; Due et 
al., 1994; Kjellberg, 2009; Ibsen and Stamhus, 1993). As Katzenstein proposes, adaptability is 
part of politics in small open European economies, and while such changes can have potential 
distributional consequences (Baccaro and Howell, 2011) they do not fundamentally compromise 
coordination as a policy-making process. Secondly, as Due et al. (1993) propose, bargaining par-
ties also have intrinsic interests in ‘organisational conservatism’ that preserve their bargaining 
role, and this role can only exist in relation to a counterpart (Martin and Swank, 2012; Mailand, 
2008). Governments actually did threat the bargaining system with ‘Solomonic compromises’ 
during the 1970s-1980s in Denmark and in the 1990s in Sweden (Elvander, 2002; 1988; Due et 
al., 1994; Kjellberg, 1998). This gave an impetus to the parties to come up with new institutional 
solutions, the design of which was ultimately political and based on reconfigured coalitions 
(Thelen, 2012; Iversen, 1996). Taking these points together, I side with the path dependency 
argument (Mahoney, 2000a; Teague, 2009), although I acknowledge that institutional changes 
are prevalent and nontrivial for labour market outcomes.  
How does the dissertation’s arguments on institutional change fare against the burgeoning lit-
erature on this subject (cf. Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Campbell, 2004)? In order to answer this 
question, I find it instructive to locate the papers in the literature on institutional change using 
four dimensions: 1) what is the impetus for institutional change, 2) what are the processes and 
consequences of change, 3) what are the forms of changes, and 4) what is the agency of institu-
tional change? In the following, I will go through these four dimensions and show the papers’ 
positions on each. In this manner, we get a picture of what drove institutional change in Den-
mark and Sweden, how the processes of change were and what consequences they have had, 
what form of change prevailed in each country, and finally which actors were most important in 
change processes. By doing this, the dissertation adds new knowledge to the crucial issue of in-
stitutional change in the collective bargaining systems of Sweden and Denmark, which can pos-
sibly be applied in future research on how coordinated bargaining systems evolve.         
1) Scholars diverge over the impetus for institutional change. Studies of change in collective 
bargaining institutions often note that institutions are path-dependent in that once established 
they are difficult to alter (Poole, 1984; Crouch, 1993). Thus, institutional paths created at past 
critical junctures have lasting effects on action beyond their initial creation (Mahoney, 2000a). 
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For example, principles of the September Compromise of 1899 in Denmark and the Saltsjöbad-
agreement of 1938 in Sweden have largely remained intact up till today, stipulating mutual 
recognition for bargaining and procedures for industrial action. Actors become ‘locked into’ the 
possibilities and constraints of institutions (Teague, 2009) and there are positive feedback effects 
– or increasing returns – for adhering to a certain institutional logic (Pierson, 2000). Conversely, 
changing institutions is costly and risky as no one knows the behavioural outcomes of new insti-
tutions (Farrell and Knight, 2003). In order to upset such institutional equilibrium, exogenous 
shocks are needed that fundamentally change the opportunity structures or worldviews of actors. 
Such shocks include wars and economic crises, fundamental technological breakthroughs and 
their consequences for the occupational structure, or political shocks like the establishment of the 
Common Market or the EU enlargement. These exogenous shocks are surely beyond the control 
and influence of actors within collective bargaining institutions, but they will force actors to re-
visit institutions in order to conform to new external circumstances. Indeed, the decentralisation 
of bargaining in the 1980s-1990s is typically explained by exogenous impetuses such as new 
flexible production systems, persistently high unemployment and product market internationali-
sation (Katz, 1993; Ibsen and Stamhus, 1993).    
In my analyses, I take the structural changes as givens but argue that the responses to these 
were political and highly contentious. Consequently, instead of repeating the analytical exercise 
of explaining why decentralisation from peak-level bargaining happened, I want to explain what 
followed and why a certain institutional design was chosen. Even in extreme situations like war 
or natural catastrophes, actors have choices in how to respond to shocks, and often they will 
make use of existing institutions to weather the storm. This does not invalidate the claim that 
exogenous shocks are an important impetus for change, but rather that they leave indeterminacy. 
Moreover, because decentralisation from peak-level bargaining was spectacular, scholars often 
forget that the new institutional designs will need time to settle before we can fully comprehend 
their significance. Therefore, I find it interesting to analyse bargaining rounds where new institu-
tions ‘come alive’. This requires a different analysis of institutional change that is not focused on 
exogenous shocks or structural changes but on gradual changes in how actors ‘use’ institutions.    
I follow scholars that have recently argued that exogenous shocks cannot be the impetus for all 
forms of institutional change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). Impetus 
for institutional change can also be endogenous when actors change institutions ‘from within’ 
without external circumstances sparking such changes. Endogenous change flows from entrepre-
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neurial actors in politics and markets. This is therefore a less deterministic view on institutions 
which leaves space for reinterpretation or defections (Hall and Thelen, 2009). Firstly, institutions 
are never self-evident, leaving room for different interpretations and reinterpretations of institu-
tional logics. As time passes, for example, new actors ‘born’ in different times and exposed to 
new ideas in other institutional domains will not fully adopt the institutional logic from ‘old ac-
tors’. To rephrase Berger and Luckmann (1967), the subjective creativity of the new generation 
replaces the old objectivity of the old generation in active rediscovery. Thus formal stability of 
an institution can actually conceal the changing of the inter-subjective meanings of the institu-
tion. Secondly, through repeated defections from the institutional logic by opportunistic actors, 
institutions might be altered to conform to actual practice. This turns institutionalism on its head 
by supporting the notion that formal institutions follow from bottom-up practices, rather than the 
other way around. Indeed, it has often been the case in collective bargaining that persistent de-
fections from industry-level agreements at the company level have spurred new provisions in 
those agreements (Navrbjerg et al., 2001). Again, defections are conceptually possible because 
institutions are viewed less deterministically. In ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, 
‘Bargaining in the crisis’ and ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , I show how institu-
tions are being ‘moulded’ in sequential bargaining rounds – a similar approach to that of Due et 
al. (1993) and Stokke (1998) and Elvander (1988).  
2) The processes and consequences of institutional change differ accordingly. Streeck & The-
len (2005) argue that processes of change can either be incremental or abrupt. Focusing on in-
cremental processes alerts scholars to seemingly trivial processes, that might (or might not) have 
consequences for the form and function of institutions. Therefore, not only wholesale institution-
al reforms matter. 
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Table 5: Processes and consequences of institutional change 
  Consequences 
Continuity Discontinuity 
Process Incremental 1. Reproduction by adapta-
tion (path dependency) 
3. Gradual transformation 
(Drift, Conversion, Dis-
placement, Layering) 
Abrupt 2. Survival and return (path 
dependency) 
4. Breakdown and replace-
ment (critical junctures) 
 
The question is whether the processes have lasting consequences, viz. whether they result in con-
tinuity or discontinuity. In incremental processes with continuity, institutions are reproduced by 
adapting to new circumstances, i.e. path dependency. However, these incremental processes 
might also gradually transform the institutional logic and therefore agency. This form of change 
is relatively new to institutional analysis and I will elaborate on it below. The abrupt processes 
are more familiar. Sometimes, continuity might be a consequence as the original institutions sur-
vive and actors return to familiar agency patterns. Alternatively, abrupt processes might result in 
discontinuity through breakdown and replacement of old institutions with new ones, i.e. a new 
critical juncture.  
The issue of consequences divide scholars immensely (Howell and Givan, 2011; Baccaro and 
Howell, 2011; Streeck, 2009; Thelen, 2012) as it depends on the manner by which real change is 
distinguished from superficial modification in, e.g., formal form, actual function or socioeco-
nomic outcomes. This has led scholars to argue whether the glass is half empty or half full 
(Thelen, 2012). As noted above, I argue that many scholars were wrong in concluding that the 
abrupt retreat by the Swedish employer confederation in 1990 was a breakdown of the Swedish 
model, however spectacular the retreat was (Pestoff, 1995). They were wrong because there was 
at least a partial return to coordinated bargaining, albeit within new formal institutions and with 
somewhat different socioeconomic outcomes. Therefore, in ‘Did mediation save coordinated 
bargaining’ and in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , I side with Katzenstein (1985) 
and Pedersen (2011) in arguing that the forms of coordination might change with controlled 
changes in socioeconomic outcomes to follow, but the fundamental way of doing politics in a 
coordinated manner has persisted. In other words, actors changed institutions in response to new 
circumstances so that they would persevere. Moreover, unions and employer associations adapt 
to new circumstances in a relational manner in which the organisational survival is also at stake 
(Due et al., 1994; Martin and Thelen, 2007).      
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3) The forms of institutional change also differ. Zooming in on the gradual transformation 
through incremental processes, Streeck and Thelen (2005: 22-29) propose four forms of change. 
Firstly, displacement refers to processes in which new institutions replace existing ones. This can 
happen when old institutions are rediscovered or when they are imported from other institutional 
domains. Layering is a process in which new institutions with different institutional logics are 
established alongside the existing institutions. To some extent, I see this in Sweden with the es-
tablishment of a new dual mediation system that complements the coordinated voluntarist bar-
gaining system (see Elvander, 2002; Teague, 2009). Differential growth between the new and 
old institutions, i.e. changes in the institutions toward which actors orient themselves, will de-
termine the consequence of layering. Drift refers to ‘bad maintenance’ of existing institutions 
that ultimately prevents institutions from surviving. For example, persistent defections from mul-
ti-employer agreements by individual companies undermine the institutional logic and could 
potentially change the institutional logic or simply make it redundant (i.e. a dead letter). Finally, 
conversion refers to processes in which formal institutions are redirected towards new goals, 
functions or purposes. This is possible due to the ambiguity of institutions in the first place and 
possible unintended consequences of institutions. For example, employers were proponents in 
centralising bargaining in Sweden and Denmark during the 1930s to avoid ‘whipsawing’ tactics. 
However, once in place, centralisation actually served unskilled workers’ unions by compressing 
wage structures by lifting the wage floor (Iversen, 1999).  
The latter form of change is fundamental for my analysis of Sweden and Denmark, as I argue 
in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’. In line with others (Baccaro and Howell, 2011), 
I argue that the purpose of coordinated bargaining has been shifted in the two countries. This 
result places my analysis of Sweden and Denmark oddly in-between different forms of institu-
tional change, as I see both continuity and discontinuity in form and function of coordination. 
Additionally, in line with Carstensen (2010), I see signs of how the ideas of wage moderation, 
flexibility, solidarity and voluntarism are being moulded by unions and employers’ associations 
that are grappling with how to combine these four ideas. Thus, flexibility is cast both as some-
thing that collective bargaining now allows but also controls, i.e. centralised decentralisation. 
Wage moderation is cast as a win-win that increases competitiveness and employment, although 
it will gradually increase wage differentials as I show in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bar-
gaining’ . Solidarity in Denmark is no longer equal wage for all work but equal wage for similar 
jobs and equal opportunity (Baccaro and Locke, 1998; Pontusson, 2011). Finally, voluntarism is 
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no longer merely non-interference by the state (Kahn-Freund, 1954) but is also bargaining au-
tonomy vis-à-vis manufacturing.  
4) Turning to the agency of institutional change, two major schools of thought dominate the 
literature, as I also show in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and ‘Three approaches 
to coordinated bargaining’. Firstly, the so-called power resource theory – often associated with 
Walter Korpi (Korpi and Shalev, 1980; Korpi, 2006) but found in a large part of the IR literature 
(Kelly, 2011; Teague, 2009) – explains levels of coordination, extent of regulation of markets 
and socioeconomic equality with two factors: strong unions and strong left-wing parties, most 
notably Social Democratic parties. Applied to changes in bargaining coordination, high union 
density is essential. Commons and the Webbs early on found that the organisation of workers 
into trade unions is the very foundation for collective bargaining. On their part, strong left-wing 
parties produce regulation, statutory recognition, and procedural frameworks that underpin bar-
gaining as the primary regulatory process in labour markets. As Traxler (2003a) notes, bargain-
ing coordination rests on either high union density or statutory mechanisms for extension of col-
lective agreements to unorganised employers (erga omnes clauses). Likewise, Sisson (1987) 
shows that strong unions are the impetus for employers to engage in bargaining, and as Korpi 
(2006) writes: ‘employers are unlikely to have first-order preferences for reforms extending so-
cial citizenship rights’. Hence, strong unions make employers consent to their second-order pref-
erence of coordinated bargaining.    
Secondly, the so-called cross-class alliance theory – often associated with Peter Swenson and 
proponents of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework – explains levels of coordination 
with coalitions between employers and unions at the industry level. By ‘bringing capital back’ 
the primary actors behind institutional change are employers, but they can form strong cross-
class alliances with unions (Swenson, 2002). Swenson shows that employers were proponents of 
centralised bargaining to avoid union whipsawing and explains the resilience of bargaining coor-
dination with employers’ vested interest in the bargaining system. Pontusson & Swenson (2000) 
remark how manufacturing unions and employers were the key drivers in the decentralisation 
from peak-level bargaining when centralised bargaining no longer catered to their interest in 
wage moderation and solidarism. Traxler (1995) argues that unions help employers in control 
markets by disciplining workers and extending bargaining coverage to companies that would 
otherwise be free-riding on collective agreements. Hall & Soskice (2001) propose that employers 
derive benefits from coordinated bargaining when it complements other institutional fields such 
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as vocational education and training, employment protection legislation and banking systems. 
Employers in so-called coordinated market economies have a special interest in preserving good 
relationships with unions, which helps them pursue business strategies based on highly skilled 
workers, incremental innovation and ‘patient capital’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001).   
In ‘Did mediation save coordination’, I argue that the two theories can be combined if we con-
sider Korpi’s (2006) suggestion that employers actually have a second-order preference for co-
ordination, which they will pursue more or less actively depending on union strength. The theo-
ries are, however, too general to explain the institutional trajectories of Sweden and Denmark. 
On a conceptual level, they underspecify how general interests are translated into concrete insti-
tutional designs. In this regard, the ideational approaches to institutional change might lend a 
helping hand (Schmidt, 2010). In ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , I argue that 
four ideas come together in the institutional change processes of Sweden and Denmark: wage 
moderation, flexibility, solidarity and voluntarism. I show that the coalitional foundation for in-
stitutional changes affect the equilibrium between these four ideas. For example, the centralisa-
tion of power by employers accomplished by creating DI in Denmark produces an equilibrium 
that privileges wage moderation and flexibility over equality (of wages) and voluntarism. By 
accepting the idea of supply-side solidarity instead of distributive solidarity – or what Pontusson 
(2011) calls equal pay for equal jobs, instead of equal pay altogether – Danish coordination has 
changed its function of wage equalisation without incurring a wholesale erosion of solidarity (cf. 
Baccaro and Locke, 1998; Due and Madsen, 2006).  
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4. Methods and data 
In this section, I outline the methods and data used for the papers. At a general level, the disserta-
tion compares cases to arrive at quasi-rule-like relationships between certain conditions and cer-
tain outcomes in specific contexts. Each paper thus departs from a case-based research tradition 
(Ragin, 1987) in which the phenomenon in question is regarded as a complex whole with multi-
ple analytical dimensions that need to be considered together. Accordingly, an explanatory con-
dition is usually only causally related to an outcome if combine with other conditions which is 
also called conjunctural causation. Regardless of whether the number of cases is two or seven-
teen, this is the basic logic, although my comparisons of Sweden and Denmark obviously allow 
for much more detail than my comparison of seventeen Western European countries. I begin the 
section by outlining the basic logic of the comparative case analysis and the reasons why some 
have criticised it. I then outline the logic of fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis and the 
way it answers some of the criticism of comparative case analysis. Next, I show how process 
tracing, especially using elite interviewing, is a complement to comparative case analysis. In the 
final part, the data used for the papers are presented.   
 
The comparative case analysis 
In the comparative spirit of the dissertation, it is instructive to compare the chosen method to 
conventional quantitative statistical methods using the yardstick of randomised experiments. In 
randomised experiments, as in medical studies, the effect of a cause is realised through observa-
tion of patients (the target group) that are given a specific treatment and comparison of the rele-
vant effects with observation of other patients that are not given the treatment (the control group) 
(King et al., 1994). If there are differences between the two groups, we can infer that the treat-
ment has a causal effect on the observed differences. By randomising the two groups, we can 
furthermore ensure (as well as possible) that the observed differences are not related to other 
factors stemming from selection bias. Moreover, by controlling the exposure to other factors, e.g. 
by confining groups to a specific laboratory setting, other unobserved factors are controlled for 
with only the treatment factor varying between the two groups. Thus we get the ‘clean’ effect of 
the cause, and we avoid the possibility that the effects of the cause are spurious, i.e. actually 
caused by background factors or mediating factors (Geddes, 2003). Randomised experiments are 
very hard to reproduce in social sciences, although laboratory-like experiments are gaining 
ground in some disciplines. One prominent problem is the external validity of such experiments, 
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i.e. whether the observed effects would happen in ‘real life’. I would argue that constructing an 
experiment of horizontal coordination of bargaining would be an insurmountable design chal-
lenge.      
One way to assimilate experiments is through the variable-based comparison of like units that 
allow for statistical control and generalisation (Lieberson, 1985). If enough units co-vary on the 
independent and dependent variables – concomitant variation (Mill, 1843) – then statistical 
measures can assess whether the correlation between these two variables actually exists in real 
life. As Gerring and Thomas (2011) note, statistical analyses rely on comparable quantifiable 
information that can readily express the variables of interest and renders statistical methods like 
regression analysis possible. Here, analytical units, such as individuals, organisations or coun-
tries, are treated as variables with discrete effects. Similarly to randomised experiments, selec-
tion should ideally be randomised to avoid selection bias – although this is hard in studies using 
countries as units – and the number of cases should be large enough to match the number of var-
iables due to the degree of freedom issue (Lieberson, 1985). While correlation should not be con-
founded with causal relationship, correlations that are statistically significant, i.e. the relationship 
between variables is a result of a rule-like pattern rather than mere chance or randomness, can at 
least not be falsified as real causes of outcomes (Popper, 1963). It is this basic logic that compar-
ative studies of collective bargaining coordination use to assess the effects of institutions on 
macroeconomic issues such as wage restraint, employment and unemployment, using, e.g., time-
series cross-sectoral analysis (e.g.Traxler and Brandl, 2012; Baccaro and Simoni, 2010).       
Another approach to infer causal relationships relies on the case-based comparison. Instead of 
converting analytical units into quantifiable variation, cases are seen as ‘complex wholes’ with 
many interacting dimensions or configurations of relevant dimensions (Rihoux and Ragin, 
2009). This approach privileges deep knowledge about cases over scope and number of observa-
tions – or put in Weberian words, understanding cases instead of explaining them. By doing so, 
case-based research places importance on understanding cases in their temporal and spatial con-
text, acknowledging that relationships between conditions and outcomes are contingent upon 
context, unlike the general rule-like relationships between independent and dependent variables 
(Locke and Thelen, 1995). This inherently poses a paradox: How can we infer causal relation-
ships when cases are treated as complex wholes? The answer lies in 1) establishing comparabil-
ity of cases, 2) choosing cases to allow for controlled comparison using J.S. Mill’s methods of 
agreement and difference, which I extend to fuzzy set QCA (Mill, 1843; Ragin, 2000), and 3) 
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conducting within-case analysis using process tracings of causal mechanisms (Mahoney, 2000b; 
George and Bennett, 2005). Nevertheless and as already alluded to above, the case-based ap-
proach chosen in this dissertation is inherently less attuned to universal causal relations than to 
quasi-rule-like relationships that pertain to specific points in time and in space. Accordingly, I do 
not view the case-based comparative approach as deterministic, like some scholars have criti-
cised it for being (notably Lieberson, 1991). 
Comparability of cases presupposes a common definition of what the cases are about, i.e. the 
phenomenon we are studying (Ragin and Becker, 1992). In other words, cases should be charac-
terised by some shared attributes in order to avoid the famous fallacy of comparing apples with 
oranges. Comparability depends on rigorous concept formation which defines the relevant attrib-
utes of social phenomenon. Three procedures are commonplace and have inspired this disserta-
tion. Firstly, concepts can vary in intension and extension to make them comparable (Sartori, 
1970). Thus, cases that are not identical at a high level of intension can be joined using higher-
order concepts and extension. E.g. men and women can be made comparable if considered to 
belong to the concept of a human being; i.e. all men and women have the attributes of a human 
being. Clearly, we run the risk that concepts can get so ‘stretched’ that they are rendered point-
less and of little analytical value (Sartori, 1970). The concept of coordination, for example, in-
cludes both intra-industry and inter-industry coordination, but these are very different processes, 
albeit related. I focus mainly on inter-industry coordination in the dissertation to avoid over-
stretching, and in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ , I show the analytical conse-
quences of various conceptualisations of bargaining coordination. Secondly, concept formation 
through family resemblance does not presuppose that all cases share all attributes (Collier and 
Mahon, 1993). For example, domestic violence, boxing and drive-by shootings are in a general 
family called violence, although they do not share all attributes of violence. The concept of third 
party intervention can be broken down into various practices like conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration that do not share all attributes but have family resemblance due to some shared prac-
tices like trying to settle conflicts. Thirdly, Weberian ‘ideal types’ define the relevant attributes 
of an object in a stylised manner in relation to which actual cases can be categorised and meas-
ured (Weber, 1978). As a precursor to this, I use the family resemblance concept formation to list 
the different attributes of conciliation, mediation and arbitration. Therefore, the fsQCA analysis 
of ‘In search of control’ constructs the ‘ideal type’ of strong third party intervention institution 
using a configuration of formal institutional capabilities, such as mandatory arbitration and no-
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tice periods for strikes, and calibrates how national institutions conform to these ideals. In this 
way, I employ different concept formations in each paper depending on the research question: 
 
1. ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining?’: Configurations of institutions that con-
strain and enable bargaining coordination processes and outcomes  
2. ‘In search of control’: Configurations of third party intervention institutions 
3. ‘Bargaining in crisis’: Institutional mediation of bargaining actors’ responses to market 
pressures 
4. ‘Striking a balance’. Collective agreement provisions that produce combinations of 
flexibility and security, i.e. flexicurity 
5. ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’: No common concept but three different 
approaches to bargaining coordination applied to Sweden and Denmark involving ma-
terial structures, institutions and ideas 
 
Each paper thus analyses slightly different cases based on the underlying conceptualisation of 
bargaining, which ultimately depends on the research question. Although the concept formations 
are slightly different depending on the research question, I nevertheless find them compatible as 
the main concept is ‘configurations of institutions’ as I presented in the beginning of this intro-
duction. Only in ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’  do I explore rather different con-
cepts derived from different ontological standpoints.  
Secondly, I choose cases to allow for quasi-controlled comparison that allows for causal infer-
ence. The method is nominal or qualitative and is based on necessary and sufficient conditions 
for certain outcomes (Mahoney, 2000b). Necessity of a condition is established when all cases 
with the outcome also share the condition. Sufficiency of a condition is established when all cas-
es with the condition also share the outcome. The interconnections between sufficiency and ne-
cessity can be seen in the table below:  
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Table 6: Necessity and sufficiency 
 Necessity Non-necessity 
Sufficiency 1. Only X leads to Y. 3. X can lead to Y alone, 
but so can other condi-
tions. 
Non- sufficiency 2. X in conjunction with 
other conditions leads to Y 
(INUS). 
4. X cannot alone lead to Y 
and is not always present 
when Y is present.  
 
Note that cell 2 includes so-called INUS conditions which I will explain below.  
Two main strategies are commonplace and originate from J.S. Mill (Scientific Inquiry). First-
ly, the method of agreement or most-different systems design compares cases in which the out-
come is the same although all hypothesised explanatory conditions except one are different 
(Przeworski and Teune, 1970). The method of agreement can be used to eliminate potential ex-
planatory conditions save the one that is shared by the cases (Ragin, 1987). As Mahoney (2000: 
392) notes, this method can be used to eliminate potential necessary conditions; i.e. when out-
comes are shared by cases, it is logically impossible for any hypothesised cause that is not shared 
by the cases to be necessary for the outcome. Case selection using this method of inference 
should look for cases that are different on all attributes save the outcome and one condition. Sec-
ondly, the method of difference or most-similar systems design (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) 
compares cases in which the outcome is different although all hypothesised explanatory condi-
tions except one are similar. This method can be used to eliminate potential sufficient conditions; 
i.e. when outcomes are different among cases, it is logically impossible for any hypothesised 
cause that is shared by the cases to be sufficient for the outcome (Mahoney, 2000; 393). In my 
comparisons of Sweden and Denmark, I use the method of difference, inferring that different 
bargaining processes and outcomes can be traced to certain institutional characteristics – most 
notably mediation institutions and bargaining structure – that are sufficient for producing differ-
ences. Conversely, I argue that the countries share many relevant conditions that can therefore be 
eliminated as sufficient causes for different processes and outcomes. I make the reservation, 
however, that controlled comparison of absence/presence of conditions cannot establish causality 
without process tracing of causal mechanism, which I develop below. 
The comparative case analysis has been criticised for many reasons (see Lieberson, 1991). 
Firstly, it often leads researchers to choose cases based on the dependent variable/outcome, lead-
ing to selection bias. As Geddes (2003) argues, case selection should include both presence and 
absence of outcomes if we are to infer causal relationship, and too many comparative case stud-
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ies neglect absence of outcomes because they also display the preferred condition by the re-
searcher. Mill’s joint method of agreement and difference alleviates this problem by broadening 
the case selection to include both positive and negative outcomes. Therefore, cases that have 
similar outcomes should have different conditions save one, while cases that have different out-
comes should have similar conditions save one. By contrast, Ragin (2000) argues that this criti-
cism is flawed. It is perfectly possible to have absence of outcome and presence of the proposed 
condition if we accept equifinality, i.e. that outcomes can have multiple causes. Lieberson (1991) 
criticises the comparative methods for being deterministic; i.e. one black swan can falsify the 
theory that all swans are white. If the world is stochastic and causal relations are at best probabil-
istic, such inference method is problematic. Moreover, he criticises the methods for missing the 
interaction of different conditions, which makes causal inference flawed when the researcher 
examines individual conditions in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Fuzzy set qualitative com-
parative analysis remedies some of these problems. 
  
Introducing fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis 
While I basically adhere to the method of difference in my comparison of Sweden and Denmark 
combined with process tracing, ‘In search of control’ uses fuzzy set qualitative comparative 
analysis (fsQCA). In a number of ways it is a step forward in improving controlled comparisons 
while still incorporating the basic logic of Mill in search of necessary and sufficient conditions 
(Ragin, 2000). Firstly, it uses set theory and set relations to go beyond nominal dichotomies of 
absence/presence of outcomes and conditions (Ragin, 2008). Secondly, it allows for equifinality 
and thus the possibility that more than one hypothesis can be supported (George and Bennett, 
2005). Thirdly, it allows for conjunctural causation, that is, that conditions might only have 
causal effects in combination with others – something which conventional controlled comparison 
has a hard time with (Lieberson, 1991). Fourthly, it builds on asymmetrical causality which does 
not presuppose that the cause of an outcome is the same as the causes of the absence of this out-
come. Finally, fsQCA provides techniques for evaluating quality of causal relations, including 
coverage, consistency and robustness checks. In this way, set relations between conditions and 
outcomes are viewed less deterministically and we get measures upon which different causal 
relationships can be assessed. Since fsQCA is relatively new to IR studies and cannot be outlined 
fully in the scope of ‘In search of control’, I elaborate these five points in the following.                 
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Nominal comparisons which rest on somewhat strict concept formation followed by dichoto-
mous observation of absence and presence of conditions and outcomes have obvious drawbacks. 
Cases might not only differ in kind (nominal) but also in degree. Using fuzzy sets, Ragin (2000) 
proposes that cases should be calibrated according to both. Cases are assigned membership 
scores of certain ideal typical sets ranging from ‘fully in’ (score of 1) to ‘neither in nor out’ 
(score of 0.5) and ‘fully out’ (score of 0). The level of precision can be established using these 
three ‘qualitative anchors’ that are ultimately based on the researchers’ calibration of cases and 
which should be open for public scrutiny, i.e. transparent, in contrast to some qualitative research 
where assignment of cases to nominal categories is hidden. For example, I argue that full mem-
bership in the set of strong CMA can be assigned in the presence of either mandatory arbitration 
or mandatory mediation with strong capabilities to force parties to settle. Conceptually, I accept 
a degree of functional equivalence (Merton, 1967) between these two types of institutions 
(Gresov and Drazin, 1997) based on my reading of the institutionalist approach to third party 
intervention (Stokke, 1998; Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). In the data appendix of ‘In search of control’, 
the calibrations of cases are presented in detail. Calibrations are reported in so-called raw data 
tables that summarise the membership scores in each condition and outcome. Based on these 
scores, the fsQCA software produces a truth table which runs each case’s membership score in 
each logical combination of conditions based on the intersection of conditions (logical AND 
which is the lowest membership score). Logically, a case can only belong – that is, have a fuzzy 
membership score over 0.5 – to one row in a truth table. In ideal-typical sense, a country belongs 
more to one specific ideal-type of the conditions. In the truth table below, Sweden, for example, 
belongs to the ideal-typical row which combines high governance capacity*strong unions*weak 
regulation of industrial action*absence of normal courts.     
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Table 7: Example of truth table in fsQCA 
GOVCAP UNPOW REGIND COURT No. of 
cases 
Cases/ 
remainders 
Consistency 
0 1 0 1 4 Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain 0.973988 
0 0 1 0 3 Switzerland, UK, Ireland 0.794118 
0 1 0 0 3 Belgium, Luxembourg, France 0.881874 
1 1 1 0 3 Denmark, Finland, Norway 0.943396 
1 1 1 1 2 Austria, Netherlands 0.728938 
0 1 1 0 1 Germany 0.883333 
1 1 0 0 1 Sweden 0.941176 
0 0 0 0 0 Logical remainder 0.885196 
0 0 0 1 0 Logical remainder 0.958904 
0 0 1 1 0 Logical remainder 0.951613 
0 1 1 1 0 Logical remainder 0.957143 
1 0 0 0 0 Clustered remainder 0.916335 
1 0 0 1 0 Clustered remainder 0.952381 
1 0 1 0 0 Clustered remainder 0.91954 
1 0 1 1 0 Clustered remainder 0.948276 
1 1 0 1 0 Logical remainder 0.915058 
       
The process of finding sufficient causal paths to the outcome is achieved through Boolean logi-
cal minimisation using the fsQCA 2.5 software (Ragin et al., 2006). The minimisation procedure, 
while logical, is rather technical based on formal logic and Boolean algebra and is not suited for 
this introduction (see Ragin, 1987; Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The purpose is to reduce 
complexity and arrive at more parsimonious solution terms (combinations of conditions) that are 
related to the outcome by eliminating conditions on which cases differ, similar to the method of 
agreement. For example, consider a solution consisting of:  
 
 ??? ? ?? ? ?  
We see that the combination of the presence of A and the absence of D OR the combination of 
presence of both A and D leads to the presence of Y. This solution can be reduced to:  
 
 ? ? ? 
This solution is more parsimonious because we have eliminated ~D and D in minimisation. 
Moreover, the parsimonious solution is a superset of the complex solution, i.e. it encompasses 
A~D + AD. The first crucial analytical point is to assess when to include truth table rows for 
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logical minimisation and when not to. This is crucial because some rows are not fully consistent 
with the outcome. The standard practice is to use a cut-off point consistency at 0,8, but this 
might conceal logical contradiction, e.g. countries that have high membership in the condition 
but low membership in the outcome, thus violating sufficiency. It is therefore advisable to con-
sider each row based on substantive knowledge about the cases and theoretical expectations 
(Rihoux and Ragin, 2009), while remaining open to subsequent ‘deviant case’ analysis 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012).    
In the example above, there are nine logical remainders; i.e. no cases ‘belong’ to these rows, 
resulting in limited diversity. Standard fsQCA includes procedures to handle this. Firstly, it is 
advised to look for rows that are either theoretically or logically impossible, e.g. the pregnant 
man4. I argue that four out of the nine logical remainders are so-called ‘clustered remainders’ 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 154), which are combinations that we know cannot exist in 
reality and can be excluded for logical minimisation. Combinations of high governance capacity 
and low union power can per definition not exist since governance capacity is built around high 
bargaining coverage (Traxler, 2004).  It is, on the other hand, quite possible to have low govern-
ance capacity and high union power as we saw, for example, in Sweden during the 1980s (De 
Geer, 1992). Secondly, remaining logical remainders can be treated using ‘easy counterfactuals’ 
(Emmenegger, 2011). Counterfactuals are at the heart of any research design involving compari-
son (which includes practically every research design with more than one observation). In the 
case of logical remainders, we are faced with a logical combination of conditions that does not 
exist in the sample, which can be translated into a counterfactual statement: What would the out-
come look like if this combination existed? This is much like the assertion that World War I 
would not have started had Archduke Franz Ferdinand not been assassinated in Sarajevo. But 
how can we establish such a hypothetical situation?      
So-called difficult and easy counterfactuals are described by Ragin (2000) as simplifying as-
sumptions on which we can eliminate conditions in solutions. The former can be illustrated by 
fitting an example of Ragin to my study (see also Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 168). In a 
comparative case study, we have empirical evidence that strong CMA (Y) can be observed in 
countries with high governance capacity of unions (A), strong unions (B) and strong regulation 
of industrial action (C), giving the following solution in Boolean notation: 
 
 ??? ? ?? 
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However, the sample does not include cases with the presence of A and B but not C: 
 
???? ? ? 
 
This is a logical remainder, and the conservative solution would be to stick with ABC using no 
counterfactuals. The parsimonious solution would entail elimination of C because it differs in the 
two rows, but since we do not observe the ABC combination, we need counterfactuals to do so. 
Based on our theory, we believe that it is in the absence of strong regulation of industrial action, 
i.e. ~C, that we should expect strong CMA (Y). Therefore, if the ABC combination produces Y, 
then it is not implausible that AB~C would also produce Y. This simplifying assumption is 
therefore an ‘easy counterfactual’. Conversely, difficult counterfactuals make simplifying as-
sumptions about logical remainders that go against our theoretical expectations (Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 169). In ‘In search of control’, I only use easy counterfactuals and the so-
called ‘intermediate solution’ when looking for sufficient solution terms leading to strong CMA.  
The logic of necessity and sufficiency can be translated into fsQCA through set relations in 
conditions and outcomes. ‘In search of control’ regards a condition necessary when it is present 
in every country with strong CMA. In set-theoretical terms, this means that the membership 
score of a case in the outcome is equal to or lower than the membership score of the condition 
(Ragin, 2000). Thus, when the score is low in the outcome, viz. a non-case of strong CMA, the 
score in the condition is allowed to be high because this does not violate necessity. In set theory, 
a necessary condition is identified if the outcome is a subset of the condition. A sufficient condi-
tion, on the other hand, is identified when the membership score of a case in the condition is 
equal to or lower than the membership score of the outcome (Ragin, 2006). Thus, when the score 
is low in the condition, i.e. a non-case of the condition, the score in the outcome is allowed to be 
high because this does not violate sufficiency. In set theory, a sufficient condition is identified if 
the condition is a subset of the condition. Remember that, due to equifinality, sufficiency does 
not preclude other conditions producing the outcome. The set-theoretical logic of necessity and 
sufficiency can be illustrated with a simple XY-plot taken from ‘In search of control’.  
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Figure 1: XY scatter plot of solution and outcome 
 
 
The Y-axis represents membership in the outcome, viz. strong CMA, and the X-axis represents 
membership in the conditions. Cases above the diagonal are consistent with sufficiency, i.e. they 
are cases where the condition is a subset of the outcome. Conversely, cases below the diagonal 
are consistent with necessity, i.e. they are cases where the outcome is a subset of the condition. 
Accordingly, we see that there is a potential trade-off between consistency of sufficiency and 
necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). For a condition to be both sufficient and necessary, 
cases would have to fall exactly on the diagonal, where memberships in conditions and outcome 
are equal.  
FsQCA allows for asymmetrical causality. This is useful when studying institutions as an out-
come (which I do in ‘In search of control’). For example, dictatorship is not conceptually the 
opposite of democracy, but rather has an institutional logic of its own. However, countries that 
are dictatorships will typically be lumped together with, for example, plutocracies or fascist-
corporatism in the category of non-democracies. Thus it would potentially be erroneous to ex-
plain dictatorship with the negations of conditions that explained democracy (Ragin, 2000). Sim-
ilarly, while it might be the case, I do not assume that the explanations for weak CMA are the 
negation of the explanations for strong CMA. This breaks with the logic of concomitant variation 
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on which conventional statistical methods, such as regression analysis, are based. Moreover, it 
means that heteroscedasticity, i.e. when error terms vary or increase over the observation, is not 
in principle problematic for fsQCA, while in regression analysis this would have to be dealt with 
to ensure correct model estimation (Verbeek, 2008: chapter 4).    
Conjunctural causation is vital for my causal inference in ‘In search of control’ and also in 
‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and ‘Bargaining in the crisis’. Starting with the 
latter two papers, I argue that bargaining structure based on strong cross-class alliances in manu-
facturing in conjunction with strong mediation prevents defection in Denmark. I give credence to 
this claim by using process tracing while acknowledging that a two-case comparison cannot log-
ically cover the possible combinations of the two conditions (22 = 4 combinations).  
I am most systematic about conjunctural causation in the fsQCA of ‘In search of control’ 
where I consider two distinct causal paths to strong CMA that both include more than one condi-
tion. At the core of conjunctural causation are so-called INUS conditions (that is, conditions that 
are Insufficient alone but a Necessary part of a condition, which is by itself Unnecessary but Suf-
ficient for the occurrence of the outcome). In this manner, combinations of conditions form suf-
ficient but non-necessary causal paths to the outcome. Membership in combinations of condi-
tions, that is, causal paths, is defined by the logical AND (Ragin, 1987). This means that the 
membership of country in a given path, e.g. weak regulation of industrial action*strong un-
ions*low governance capacity of unions, is given by the intersection of conditions and thus the 
lowest membership score (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 51). Thus the country’s membership 
in a certain path is never greater than the lowest membership score of the concerned condition. 
Considering full membership in all three conditions to be the ideal path, intersections of condi-
tions give us an appropriate membership of the causal path which can be related to membership 
in the outcome in terms of sufficiency. For example, a 0.8 membership in the path is consistent 
for sufficiency if membership in the outcome is 0.9. 
We have now arrived to the final point: techniques to assess the results of fsQCA. The descrip-
tive measure of consistency can be used to assess whether combinations are consistently related 
to outcomes (Ragin 2006a). It therefore bears resemblance with significance tests in regression 
analysis, although the logic behind is very different, as already noted (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009). 
Moreover, it refutes Lieberson’s claim (1991) that causation based on necessity and sufficiency 
presumes no measurement error since such measurement error of a condition for a case would 
lead to false inference of the causal relationship between this condition and the outcome 
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(Mahoney, 2000b). By introducing fuzzy sets and techniques to assess consistency, measurement 
errors – although they should be avoided – can be tolerated. Consistency of sufficiency assesses 
whether set memberships in the combination of conditions are consistently lower than or equal to 
the set memberships of outcomes:  
 
∑������� � ���� ∑�����  
According to the equation, ‘when Xi values are all less than or equal to their corresponding Yi 
values, the consistency score is 1.00; when there are only a few near misses, the score is slightly 
less than 1.00; and when there are many inconsistent scores, with some Xi values greatly exceed-
ing their corresponding Yi values, consistency drops below 0.5’  (Ragin 2006a: 297). In this way, 
we also avoid deterministic rejection of a condition due to one case. Instead, this case lowers 
consistency and should be investigated as a deviant case, which I do in ‘In search of control’ 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Consistency can also be assessed for necessity by reversing 
the subset relationships between conditions and outcome. Usually, a cut-off level for consistency 
of 0.8 is regarded as satisfactory, although this requires substantive knowledge and analysis of 
the cases that violate consistency.  
Coverage, the second descriptive measure of the analysis, assesses the magnitude or im-
portance of X in explaining Y. For example, coverage tells us how many of the cases with strong 
CMA can be explained by a specific causal path. It therefore bears resemblance to R2 in regres-
sion analysis, which is a measure of how much variation in the dependent variable can be ex-
plained by the independent variables. As Ragin (2006a) and others note, coverage of a condition 
is only relevant if the condition is also consistent (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). The equation 
for coverage is:  
 
∑������� � ���� ∑�����  
Thus whenever Yi values greatly exceed their corresponding Xi values, the coverage measure 
will be reduced. Consistency and coverage can also be calculated for necessity, however, with 
the crucial difference being that outcomes are subsets of conditions (below the diagonal), thus 
changing the numerator and denominators in the equations. I use both consistency and coverage 
in ‘In search of control’ to assess the causal fit and relevance of causal paths. Moreover, I em-
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ploy robustness tests, which are explained in the paper (cf. Skaaning, 2011; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012).  
  
Within-case analysis and process tracing 
Up till now, I have presented cross-case comparative methods that allow for logical minimisa-
tion/elimination of potential causal conditions for outcomes. The endemic problem for small-N 
research is that there are too many conditions and too few cases – something which large-N stud-
ies deal with using conventional statistical procedures. Many possible combinations of condi-
tions and outcomes are not available due to limited diversity in small samples, and because of the 
interest in necessity and sufficiency, these problems cannot be solved as in conventional statis-
tics by, e.g., confidence intervals and z-scores. King, Keohane & Verba (1994) recommend that 
small-N studies assimilate large-N studies by adding new observations/cases to the sample in 
order to compensate for ‘missing values’. This, they argue, can be done by increasing the ‘data 
points’ for a single case by within-case analysis, e.g. in which the case is treated at multiple 
points in time. Using this method, the number of observations increases, and it becomes possible 
to get information on relevant analytical conditions omitted in the initial analysis. George & 
Bennett (2005: 172-178) criticise this approach for being insensitive to issues of multicollineari-
ty (when new conditions are in fact correlated with old ones) and for overlooking path depend-
ency within cases (when an observation in t1 is dependent on an observation in t2). Instead they 
suggest the method of process tracing. The method involves a more careful attention to temporal-
ity by discovering intervening causal mechanisms between causal conditions and outcomes in 
social processes (George & Bennett, 2005: 206). I find this method useful, albeit demanding, 
because it requires the researcher to build comprehensive knowledge of social processes which 
might uncover how institutions affect bargaining outcomes, viz. bargaining coordination. In this 
way, I can qualify the cross-case comparison by showing that mediation institutions indeed have 
a causal effect on bargaining coordination by looking into the mechanism by which it produces 
coordination. 
The method of process tracing requires deep knowledge of social processes and building of 
valid and reliable narratives of how causal conditions affect the outcome in question through a 
causal mechanism. A causal mechanism is defined as the process or sequence of events leading 
from the causal condition to the outcome (Elster, 1989b). As I employ different concepts in my 
papers, the forms of process tracing of causal mechanism differ. At the core, however, is how 
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organisational actors strategically interact based on the institutional incentive structures and 
meaning structures in a given national bargaining context (Kochan et al., 1994). In ‘In search of 
control’, following the fsQCA, I go on to explore one causal mechanism, viz. the need for con-
trol over collective bargaining and how this was pursued in Denmark, Sweden and Norway 
through institutionalisation of strong CMA. The causal mechanism that I’m trying to detect 
through process tracing in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and ‘Bargaining in the 
crisis’ is the sequence of events by which mediation institutions constrain and enable certain 
kinds of behaviour, i.e. their invariant effect on how the bargaining parties will act to produce 
certain processes and outcomes of bargaining coordination. As Mahoney (2000b) remarks, pro-
cess tracing can also be used to investigate interaction between conditions. I show interaction 
between cross-class alliances in manufacturing and mediation institutions in ‘Did mediation save 
coordinated bargaining’ and how they are both INUS conditions for bargaining coordination, i.e. 
how they are insufficient for bargaining coordination on their own. Mediation institutions need a 
cost norm from manufacturing to mediate from, and cross-class alliances need mediation institu-
tions to bring other bargaining areas in line without undermining their bargaining autonomy.  
Process tracing also allows for studying deviant cases (George and Bennett, 2005: 215). By 
tracing processes for deviant cases, I try to uncover whether a condition is hidden in a sequence. 
For example, in ‘In search of control’, the aggregate cross-case fsQCA comparison showed that 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway belonged to high governance capacity, which made them deviant 
cases for the Elvander’s hypothesis. However, by process tracing using the exemplary historical-
sociological case studies of Stokke (1998), Due et al. (1993) and Elvander (1974), I detected 
how periods of low governance capacity had indeed spurred strong CMA, despite the generally 
high governance capacity in these countries. The condition was hidden in a sequence, probably 
due to path dependence. Thus for Norway and Denmark, once strong CMA was institutionalised 
in the 1930s, increasing governance capacity did not lead actors to revoke strong CMA. In Swe-
den, it was the exceptionally low governance capacity of the 1980s that spurred institutionalisa-
tion of a relatively strong CMA – despite Sweden’s generally high governance capacity. These 
processes of institutional change are – as noted by Ragin and Schneider & Wagemann (2012) – 
inherently difficult to incorporate into fsQCA. However, by adding process tracing and a ‘social 
chemistry’ approach to case studies by which different hypotheses can be reemployed for single 
cases over time (Gerring and McDermott, 2007; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006), we get a fuller 
picture of the causal mechanisms linking causal conditions to outcomes. 
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Triangulation of interviews and documents 
In the following section, I will present my use of semi-structured interviews and document anal-
ysis and the ways in which I combine the two in triangulation. Since I was not allowed to ob-
serve mediation and bargaining processes due to confidentiality issues, I was forced to rely on 
indirect data. The main research methods for process tracing in the dissertation are therefore 
document analysis and elite interviewing (see George & Bennett, 2005: chapter 10). By triangu-
lating different types of data it was possible to get thick descriptions of bargaining processes and 
the ways in which institutions influence these processes, which allows for grounded theory 
building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Triangulation is useful because comparisons of different 
methods and data sources might lead to confirmation of disconfirmation of claims based on sin-
gular data points (Denzin, 1970). In my dissertation this has also entailed a constant dialogue 
between data points and concepts as is customary in qualitative analysis (Ragin, 1987). Yin 
(1994) and George and Bennett (2005) recommend various types of data to discover patterns in 
social processes that might warrant claims about causal mechanisms, such as the institutional 
effects of mediation on bargaining processes and outcomes. Indeed, many influential studies of 
collective bargaining more or less explicitly adhere to such an approach (e.g. Due et al. 1993; 
Traxler et al. 2008; Sisson, 1987; Elvander, 1988; Locke and Thelen, 1995).  
Semi-structured elite interviewing is especially important for this dissertation as the accounts 
from negotiators and mediators are the only first-hand source for uncovering how institutions 
matter in bargaining processes and outcomes (Tansey, 2007). In the appendices I provide a com-
plete list of the interviews. There are several advantages and pitfalls of using elite interviewing. 
The foremost advantage for my studies was that negotiators and mediators could corroborate 
what formal documents stipulate regarding bargaining and mediation procedures, rules and ca-
pabilities. By reconstructing the processes of bargaining coordination, I got first-hand accounts 
of what actually happens before, during and after bargaining and mediation (Davies, 2001; 
Dexter, 1970). Moreover, by employing a so-called ‘epistemic’ interviewing technique 
(Brinkmann, 2007), I invited interviewees to reflect about the role of bargaining structures and 
mediation institutions by asking questions specifically related to my theoretical hypotheses. Fi-
nally, I used interviews to identify power relations between organisations in bargaining coordina-
tion – an approach similar to Traxler et al. (2008), who try to uncover power relations in Austri-
an pattern bargaining through qualitative interviews. As power is an elusive concept in collective 
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bargaining coordination (Lukes, 2005; Kelly, 2011) – which I show in ‘Three approaches to co-
ordinated bargaining’  – qualitative interviewing helped me grasped the ways in which how 
power was being exerted in social processes that go beyond merely inferring power from organi-
sational size and density of membership vis-à-vis other organisations.    
The interviews were semi-structured to balance the need of getting information on the key 
concepts and hypotheses while remaining open to deviations that might turn out important 
(Kvale, 1996). The interview guide was based on three layers of questions which were adapted to 
the interviewee in question. Firstly, I asked open descriptive questions regarding what the organ-
isation of the interviewee does in bargaining and mediation processes and what the outcomes of 
strategic choices were. The first layer is designed to establish that something is actually happen-
ing in bargaining and mediation. As Elster (1989b) notes, we need to know that something is 
actually taking place before we start to explain it. Getting inside the black box of bargaining lets 
us understand how/if coordination is practiced (Traxler et al., 2008). Secondly, I asked more 
analytical questions regarding the rationale behind strategies in bargaining and mediation. This 
layer is related to epistemic interviewing as it lets the interviewee reflect on his/her actions, 
which also makes it possible to ‘test’ hypotheses with the interviewee. While this is sometimes 
regarded as ‘leading’ interviewees to answer in certain ways (Bryman, 2001: 154), the epistemic 
approach encourages open reflection by capable actors (Brinkmann, 2007).Thirdly, I asked pre-
cise questions regarding the influence of certain institutions for the bargaining and mediation 
strategy of the organisation. This layer is very direct and was only used at the end of interviews 
to fully saturate the interview data. The interviewee was always asked open questions before the 
third layer in order not to influence the answer – although such influence can perhaps never be 
completely avoided in interview situations (Kvale, 1996). Sometimes I used this layer only in a 
confirmatory manner to establish that I had correctly understood the interviewee’s reflections 
upon his/her actions.   
I argue that the interviewed elites in this study are highly capable of assessing the validity of 
certain theoretical hypotheses if posed in open-ended questions. Nevertheless, there is a risk of 
interviewees making post-hoc rationalisations of processes and perhaps inflating or minimising 
their involvement in certain aspects of bargaining coordination (Tansey, 2007).When conducting 
the interviews with elites, I was constantly aware of the position of the interviewee, viz. their 
title and organisation, their interests in the subject, and their knowledge about the subject 
(Dexter, 1970). Likewise, triangulating interview statements with other interview data, docu-
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ments and secondary literature improves the reliability of interviews (Davies, 2001; Due and 
Madsen, 1996). To avoid distortion of statements, I make the choice not to quote any of the in-
terviewees in the papers since bargaining and mediation processes are typically sensitive to pub-
lic disclosure. Building trust so that interviewees could speak freely (and sometimes very nega-
tively about other actors) facilitated an open environment for the interviews. This has the obvi-
ous drawback that the very rich accounts in interviews cannot be fully developed – which is also 
partly because of the word limits of journal papers. A more interpretative research design could 
have elicited more information on the rationalisations of actors on bargaining and mediation pro-
cesses, even with complete anonymity of interviewees, and I concede that the choice of remain-
ing focused on institutions puts the actors in a background position. Nevertheless, I found the 
institutional story the most interesting, while acknowledging that it could not have been told 
without the information from interviews.  
Throughout the dissertation, I use document analysis to inform the analysis. While documents 
are almost invariantly used in any study – at least for literature reviews – it might seem redun-
dant to mention it. However, as Bowen (2009) notes, exactly because of its pervasive use, it is 
important to be more explicit. In the table below, I list the type of document analysis with its 
analytical purpose and some examples of the selected documents. 
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Table 8: Types, uses and examples of document analysis 
Type of document analysis and ana-
lytical purpose  
 
Examples of document type 
Analysis of statutory acts  
 
Purpose: Establish formal intended 
purpose of mediation, formal applica-
tion of mediation, legal scope of media-
tion and formal competences of media-
tor 
Statutory Act: Medbestämmandalagen (MBL) § 46-53 – Law on Codetermination 
(Sweden)  
Förordning (2007:912) med instruktion för Medlingsinstitutet – Ordinance with in-
struction for National Mediation Institution (Sweden) 
 
Statutory Act: Forligsmandsloven – Law on Mediation (Denmark) 
 
Used in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ 
 
Analysis of secondary sources 
 
Purpose: Calibrate strength of third 
party intervention understood as concil-
iation, mediation and arbitration in 
collective bargaining 
  
Legal analysis of CMA in various countries: Valdés Dal-Ré V. (2003) Labour concili-
ation, mediation and arbitration in European Union countries. Madrid: Ministerio de 
Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. 
 
Database on institutions for wage bargaining and industrial relations: Visser J. 
(2011b) ICTWSS database 3.0. In: http://www.uva-aias.net/208 (ed). Amsterdam. 
 
Used in ‘In search of control’ 
 
Analysis of collective agreements 
 
Purpose: Code provisions in collective 
agreements according to contribution to 
enhanced managerial prerogative 
and/or enhanced employee security  
Collective agreements: Agreements print and electrical contracting of UK, Denmark 
and Spain 2004-2007 
 
Agreements in Swedish and Danish manufacturing 
 
Used in ‘Striking a balance’, ‘Bargaining in the crisis’ and ‘Did mediation save coor-
dinated bargaining’ 
 
Analysis of pieces of legislation 
 
Purpose: Code provisions in legislation 
according to contribution to enhanced 
managerial prerogative and/or en-
hanced employee security   
Statutory Acts: Legislation on employee protection legislation (EPL), statutory rights 
to maternity/paternity/parental leave, statutory rights to education and training, mini-
mum wage legislation.  
 
Used in ‘Striking a balance’  
 
Analysis of social partners bargaining 
material 
 
Corroborate interview data by estab-
lishing bargaining views and strategies 
of social partners. Establish context of 
bargaining rounds 
 
Various web based news feeds and reports 
 
Used in ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ and ‘Bargaining in the crisis’  
Analysis of newspaper clippings 
 
Purpose: Corroborate interview data by 
establishing context, process of collec-
tive bargaining  
 
Various web based newspaper articles. Not sampled systematically in Sweden 
 
Used in ‘Bargaining in the crisis’  
 
Besides standard literature review, the analysis of documents are all based on non-quantitative 
content analysis whereby I organise documentary information into categories that are central to 
my research questions (Bryman, 2001: 183). There are four main empirical uses: 1) as sources on 
formal procedural institutions, 2) as sources on formal substantive institutions, 3) as sources that 
could corroborate interview data on bargaining processes and outcomes, and 4) as sources on 
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context for bargaining and mediation. Thus documents worked as actual data points, as back-
ground to generate questions for interviews and as sources to corroborate data from interviews 
through triangulation. 
There are many obvious advantages of document analysis besides it giving an opportunity for 
triangulation. Due especially to digitalisation, documents are readily available (Bowen, 2009). 
There are rich sources of information from organised actors that are more than willing to share 
their information and points of view on collective bargaining. Moreover, the growth of research-
based data for comparative institutional analysis makes the mid-size-N study more feasible than 
ever. Obviously, the drawback of plentiful document data is having to select it and process it 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). I have tried to select documents from both sides of the bargaining 
table – although I do find that unions are generally more active in disseminating information than 
employers, at least to the general public. Nevertheless, I recognise that organisational documents 
inherently frame reality in a certain way and that only in combination with other sources can we 
hope to approximate valid representations of reality. Similarly, using secondary studies to cali-
brate fuzzy scores obviously has the drawback that these studies were conducted with potentially 
different concepts in mind, which in turn reduces the validity of the study (Bryman, 2001: 72). 
Again, the solution has been to gather as many sources as possible to corroborate my calibra-
tions, but also to critically assess the match between my theories and the available data. As I re-
strict the analysis to formal institutions in the fsQCA study, I believe that the validity is generally 
high, while I acknowledge that formal institutions are not the same as actual practice. 
          
Data 
This section outlines the data generation and selection together with some methodological reflec-
tions on data quality issues. I reserve the treatment of limitations of my study to the final con-
cluding section.   
There are two interrelated levels of analysis in the dissertation: the level of nations and the 
level of organisations. Despite significant internationalisation of industrial relations and cross-
border coordination of bargaining (Marginson and Sisson, 2006), I contend that it is still war-
ranted to study national configurations of institutions when it comes to collective bargaining (see 
e.g. Bechter et al., 2012). This has a lot to do with case selection and the fact that Sweden and 
Denmark by most measures have retained high levels of coordination (Visser, 2011b). In these 
cases, the national level is an institutional one as I study national institutions for bargaining co-
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ordination. While conventional studies of coordination focus on bargaining levels and organisa-
tional procedures for coordination, this dissertation puts mediation institutions centre stage. In 
other countries with less coordination, the industry level or company level might be the appro-
priate choice due to convergence across countries of each industry or of company practices (Katz 
and Darbishire, 2000; Batt and Nohara, 2009). Organisations are the main actors in my analyses, 
but I try to map their strategies and interactions in relation to configurations of institutions and 
specific industry dynamics, such as skill requirements and exposure to international competition. 
Moreover, I side with conventional IR approaches in stressing the important role of the state in 
devising procedural frameworks for bargaining and in directly inducing or sanctioning certain 
behaviour by unions and employers’ associations (Sisson, 1987; Traxler, 2003a; see also Martin 
and Thelen, 2007). I do agree with recent literature that employers are pivotal actors 
(Busemeyer, 2012), but I abstain from making hard assumptions about this, as unions have been 
very influential in Sweden and Denmark – most likely due to supportive institutions like the 
Ghent-system, collective labour law and mediation institutions. 
 
Table 9: Papers and levels of analysis 
Paper Analytical level Type of data 
‘Did mediation save coordi-
nated bargaining’ 
National 
Organisational  
Document 
Interview 
‘In search of control’ National Document 
ICTWSS Database 
‘Bargaining in the crisis’ National 
Organisational  
Document 
Interview 
‘Three approaches to coor-
dinated bargaining’ 
National Document 
Interview 
‘Striking a balance’ National 
Organisational 
Document  
Interview 
 
For the organisational level, I build my analyses primarily on interviews while documents are 
secondary. As noted above, interviews with key negotiators and mediators are the key source of 
data for ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, ‘Bargaining in the crisis’ and ‘Striking a 
balance’. Moreover, interviews helped inform the conceptual discussion in ‘Three approaches to 
coordinated bargaining’. I chose representatives of organisations using a non-probability sam-
pling method for the interviews in line with the standard recommendations for process tracing 
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using elite interviewing (Tansey, 2007). The sampling was mainly purposive (Bryman, 2001: 
333-334), which entailed choosing lead negotiators from the main trade unions and employer 
associations that, given my prior knowledge and theoretical assumptions, were deemed to have 
an important role in bargaining coordination. Size of the organisation and their position in bar-
gaining coordination were two key parameters for sampling which lead me to choose leading 
negotiators from manufacturing, retail, private services, construction, finance, transport and stor-
age, in most cases from both employers’ associations and trade unions. Thus, both pattern-setters 
and pattern-takers, to use the jargon from ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, were 
interviewed. Moreover, representatives involved in bargaining coordination from confederations 
of both employers and unions were interviewed in both countries.  
Due to my prior research, sampling was easy in Denmark, while in Sweden it required some 
desktop work to locate key negotiators. I was fortunate to receive great help from the chief medi-
ator in Sweden for this task as he helped me in setting up interviews with mediators and many 
negotiators. I also employed snowball sampling (ibid.) by which already interviewed persons 
would refer me to relevant interviewees. In Sweden, I relied relatively more on this sampling 
method because of my initially limited knowledge of interview subjects. As the research pro-
gressed, sampling was made more purposive. While these non-probability sampling methods 
entail a risk of selection bias of interviewees (Tansey, 2007), the broad scope of interviewees as 
well as the limited numbers of negotiators and mediators in Sweden and Denmark somewhat 
eradicates this risk. Moreover, I preferred speaking to the relatively few negotiators in important 
bargaining areas over randomised selection which could have placed me well outside the ‘black 
box’ of bargaining coordination. A brief mention should be made of ‘Striking a balance’, which 
also relies on a different group of interviews.  My co-author, Mikkel Mailand, and I carried out 
23 semi-structured interviews in Great Britain, Spain and Denmark with trade union officials and 
employers’ association officials who had led negotiations on the flexicurity provisions in ques-
tion. Respondents were likewise chosen based on their proximity to and participation in top-level 
negotiations.  
In the appendices, I provide a full list of interviewees. In total, 83 interviews were used for the 
analyses of the dissertation, 13 of which were conducted by other persons than me. The repre-
sentativeness of the samples is generally good, but for some industries I did not get access to 
both sides of the bargaining table. The samples are especially skewed towards manufacturing, 
which I deemed most important at the outset of my data collection. Subsequently, I realised that 
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the pattern-following industries were just as important for my main argument, which spurred me 
to sample from these industries. I believe that the general argument is warranted by the selection 
of interviewees, but I would have liked to have had more time to interview negotiators from 
smaller bargaining areas especially. The sample of mediators, however, is by far the most com-
prehensive in research to date (cf. Stokke, 1998) which gives me good traction for my claims 
about the coordinative effect of mediation. All interviews save a handful were transcribed and 
coded using an additive coding frame in NVIVO with which I content-analysed interviews based 
on the concepts of interest to me. New nodes were added to the coding frame progressively, 
which required recoding of some prior coded interviews.   
At the national level, I mainly relied on document analysis, while for Sweden and Denmark – 
and Great Britain and Spain for ‘Striking a balance’ – I aggregated and triangulated interview 
data from the organisational level. Formal documents were always a first port of call to pinning 
down formal institutions. Rather than relying solely on the otherwise excellent studies of on 
Sweden and Denmark, I went to the relevant pieces of legislation on bargaining and mediation 
together with the bilateral negotiation procedure agreements and Basic Agreements at confeder-
ate level (see above). Moreover, online published resources on the bargaining processes of 2010 
were used to inform my subsequent interviews of negotiators and mediators which I use for 
‘Bargaining in the crisis’. To assess the outcomes of bargaining, the primary collective agree-
ments were studied to ensure that outcomes matched my analysis. However, I relied heavily on 
the yearly reports by Medlingsinstitutet and the agreement overview by Swedish LO (LO, 2005; 
LO, 2012), while the compiled information on bargaining rounds in Denmark by FAOS, which I 
partly produce myself, gave me on overview of bargaining rounds in Denmark (cf. FAOS, 2013; 
Navrbjerg et al., 2001). 
For the fsQCA, I mainly relied on secondary sources to calibrate cases, which can be seen in 
the data appendix to ‘In search of control’. To calibrate union power and governance capacity, I 
used Jelle Visser’s Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts in 34 countries (ICTWSS). The database, which I most fre-
quently used in comparative studies (e.g. Avdagic et al., 2011; Traxler and Brandl, 2012), covers 
four key elements of modern political economies: trade unionism, wage setting, state interven-
tion and social pacts. The database contains annual data for all OECD and EU member states 
with some additional data for emerging economies Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and 
South Africa, and the version I use runs from 1960 till 2011. I used data on the seventeen West-
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ern European countries to calibrate fuzzy membership scores. When values were missing I ex-
trapolated from available years. Visser’s database compiles information from various sources, 
including large-N quantitative studies and annual reporting to Visser from national experts on 
IR. A detailed presentation of coding and sources can be found in Visser (Visser, 2011a).  
I used different secondary sources to calibrate regulation of industrial action. Cross-national 
studies by Warneck (2007), Jacobs (1993a) and EIRO (2006) were used as well as a host of na-
tional sources from Valdéz Dal-Ré (2003), Ferner & Hyman (1998) and (Bamber et al., 2011) to 
corroborate the comparative studies. I also used data from the European Association of Labour 
Court Judges (EALCJ, 2013) and national expert accounts from EIRO/EMIRE (EIRO, 2013) to 
calibrate labour court traditions. Finally, I used national expert sources and comparative studies 
to calibrate strong CMA: the European Commission project on CMA edited by Valdés Dal-Ré 
(2003), the earlier Commission project by Jacobs (1993b) and the EIRO comparative study 
(2006) of third party intervention. To avoid naïve formalistic calibration, the national expert ac-
counts also contain information about ‘dead letter’ CMA systems that are never used, in which 
case the fuzzy score is calibrated accordingly. By including various documentary sources to cor-
roborate each other, I believe that the calibrations are sound. However, I concede that my subjec-
tive judgments in choosing ‘qualitative anchors’ for calibration can be erroneous (Verkuilen, 
2005), which is why I have attached the raw data tables for each condition and outcome for 
transparency and scrutiny (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010).  
In sum, the data provide rich accounts of national configurations of institutions together with 
the bargaining and mediation processes. With the exception of my fsQCA study, I chose analyti-
cal depth with the inevitable loss of robustness and generalisability that a large-N study can pro-
vide. Moreover, inherent in any study – especially qualitative case studies like mine – are issues 
of subjective judgments that potentially compromise reliability and replicability of the study. I 
tried to overcome this issue by being transparent in my analytical approach and in my data selec-
tion, but I concede that other researchers may arrive at different conclusions when studying con-
cepts like strong CMA, institutional change, bargaining coordination, solidarity and voluntarism 
(see e.g. Baccaro and Howell, 2011). However, perhaps this is not so problematic. To paraphrase 
Parsons (2007), I am not arguing with Truth itself, after all, but with other scholars over who has 
the most convincing story to tell about collective bargaining coordination and mediation.         
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5. Contributions and limitations of the study 
In this final section, I conclude by presenting the main contributions and limitations of the dis-
sertation. It is obviously difficult to make a singular conclusion from the five papers which – 
despite a common theme of collective bargaining – address distinct puzzles and research ques-
tions. As noted in the introduction, there are multiple fruitful angles from which we can analyse 
collective bargaining, and I have tried to choose the ones that I find most interesting and most 
puzzling. Most importantly, I add mediation as a pivotal institution for bargaining coordination 
in Sweden and Denmark after centralised bargaining. In this concluding section, I present the 
main theoretical and empirical contributions to comparative studies of collective bargaining. 
Finally, I reflect on some of the limitations of my study and what should be done in future re-
search. 
  
Theoretical contributions 
My study shows that comparative studies of collective bargaining should pay attention to institu-
tions for conflict resolution out of which mediation plays an important role in many countries. 
Institutionalised procedures that help parties with diverging interests to overcome conflicts are 
part of the ‘polity’ of labour markets and should therefore be a first port of call when investigat-
ing collective bargaining. Therefore, instead of equating bargaining institutions with bargaining 
levels and structures, the procedural institutions of conflict resolution should be considered. Per-
haps because these institutions are regarded as second-order and because they change very little 
over time, scholars tend to forget them. However, this does not mean that they stop mattering or 
that the function of these institutions hasn’t changed despite formal stability. Conflict regulation 
institutions are not neutral but rather cater to the interests of certain actors and therefore also a 
certain order in market relations between capital and labour. Do they allow for coordinated solu-
tions? Are their purposes governed by neutrality or by certain socioeconomic outcomes? Do they 
force employers into bargaining with unions? Or do they make it hard for unions to force em-
ployers into bargaining?  
Surely, the decline of unionism, wage decentralisation and bargaining coverage in some coun-
tries can be partly explained by technological change, market integration, neoliberal ideology 
and new political coalitions, but the lesson from the last three decades of neo-institutionalism is 
that these changes will be mediated by institutions, of which, I argue, conflict resolution proce-
dures are pivotal. The key point is whether institutions bolster or hinder collective bargaining, 
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and one needs only to look at the important consequences of the regulation of industrial action to 
prove this. In Great Britain during the 1980s-1990s, restrictions on industrial action took away 
unions’ primary tool to force employers into bargaining under voluntarism. Conversely in Swe-
den and Denmark, mediation institutions that facilitate wage moderation, while preserving the 
right to industrial action, reinforced bargaining despite adverse structural changes. Indeed, as 
markets change, so will conflict regulation (Brown, 2004) and this interplay holds important in-
formation about the future of bargaining, viz. whether it can deliver agreements that holds bar-
gaining systems together.       
Accordingly, ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ contributes to theoretical discus-
sions about institutional change in two ways. Firstly, it shows that the discussion between power 
resource theory and cross-class alliance can be solved by loosening some propositions. The 
cross-class alliance theory is right in giving employers an important role in coordination of bar-
gaining due to their interest in control over wage setting. As Traxler (2003b) notes, unions can 
help this by increasing bargaining coverage which reduces competition over wages. However, 
this interest is a second-order interest based on the existence of strong unions. In their absence, it 
is hard to imagine employers being interested in or able to even propose, let alone enforce, coor-
dinated wage setting. As Korpi (2006) contends, employers are better termed as ‘consenters’ 
than ‘protagonists’, and the Swedish employer strategies during the 1990s are testament to this. 
Recall that it was unions that came up with Industriavtalet in 1996/1997. Theories of coalitions 
that change within and across classes are arguably more accurate than pure versions of power 
resource and cross-class alliance theory (Thelen, 2012; Due and Madsen, 1996). If bargaining 
systems are considered as inter-organisational relations (Due et al., 1993) we see that the inter-
ests of actors can be moulded if the counterpart moves to save the relation – as the Swedish 
manufacturing unions did in 1996 leading to Industriavtalet in 1997. Moreover, the independent 
effect of the state as an active agent in coalitions should be considered instead of viewing it as a 
mere weathervane for the interests of societal groups.          
Secondly, we can refine the hypotheses of power resource and cross-class alliances by show-
ing how institutions of conflict regulation facilitate or obstruct certain actors from pushing insti-
tutional change in accordance with their interest. In Denmark, the mediation institution was – in 
its existing form – well-suited for wage moderation as long as linkage across bargaining areas 
could be based on the manufacturing agreement. In other words, it complemented the interest of 
the manufacturing cross-class alliance. What had to happen in Denmark, then, was a reconfigura-
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tion of power internally in the confederations of employer associations and trade unions towards 
manufacturing. Here, the employers had the first-mover advantage in their centralising of power 
in DI very quickly during the early 1990s. Institutional change is driven by entrepreneurial actors 
that try to adjust existing institutions to their interests, but often they can only do this by using 
the opportunities existing institutions give them (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Conversely, the 
secret to maintaining institutions, e.g. for wage solidarity, despite adverse structural changes is to 
adjust them so that they cater to changed circumstances – the ‘change to persevere’ argument 
that Katzenstein (1985) and Thelen (2012) posit.       
Running through the papers, I find that the key interest of employers is control. This echoes 
Sisson’s (1987) finding that employers engage in collective bargaining because they wish to re-
store managerial prerogative at the shop floor by compartmentalising union activities to market 
relations. We find the concern about control in different ways across industries. In sheltered sec-
tors with highly skilled labour, control over labour supply is crucial and employers are willing to 
pay above-market rates to achieve this. In exposed sectors with highly skilled labour, control 
over wage externalities is essential and they have to achieve this by forcing other industries into 
line. In exposed sectors with low-skilled workers, control over labour costs and thus downward 
flexibility is critical, while in sheltered sectors with low-skilled workers, control over inter-firm 
wage competition is indispensable. Coarse arguments about neo-liberalism and unidirectional 
employer pushes for more flexibility do not fit empirical reality (Swenson, 2002). To be sure, 
some employers might wish for more flexibility because it enhances their control over wages, 
but other employers in other markets might suffer severely for this. In this way, employers’ in-
terest in flexibility and wage moderation are underpinned by a deeper-level interest in control of 
the market situation they are facing. In turn, conflict regulation institutions – and third party in-
stitutions – can increase or decrease the positive role played by unions in employers’ quest for 
control over employment relations.        
In ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’, I show how three different approaches yield 
three different analyses of bargaining coordination. Specifically, I try to go beyond the view that 
bargaining is merely ‘interest mediation’ by showing the value of including cognitive and nor-
mative discourse to the analysis. The crucial point is to illustrate how these elements entail pow-
er relations in making actors behave in ways that they might not have chosen otherwise. Howev-
er, instead of treating discourse as macro-level hegemonic ideologies that determine behaviour, 
the analysis of Sweden and Denmark shows that discourses are used in interest-based politics 
 
 
84
over the specific equilibrium between wage moderation, flexibility, solidarity and voluntarism. 
Moreover, I show that this equilibrium is institutionalised in the technical details of how actors 
coordinate, e.g. on whether they choose coordination around percentage increases or nominal 
increases or whether they compare the scope for wage increases with wage developments in 
Germany or China. Admittedly, analysis of discourse in bargaining coordination needs to go 
further than merely showing examples. Nevertheless, the paper outlines the merits of also focus-
ing on meaning structures that affect what is desirable for actors and show how they can achieve 
it. This gives us a way to get to know how actors make sense of the objective market structures 
that they inhabit (Blyth, 2003; Schmidt, 2010). 
Finally, to behavioural theories of mediation I add an institutionalist perspective. Mediation is 
an institutionalised part of bargaining (Stevens, 1963) and even with the most disregarded me-
diator, any party has to consider mediation as a step in the bargaining process that his/her coun-
terpart can use strategically. Often studies of mediation stress micro-processes and how media-
tors affect processes in various ways. My study shows that mediation of collective bargaining – 
at least in the Swedish and Danish context – is highly institutionalised with specific rules of the 
game for mediation that impinge on the processes and outcomes of bargaining. Specifically, the 
stated purposes and capabilities of mediators provide an incentive structure for bargaining par-
ties, as I illustrate in the decision tree above. Thus, by including the institutional foundation of 
mediation, we can explain certain regularities that mediator techniques, styles or personalities 
cannot capture. By this, I do not mean to suggest that the individual properties of mediators are 
inconsequential, by no means. Skilled mediators can have a great role in facilitating settlements. 
However, in the context of coordinated bargaining systems, it needs to be recognised that they 
operate in a highly institutionalised environment with organised actors that meet regularly over 
outcomes that have systemic consequences for national labour markets.  
 
Empirical contributions 
The dissertation makes a number of empirical contributions to studies of Nordic models of coor-
dinated collective bargaining and studies of third party intervention. Only a few can be men-
tioned in this section. Firstly, ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, ‘Bargaining in the 
crisis’ and ‘Three approaches to coordinated bargaining’ all build on the seminal studies of El-
vander (1974; 2002), Stokke (1998; 2002), Kjellberg (1998), Due et al. (1993), Due & Madsen 
(2006), and Scheuer  (1993; 1998) (1993/1998) of bargaining coordination in Sweden and Den-
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mark. It extends these studies beyond the turmoil of the 1980s and 1990s and shows how media-
tion institutions facilitated a new bargaining order in which industry-level bargaining remained 
horizontally coordinated while framework agreements gave greater scope for company-level 
bargaining. Moreover, the studies show how and why Sweden and Denmark diverged despite 
their similarities, which complement Stokke and Elvander’s comparative work on mediation 
institutions in the Scandinavian countries. Empirically, the dissertation updates these works by 
also considering the new equilibria in Sweden and Denmark, respectively, between wage moder-
ation, flexibility, solidarity and voluntarism, and what role mediation institutions play in this 
alongside bargaining structures and alliances. In this way, we also get a sense of future bargain-
ing dynamics. It is likely that we will continue to see relatively more contestation over wage sol-
idarity and flexibility in Sweden due to the more fragmented bargaining system. However, defec-
tions and bargaining breakdowns might be too negligible to really matter, and if Swedish history 
has told us anything, it is that the parties are capable of finding ways to keep coordination to-
gether. Conversely, the stability in Denmark is likely to continue with the current bargaining 
system. Nevertheless, the Danish situation might change due to a decline in union membership 
and the growing need for union leaders to mark their turf.  
Secondly, ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’ specifically contributes with a process 
analysis of how mediation contributes to coordination. It thus goes beyond merely linking the 
purpose and capabilities of mediators with bargaining outcomes by also showing how this is 
done and what is required. For example, I show the specific requirements that have to be fulfilled 
for the mediator to broker agreements in Denmark. In Sweden, I show that public naming and 
shaming in manufacturing mediation is an important element when bargaining areas wish to go 
outside the norm. This should give us a better understanding of what actually goes on inside bar-
gaining processes and why different steps matter. Moreover, it points forward to micro-studies of 
mediation processes in collective bargaining and how different mediator techniques, styles and 
strategies lead to settlements.   
Thirdly, the dissertation contributes the first systematic comparative analysis of explanations 
for strong third party intervention, or CMA, in collective bargaining. ‘In search of control’ cor-
roborates Elvander’s original hypothesis that it is the search for control over strong, fragmented 
unions that leads to strong CMA. The causal conditions related to strong CMA are found in 
terms of sufficiency and necessity. Two combinations of conditions are sufficient for strong 
CMA. The Nordic path includes strong unions, high governance capacity and specialised labour 
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courts. The Mediterranean path includes strong unions, low governance capacity and weak regu-
lation of industrial action. There are no necessary conditions for strong CMA, although strong 
unions are present in both solution terms. This is mostly due to the high bargaining coverage in 
Western Europe. Through process tracing, I find that incidents of low governance capacity are 
found in reforms to strong CMA, which can potentially merge the two paths into the combina-
tion of strong unions and low governance capacity. Conversely, the court system tradition, as 
suggested by Valdés Dal-Ré (2003), seems less important. I find that strong CMA complements 
collective bargaining by trying to control the risk of industrial action without obstructing collec-
tive bargaining itself (Brown, 2004). This logic can be found in both Nordic and Mediterranean 
reforms.   
Fourthly, ‘Bargaining in the crisis’ shows how coordinated bargaining systems in Sweden and 
Denmark respond to a historic economic crisis in a neo-Rehn-Meidner world (Erixon, 2010; 
Klindt, 2008). Due to framework agreements that allow internal measures of flexibility, compa-
nies do not just adjust externally through redundancies, the costs of which society handle. In-
stead, the Crisis Agreement on working time and wage reductions in Swedish manufacturing and 
the considerable wage adjustments in Denmark bear testament to the use of internal forms of 
flexibility that would have been hard to realise during the heyday of centralised wage bargaining. 
The analysis, moreover, shows that Swedish employers used the crisis to awake a perhaps 
‘dormant wish’ to strip industry-level agreements from wage rates; it additionally shows that the 
processes of agreement settlement was much more unstable due to the relative fragmentation of 
bargaining parties. In Denmark, by contrast, it was relatively smooth sailing with Danish em-
ployers using the already expansive scope to adjust wages in industry-level agreements. For their 
part, unions focused on non-wage issues as leverage to get members on board. Danish unions 
thus follow an established tradition of pushing for non-wage issues in industry-level bargaining 
because actual wage increases are negotiated locally.     
Finally, ‘Striking a balance’ shows that collective bargaining can create balances between la-
bour market flexibility and security – even under adverse circumstances such as in market-
dominated Great Britain and government-dominated Spain. Flexicurity refers not only macro-
level statutory policies on active and passive labour market policies but also to balances between 
internal forms of flexibility and security. Indeed, collective bargaining enables regulation by the 
direct parties of the employment relationship, thus potentially providing a flexible fit between 
regulation and the realities of specific labour markets. Conversely, collective bargaining is by 
87 
 
nature different from individual contractual relationships in which security of workers (and in 
some cases employers) might be jeopardised. As Commons and the Webbs showed a long time 
ago, it is organisation by market actors that prevents labour market transactions from turning into 
a ‘race to the bottom’. The analysis, moreover, suggests that bargaining autonomy, power parity 
and mutual trust between the parties might promote conditions for development of flexicurity in 
collective bargaining, but also that the state as a facilitator or coercer might induce bargaining 
parties to settle in balanced ways.  
 
Limitations and ways forward 
I conclude this introduction by highlighting a few important limitations of my study that, in my 
opinion, point the way to future research. Firstly, the study is highly skewed towards the Swe-
dish and Danish reality of labour markets and collective bargaining. What is gained in empirical 
detail is perhaps lost in generalisability and parsimony. I limit the study of CMA in other coun-
tries to formal document analysis and secondary literature whereby I exclude the actual bargain-
ing and mediation practice. Future case studies of CMA practice in other countries could en-
hance our understanding of the positive relationship between CMA and coordination bargaining, 
which perhaps can only be found in the very small sample of Nordic countries (see also Stokke, 
2002). Indeed, in less coordinated systems, CMA probably has a quite different role as shown by 
the US literature. However, this should not make us lose sight of the supportive role that third 
party intervention can play for collective bargaining as a regulatory process. As Brown suggests 
(2004), the nature of CMA itself might change due to the decline of industrial action and market 
integration, moving from a preoccupation for control and industrial peace to support and social 
justice. More case studies will reveal this.  
Secondly and related, the study does not warrant conclusions that strong CMA generally leads 
to certain bargaining outcomes as some large-N studies can. For example, using time series 
cross-sectional regression analysis (TSCS), Baccaro & Simoni (2010) have shown that union 
balloting actually has a wage moderating effect. Traxler and colleagues have shown in multiple 
TSCS analyses that compliance mechanisms are significant for wage moderation and employ-
ment. In a similar way, it would be interesting in the future to analyse the effect of CMA on key 
macroeconomic outcomes such as inflation and employment but also on levels of industrial ac-
tion. Usually CMA is included in wage coordination indicators as an intermediate level of wage 
coordination in which the government assists bargaining with procedural frameworks. By ex-
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tracting the CMA institution and coding its strength, we might approach the net effect of CMA 
on key bargaining outcomes. The calibration made for ‘In search of control’ could be used for 
this purpose. 
Thirdly, future studies of third party intervention would benefit from a more in-depth histori-
cal study of when and how CMA was established. Such studies should be political in nature, 
attuned to the interests of coalitions that either promoted or obstructed the establishment of 
strong CMA. My analysis stresses the need for control because of strong, fragmented unions, but 
the response to such need is ultimately political and contingent upon the strategies of actors. Re-
lated to the point made above on CMA practice, tracing the practice of CMA through time will 
also reveal whether CMA had a significant role to play in bargaining or not. Thus, the more in-
cremental processes of institutional change should also be considered alongside the critical junc-
tures of abrupt institutional change. 
Fourthly, I point to the ways in which discourses inform interest-based politics between un-
ions, employers and governments, but I do not develop this beyond a few examples. Future re-
search of collective bargaining should do this more systematically. Bargaining coordination ob-
viously is about interest-mediation, but ideas can give content to interests by defining the norma-
tive and cognitive orientations of actors. Unions in Sweden and Denmark clearly pursue different 
bargaining strategies, which can be explained by fragmentation of actors in the former and con-
centration in the latter country, but they also use somewhat different ideas of solidarity to make 
sense of these strategies. Whether ideas are used post-hoc as legitimisations of bargaining strate-
gies or ex-ante as frames to formulate bargaining demands would be interesting to trace histori-
cally. In connection to this, the role of governments in influencing the bargaining agenda 
through, for example, supply-side policies and rhetoric is also of interest. Recent research has 
shown how welfare state reform and collective bargaining processes are tightly interconnected 
(Palier and Thelen, 2010; Trampusch, 2009; Mailand, 2008). With a high degree of coordination 
and coverage, bargaining systems are likely to be of future interest for governments that wish to 
alleviate fiscal burdens or optimise labour markets through supply-side reforms.    
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Paper 1:  
Did mediation save coordinated bargaining? A 
comparative case study of Sweden and Denmark 
 
Christian Lyhne Ibsen 
 
Abstract 
The article compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark since decentral-
isation. The historical-comparative case study shows that confederate bargaining has been re-
placed with a pattern bargaining system based on cross-class alliances in the exposed manufac-
turing sector. In contrast to conventional literature, this article stresses the importance of media-
tion institutions in institutional change. By pegging settlements to the pattern, mediation institu-
tions of both countries have a necessary role in solving collective action problems in pattern bar-
gaining. Their capabilities, however, differ, which is reflected in more frequent defections in 
Sweden. Defections in Sweden, moreover, appear to be driven by unions’ continuing stress on 
wage solidarity, whereas Danish unions have refocused on supply-side issues. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
When centralised bargaining ended in Sweden and Denmark, many pronounced coordinated 
egalitarian wage bargaining in deep crisis (Ahlén, 1989). Industry-level bargaining with strong 
unions posed a threat to wage restraint and full employment as some protected sectors would be 
able to negotiate pay hikes with negative cost-push externalities and inflation as a consequence 
(Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). With no encompassing confederation to internalise cost-push pay 
hikes in centralised bargaining, wage moderation might be jeopardised (Olson, 1982). Converse-
ly, bargaining at industry level and flexible wage-setting would increase inequality and low 
skilled workers especially would lose out due to increased skills premium. One highlighted solu-
tion was pattern bargaining with manufacturing as the pattern-setter for the rest of the labour 
market, which could induce wage restraint in protected sectors and ensure uniform improve-
ments in an ‘organised decentralisation’ (Iversen, 1996; Swenson, 2002; Traxler et al., 2008). 
Horizontal power differentials between federate-level actors together with sufficient vertical con-
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trol have been identified as a precondition for this type of coordination to work (Traxler and 
Brandl, 2012).  
The bargaining parties in the two countries faced a similar challenge of institutional design 
that could reintroduce wage moderation and introduce flexibility while preserving the fundamen-
tal principles of collectivism and voluntarism. The claim of this article is that the resilience of 
bargaining coordination in Sweden and Denmark cannot fully be explained by conventional ap-
proaches to institutional change as they underspecify – or omit – how certain industrial relations 
institutions, most notably mediation, solve collective action problems inherent in coordination. 
The purpose of this article is therefore to investigate the impact of mediation institutions on pri-
vate sector pattern bargaining after centralised bargaining. Importantly, the question is whether 
mediation institutions that peg settlements to the manufacturing bargaining result can help solve 
collective action problems that were previously resolved by centralisation. 
The analysis is historical-comparative and builds on a variety of sources that are part of a larg-
er project on mediation institutions in Western Europe with special focus on Sweden and Den-
mark. This article mainly builds on two data sources. First, it analyses formal rules for mediation 
institutions and bargaining procedures. Second, interviews with key negotiators and mediators 
together with historical document analysis are used to uncover the actual strategies and processes 
of pattern bargaining and mediation within formal structures and procedures. Interviews were 
conducted with key bargaining actors from the main private sector industries in the two coun-
tries, most notably the pattern-setting manufacturing sector, and pattern-followers in the 
transport, building, retail, private services, finance and construction sectors. This was coupled 
with interviews with representatives from the union and employer confederations. Lastly, media-
tors in both countries were interviewed. In total sixty interviews were conducted. Due to con-
cerns of confidentiality, none of the interviewees are quoted directly and their statements are 
used exclusively to map the actual processes of formalised procedures (see Traxler et al., 2008 
for a similar approach). Together the sources provided a comprehensive set of data to build a 
contextualised comparative case analysis across time and space (Locke and Thelen, 1995).  
Sweden and Denmark are close to optimal for a most-similar case comparison of industrial re-
lations systems (Stokke, 1998). They are both small open economies with similar business struc-
tures that face similar market challenges. Moreover, the two countries are usually lumped to-
gether in welfare and industrial relations typologies as they share many important characteristics, 
including high union density, high bargaining coverage, universalist social democratic welfare 
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systems, country size and similar cultural backgrounds (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Lastly, both 
countries have converged onto a non-inflationary fiscal and monetary policy regime (Iversen and 
Pontusson, 2000). Accordingly, we should be looking for the fine details in the institutions and 
strategies of actors when explaining differences in bargaining processes and outcomes.  
The article proceeds as follows. Following this introduction, the second section outlines the 
theoretical framework used to explain the apparent differences between the two countries. In this 
section, the effect of mediation institutions on bargaining coordination is introduced as a com-
plement to conventional theory on institutional change, viz. power resource theory and cross-
class alliance theory. The third section compares the pattern bargaining systems in Sweden and 
Denmark with the crucially important mediation institutions as the analytical centrepiece. The 
institutions of bargaining and mediation are presented and analysed in a comparative-historical 
manner together with the resulting coordination practices and outcomes. The final section dis-
cusses findings and reflects on the theoretical and empirical implications of the study.  
POLITICS OF PATTERN BARGAINING AND THE EFFECT OF MEDIATION 
Pattern bargaining at industry level is formally non-hierarchical – due to the absence or limited 
role of confederate bargaining – and requires that manufacturing settles first on a labour cost-
norm (henceforth called the norm) (Sisson and Marginson, 2002). The norm is ideally a percent-
age ceiling for labour cost increases that can be transposed into other pattern-following agree-
ments (Traxler et al., 2008). Bargaining is synchronised in terms of agreement periods; otherwise 
economic conditions for laggards might change the bargaining situation. Decentralisation from 
peak-level bargaining to pattern bargaining entailed a challenge of institutional design. The chal-
lenge was to introduce flexibility and reintroduce wage moderation into the bargaining model 
while preserving the fundamental principles of collectivism and voluntarism. As such, the insti-
tutional challenge meant realignment of both cross-class and intra-class coalitions resulting in a 
fundamental collective action problem –in terms of both designing institutions and sustaining 
them by avoiding defections in subsequent bargaining rounds (Scheuer, 1993).  
The bourgeoning literature on institutional change has recently focused on endogenous incre-
mental change with accumulative consequences (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). This strand of lit-
erature departs from punctuated equilibrium models of change and from investigation of critical 
junctures in which exogenous shocks shift the conditions for political, cognitive or normative 
lock-ins of institutions (Pierson, 2000; Teague, 2009). Thelen (2009) proposes various types of 
incremental institutional change. Drift refers to a slow decay of institutions that become ill-suited 
103 
 
to new circumstances and are made redundant or replaced. Layering refers to processes by which 
new institutions are formed while preserving the old ones. This changes actors’ strategies as they 
can manoeuvre in a changed institutional setting. Old and new institutions might exist in compe-
tition, leading to drift, or they might co-exist. Conversion refers to processes in which actors 
reinterpret the rules of the game, thus changing the function – not form – of institutions. Authors 
investigating collective bargaining have noticed that resilience of institutional forms, e.g. bar-
gaining coordination, might co-exist with changes of institutional functions, e.g. greater manage-
rial discretion (Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Instead of plain displacement of existing institutions 
by new ones, these types of changes might actually save coordination and collectivism; in other 
words, you need to change to persevere (Thelen, 2012).  
How do we explain the solutions in which bargaining coordination is changed but not disman-
tled? Two schools of thought have dominated analysis of institutional change in collective bar-
gaining. The logic of power resource theory building associated with work by Walter Korpi is 
pervasive in industrial relations scholarship (Godard, 2004; Korpi and Shalev, 1980). According 
to this logic, resilience of coordinated collective bargaining can only be achieved by strong un-
ions alone or together with strong Left parties. Thus, in the face of high unemployment and post-
Fordist production from the late 1960s and onwards, different power resources of labour meant 
that some countries resisted ‘disorganised decentralisation’ (Traxler, 1995). The sources of pow-
er can be many (Kelly, 2011), but sufficiently broad and dense union movements are needed to 
equalise the inherent power imbalance between employers and employees (Godard, 2004) and 
avoid intra-class competition on terms and conditions of employment (Traxler, 1998). In the ab-
sence of strong unions and statutory extension mechanisms, employers would prefer individual-
ised contracts as a means to achieve flexibility and wage moderation through market discipline. 
As Teague (2009: 518) has recently argued, the new collective bargaining system in Sweden did 
not dismantle the fundamental principles of collectivism and self-regulation due to strong unions. 
The second logic stems from cross-class alliance theory and its affinities with Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC). At the core of this logic, employers are not passive takers or opponents but 
often active proponents for coordination (Hall and Thelen, 2009). Following cross-class alliance 
scholars (Iversen, 1996; Swenson, 1991; Swenson and Pontusson, 2000), it is possible to map 
cross-class alliances based on common interests between capital and labour due to the position of 
industries in labour markets and product markets. The market-vulnerable alliance consists of 
companies under fierce low-cost competition employing low-skilled workers. Low-skilled un-
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ions previously benefited from solidaristic peak-level bargaining where high-skilled workers 
accept wages below-market clearance levels in return for high employment. Conversely, em-
ployers in this alliance benefited from taking wages out of competition. The strategic alliance, 
typically in exposed high-end manufacturing, has a common interest in flexible wage-setting to 
attract high-skilled labour but must avoid cost-push externalities from other sectors due to for-
eign competition. Finally, the sheltered alliance consists of employers that are not in competition 
with foreign companies. This alliance can easily pass on pay hikes to price increases for con-
sumers and since workers are high in demand, defection from the pattern is opportune. Scheuer 
(1993) depicts the risk of defection as an N-way prisoners’ dilemma. Thus, according to this the-
ory, cross-class alliances and the outcome of their power battles will determine institutional de-
sign (Iversen, 1996). If the strategic alliance yields sufficient power over the others, bargaining 
coordination will reflect this.    
Consequently, what should we make of actors’ interests and strategies? Industrial relations 
scholars have long documented the partly diverging, partly converging interests of capital and 
labour across sectors. Sisson (1987), Traxler (1996) and Due et al. (1996) argue that strong un-
ions were the prima facie reason for employer coordination to ‘cartelise’ prices through wages, 
avoid leapfrogging tactics and unrest on the shop-floor. Korpi (2006) argues that employers are 
mere consenters – not protagonists – when it comes to bargaining coordination and when given 
the choice, employers are antagonistic towards coordination. By showing that employers have a 
second-best preference for coordination, the differences between power resource theory and 
cross-class alliances seem reconcilable (Korpi, 2006). Thus, while we should recognise that em-
ployers are key players in changing bargaining institutions, such changes are contingent upon 
union power resources (Due et al., 1994; Hall and Thelen, 2009). Recently, Busemeyer has 
shown that employers are ‘pivotal actors’ in designing institutions due to an institutionally con-
structed dependency of the state and unions on continued support from business (Busemeyer, 
2012). Similarly, Howell and Givan (2011) and Palier and Thelen (2010) stress how the state has 
promoted changes in industrial relations towards greater flexibility furthering the interests of 
cross-class alliances in manufacturing. 
The problem with these two schools of thought and their potential compromise is that their 
primary focus is on material interests and power resources – although they disagree on the struc-
ture of interests and power. Institutions become a reflection of these factors and not an explain-
ing factor in itself (Parsons, 2007). In other words, both theories assume a link between material 
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interests and institutions but the mechanisms of institutional design are not clear cut. Thus, cross-
class alliances can explain why a strategic alliance in manufacturing – the key bargaining sector 
– should attempt to control other sectors in a coordinated bargaining model due to considerations 
of wage moderation and flexibility, but we need to know the mechanisms or conditions to 
achieve this.  
As Traxler et al. (2008) note, remarkably little is known about the agency of pattern bargain-
ing and how it is institutionalised in bargaining procedures. In their study of Austria, Traxler et 
al. (2008: 40-42) argue that the functionality of pattern bargaining – and thus employers’ contin-
ued support of bargaining coordination – is contingent upon interest mediation by social control. 
First, the exposed sector should wield power over other bargaining units, notably sheltered sec-
tors. This can be achieved through size and importance of the sector together with high organisa-
tional density. Mergers in manufacturing unions and employer federations are beneficial to this 
(Iversen, 1996; Marsden, 1999). Second, the exercise of power must be latent and non-
intentional as to not compromise self-autonomy of other bargaining units. Third, the exposed 
sector must itself show wage moderation, even though it typically increases productivity relative-
ly more. In this way, counter claims for wage increases in other sectors due to wage drift in 
manufacturing can be avoided.    
Taking the authors’ argument further, the challenge of institutional design begs the question of 
how social control can be institutionalised in repeated bargaining rounds. Recently, Baccaro and 
Simoni (2010) have criticised the focus on bargaining levels and coordination and the neglect of 
internal organisational procedures of bargaining parties, that is, institutions. Contrary to main-
stream neo-corporatism, their study shows how union ballots actually increase wage moderation 
rather than decrease it. In doing so, they underline how important decision-making procedures 
are for the actions of organised labour and employers. In this vein, we need to include the rein-
terpretation of existing institutions or establishment of new institutions to explain how the intro-
duction of flexibility and reintroduction of wage moderation could be introduced without dis-
mantling coordination based on collectivism and voluntarism. 
 
Bringing in mediation institutions  
As noted, the impact of mediation for coordination has largely been underemphasised in interna-
tional comparative work on bargaining coordination (e.g. Swenson, 2002; Traxler et al., 2008; 
Wallerstein and Golden, 2000). Case studies, however, have shown that mediation institutions 
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can have a coordinating role in collective bargaining and that bargaining parties and their relative 
powers are not alone in explaining coordination (Due et al., 1994; Elvander, 2002; Stokke, 
1998). Mediation differs from the related activity of conciliation in that the mediator can actively 
propose settlements to bargaining parties that cannot settle on their own. But in contrast to arbi-
tration, the mediator cannot make binding settlements that bargaining parties must follow.  
Stokke (1998) notes two general roles that can be found in Scandinavian mediation. The 
peacemaker is a neutral third party appointed by the state or the parties whose only objective is 
to produce a settlement according to bargaining power and avoid industrial action. If proposed 
settlements by the mediator can exceed the manufacturing norm, then mediation seems a weak 
bulwark against defection. Conversely, the political actor is a biased third party whose objective 
is to produce a settlement according to politically defined aims. If proposed settlements are 
somehow restricted to remaining within the labour cost norm, then in order to break the norm, 
bargaining parties will be forced incur the costs of naming and shaming for defection and possi-
bly the costs of industrial action. Unions in the sheltered sector can therefore use backward in-
duction to determine that they will get no more and no less from mediation than from the manu-
facturing norm if they do not strike a bilateral deal. Therefore, they have to either resort to indus-
trial action or convince employers to concede and break the norm. However, with a neutral me-
diator, the settlement, ceteris paribus, will reflect the bargaining power of the parties and give a 
higher payoff for unions. Conversely, for employer representatives in the sheltered sector, in the 
situation of neutral mediation, defection might actually be the optimal strategy as the blame for 
defection from the norm can be transferred to the mediator, i.e. the scapegoat function of media-
tion (Kerr, 1954) and cost increases can be transferred to consumers. Moreover, if unions want to 
minimise the risks in industrial action, they might want to ‘help’ their employer counterpart by 
using mediators as scapegoats.   
The feasibility of going outside mediation to a large extent rests on the institutions regulating 
industrial action. For sheltered sector unions, going outside mediation and into industrial action 
might make sense in market terms but institutionally this possibility can be severely circum-
scribed. First of all, mediation might be compulsory, although there is no binding award as in 
arbitration. Moreover, mediation will typically involve a restriction of industrial action during 
the mediation process. This can include a mandatory notice period for industrial action, exten-
sion of mediation period or a cooling-off period. Similarly, the mediator can compel parties to 
engage in real negotiations; that is, they have to exhaust all possibilities for a compromise before 
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choosing the outside option. By such procedures, pattern-followers are compelled into mediation 
and cannot go it alone until the mediator has proposed at least one settlement. Furthermore, and 
this is crucial, mediators can affect final decision-making on proposed settlements. This can be 
done indirectly by publicising the proposed settlement, thereby exposing potential defectors, or 
directly by choosing the procedure for decision-making, most commonly through balloting or 
competent assembly (Kerr, 1954). Note that compulsion does not entail binding awards as in 
arbitration but rather capabilities that will raise the costs and thus lower the feasibility of defec-
tion. Stipulating the internal ratification process of bargaining parties is highly controversial but 
is a cornerstone of the statutory procedural framework for industrial relations in many countries 
(Baccaro and Simoni, 2010; Dickens and Hall, 2003). 
Based on these two dimensions – mediation roles and capabilities – we end up with the fol-
lowing four propositions for analysing the coordination effect of mediation in pattern bargaining: 
  
 Proposition 1: Biased mediation based on pattern bargaining combined with hard capabilities 
that compel parties to follow the proposed settlements should be very effective in avoiding de-
fection. Mediators will not propose settlements above (or below) the cost norm and the outside 
option is made difficult due to decision-making procedures.  
 Proposition 2: Biased mediation based on pattern bargaining combined with soft capabilities 
has a mixed effect of its effectiveness in avoiding defection. Parties are forced to choose the out-
side option if they want to defect. But if market conditions and rules for industrial action allow it, 
defection might be feasible. 
Proposition 3: Neutral mediation combined with hard capabilities also has a mixed effect. The 
inside option of mediation could be a defection from the cost norm based on bargaining power of 
parties. Conversely, mediators can make it hard to choose the outside option due to hard capa-
bilities. Market conditions might be decisive.  
 Proposition 4: Neutral mediation combined with soft capabilities has a weak effect on pattern 
bargaining. Parties can choose either the inside or outside option for defection and the bargaining 
power will be decisive. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The comparative analysis first investigates the power resource and cross-class alliance explana-
tions for coordinated bargaining resilience. Next, we analyse the role and capabilities of media-
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tion institutions and show how they solve collective action problems in pattern bargaining by 
pegging settlements to the manufacturing pattern. 
 
Power resources and cross-class alliances in the wake of decentralisation 
Swedish and Danish wage coordination oscillated between bargaining levels during the 1980s 
but stabilised at the industry level during the 1990s. Table 1 depicts the degree of coordination 
from 1960 to 2010. During the 1960s, confederations of capital – Svenska Arbets-
givareföreningen/Svenska Näringslivet (SAF/SN) in Sweden and Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 
(DA) in Denmark – and labour – Landsorganisationen i Sverige (LO-S) in Sweden and Landsor-
ganisationen i Danmark (LO-D) in Denmark – negotiated economy-wide enforceable agreements 
on the major items in collective agreements, most notably wage increases and working time. As 
de Geer (1992) shows, this typically entailed that metalworking in exposed markets coerced or 
persuaded its peers in construction and transport in sheltered markets to accept wage moderation 
in solidaristic bargaining. 
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Table 1: Wage coordination in Denmark and Sweden, 1980–2012 (private sector) 
 Denmark Sweden 
1960s–1970s Centralised Bargaining (5)  Centralised Bargaining (5) 
1980 Centralised Bargaining (5)  Centralised Bargaining (5) 
1981 Industry Bargaining (3) Centralised Bargaining (5) 
1982 Centralised Bargaining (5) Centralised Bargaining (5) 
1983 Industry Bargaining (3) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1984 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1985 Centralised Bargaining (5) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1986 Centralised Bargaining (5) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1987 Industry Bargaining (3) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1988 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1989 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1990 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1991 Industry Bargaining (3) Tripartite Bargaining (5) 
1992 Industry Bargaining (3) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1993 Industry Bargaining (3) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1994 Industry Bargaining (3) Mixed Bargaining (4) 
1995 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1996 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1997 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1998 Governmental Intervention (5) Industry Bargaining (3) 
1999 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
2000–2012 Industry Bargaining (3) Industry Bargaining (3) 
Adapted from [WCOORD] in ICTWSS 3.0 database (Visser, 2011):  
Note: The author recoded 1999, 2000, 2004 for Denmark, which erroneously were coded as Mixed bargaining (4) in Visser (2011).  
 
The pressures leading to change have been dealt with elsewhere and are not the focus here (cf. 
Ahlén, 1989; Blyth, 2002; Iversen, 1996; Katz, 1993; Swenson and Pontusson, 2000; Thörnqvist, 
1999). Decentralisation to the industry level meant cutting off the centralised bargaining level to 
curb wage inflation. Federate unions and employers’ associations are the parties to collective 
agreements. Thus, confederate bargaining and control over wages at lower levels depended on 
confederate control over affiliates at both industry and company level. If control is weak, con-
federate bargaining was just another layer of wage increases that typically favoured low-skilled 
workers while accepting lower than market clearance for higher-skilled workers. By the end of 
the 1970s, confederate control over affiliates had run its course with wage increases happening at 
confederate, federate and company level. In Denmark, the parties rarely reached agreements and 
governments intervened in wage bargaining four times during the 1970s (Due et al., 1994). And 
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in Sweden, employers became more and more frustrated over the lack of wage discipline at low-
er bargaining levels (De Geer, 1992). With public sector unions in other confederations on the 
move, the governance deficit became even more apparent. Wage drift gave asymmetrical wage 
increases, with the effect that unions made compensatory claims without regards to competitive-
ness or productivity, to the distress of metalworking unions. The advantages for employers of 
centralised wage bargaining – taking wages out of competition and settling below market clear-
ance – had vanished.  
 
Table 2: Pattern‐setters and defectors in Denmark 1990–2012 
 Pattern-setter Defectors Result 
1991 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
1993 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
1995 Transport Manufacturing Two-year agreements in 
transport and construction 
Three-year agreement in 
manufacturing  
1998 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Encompassing strike and 
governmental intervention 
2000 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2004 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2007 Manufacturing - Synchronised approval 
2010 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2012 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
Various sources5. Note: Transport in parentheses means that this agreement takes out higher wage increases due to the normal 
wage system – no local wage increases – and that it sets the pattern for the approximately 15 percent of the private sector labour 
market with this wage system.  
 
Table 3: Pattern‐setters and defectors in Sweden 1990–2012 
 Pattern-setter Defectors Result 
1991 Tripartite Rehnberg Group Transport Approved 
1993 Retail Transport Partial strike: Transport 
1995 Paper and pulp Various industries Breakdown in coordination 
1998 Manufacturing (IA agreements) - Approved 
2001 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Retail  
Hotel and Restaurants 
Approved 
2004 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Food processing 
Retail 
Hotel and Restaurants 
Maintenance 
Approved 
2007 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Retail 
Hotel and Restaurants  
Approved 
2010 Manufacturing (IA agreements) 
Salaried workers and academics first 
Retail 
Paper and pulp 
Partial strike: Paper and 
pulp 
Unsynchronised agreements 
2012 Manufacturing (IA agreements) - Approved 
Various sources6
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In both countries, however, cross-industry coordination was needed to avoid negative cost exter-
nalities arising from sheltered sectors. Similarly, weak unions needed coordination to avoid 
growing wage gaps. The solution was pattern bargaining where parties in the pattern-setting in-
dustry settle on a percentage labour cost norm that other bargaining units subsequently follow. 
Tables 2 and 3, however, show that there are substantial differences between the pattern bargain-
ing outcomes in the two countries. Coordination has broken down only once in Denmark, when 
transport went first in 1995 and settled differently from manufacturing. Conversely, there are 
multiple defectors in the Swedish case, with retail, hotels and restaurants often breaking the pat-
tern and settling on relatively higher cost increases.  
 
Table 4: Organisational power resources in Sweden and Denmark 2011–2012  
 Sweden Denmark 
Manufacturing share of total union  
membershipa 14.6 % 13.4 % 
Manufacturing net union densityb 78.0 % 81.7 % 
Manufacturing employer associa-
tions’ share of employment in confed-
eration 
Multiple organisations 
33.2 % of SN 
(12.1 % of Swedish total employment) 
DI 
62.3 % of DA 
(20 % of Danish total employment) 
Union concentration in manufactur-
ing – number and bargaining compe-
tence 
5 unions  
Facken inom Industrin is a non-binding 
bargaining cooperation  
8 unions  
CO-industri is a bargaining cartel with 
binding agreement mandate 
Employer association concentration in 
manufacturing – number and Her-
findahl indexvii 
9 employer associations 
0.29 
1 employer association 
1 
Manufacturing share of GDPc 19.0 % 19.0 % 
Manufacturing share of total em-
ploymentd 14.0 % 12.0 % 
a Manufacturing union membership as a percentage of total union membership 
b Ratio of union membership to employment in manufacturing 
c Ratio of manufacturing production/services to GDP 
d Manufacturing employmentviii as a percentage of total employment 
Sources for Sweden: Own calculations, Facken inom Industrin, Medlingsinstitutet 2012, SN, Teknikföretagen  
Sources for Denmark: Own calculations, CO-industri/DI, Statistics Denmark, faos.dk, DA  
 
Table 4 gives a snapshot of the organisational power resources. While density rates should not be 
regarded as power per se (Kelly, 2011), it is remarkable how much the two countries are alike 
when looking at total union and employer density rates. Well above the averages in EU coun-
tries, union density is approximately 70 percent in both countries, reflecting powerful organised 
labour, i.e. the precondition for resilient coordination in power resource theory. Moreover, over-
all employer density is 86 percent in Sweden and 71 percent in Denmark (Due et al., 2010; Med-
lingsinstitutet, 2012). One would be hard pressed, however, to explain multiple defections in 
Sweden with union power or substantial differences in Left party dominance (cf. Manow, 2009). 
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According to the cross-class alliance theory and the hypothesis of Traxler et al. (2008: 44) about 
social control through economic size and organisational strength, more defections in Sweden 
should be explained by manufacturing in Denmark being more powerful than in Sweden. The 
second part of table 4, however, shows that the economic size and importance of manufacturing 
in the two countries are remarkably similar, thus not warranting the kinds of differences we see.   
Nonetheless, the employers and unions in exposed sectors were indeed the main agents in de-
centralisation. The metalworking employers, Jernets Arbejdsgivere (JA) in Denmark, spearhead-
ed pushes for industry-level bargaining but with assistance from metalworking unions. The logic 
for Danish pattern bargaining was signalled in the tripartite ‘Common Declaration’  in 1987 in 
which LO-unions pledged to bargain for employment and real wage improvements rather than 
nominal pay hikes. In 1991–1992 a strong ‘strategic alliance’ took shape on the basis of Danish 
Industries (DI). The new confederation of business was the result of two mergers – first between 
JA and Industrifagene (process manufacturing industries) to form Industriens Arbejdgivere, 
which then merged with Industrirådet (a policy and lobby organisation for manufacturing). The 
move culminated in the 1989 reorganisation of DA that cut down its affiliates from 150 to 50 
employer associations. As of 2013, there are only 13 employer associations in DA. Unions in 
metalworking had long since created the bargaining cartel CO-metal, but it did not match DI for 
the rest of manufacturing. Thus, in 1992, CO-industri was formed between skilled and unskilled 
workers, the latter represented primarily by KAD and SiD, and with it a strong strategic alliance 
in manufacturing – with concentrated actors on both sides – was born (Due et al., 1994; Scheuer, 
1993).   
Metalworking employers, Verkstadsföreningen (VF) and IF Metall also spearheaded decen-
tralisation in Sweden with their break-free agreement in 1983 (Ahlén, 1989). In contrast to Den-
mark, however, the ‘strategic alliance’ in Swedish manufacturing was not fully institutionalised 
until 1997. Moreover, it was on union initiative and with government pushing (Howell and 
Givan, 2011) that employer associations, including Teknikföretagen (former VF) in metalwork-
ing and manufacturing unions – across union confederations – signed Industriavtalet (IA) after a 
chaotic bargaining round of 1995 (Stokke, 1998). IA was the biggest development in Swedish 
industrial relations since the Saltsjöbaden agreement in 1938 as it constituted a bargaining sys-
tem fundamentally different from centralised bargaining (Elvander, 2002). The parties pledged to 
use a new synchronised and coordinated bargaining system in which manufacturing should set 
the norm for the rest of the economy. Uniformity of cost increases and agreement periods in 
manufacturing is seen as key for pattern bargaining to have any effect. Employer associations in 
Sweden, however, did not merge as they did in Denmark, which can be seen in the low Her-
findahl score in table 4. Clearly, Teknikföretagen has a privileged role due to its size, but it is 
113 
 
dwarfed by its Danish counterpart DI. On the union side, a new bargaining cooperation called 
Facken inom Industrin (FI) joined the SACO union for engineers (Sveriges Ingenjörer), TCO 
union for salaried workers (Unionen – formerly SIF) with LO-unions for manual workers. This 
certainly strengthened cross-confederation coordination but did not create a bargaining cartel – 
like CO-industri in Denmark – due to fragmentation of employers. 
This shows that interest representation in Danish manufacturing is more concentrated than in 
Sweden but is not more important economically. This would suggest an organisationally stronger 
cross-class alliance in Denmark and would thus explain fewer defections in Denmark. Converse-
ly, power resource theory seems apt to explain why complete decentralisation never materialised. 
The theories, nonetheless, fail to specify how cross-class alliances exercise social control, in the 
words of Traxler et al. (2008). By comparing mediation institutions – their role and their capabil-
ities – the analysis will now show how social control is institutionalised and why defection is 
possible in Sweden while almost impossible in Denmark. 
  
Mediation in Denmark and Sweden 
In this section, we will show that by pegging settlements to the pattern, mediation institutions of 
both countries have a necessary role in solving collective action problems in pattern bargaining. 
The mediation institution in Denmark – forligsinstitutionen – is formally a peacemaker but with 
hard capabilities (proposition 3). Established in 1910 to mediate in interest conflicts over renew-
al or creation of collective agreements, it has the power to convene the parties, obtain infor-
mation on actual conditions at the workplace, and make recommendations for concessions. 
Moreover, it can postpone notified industrial action two times for up to 14 days. By law, the me-
diator can propose settlements but according to mediations, settlements will de facto reflect the 
relative strength of the parties. Thus, the mediator is neutral and will only propose what the re-
sult of industrial action would have been. In the 1930s, Denmark was plagued by conflicts in 
which work stoppages in singular bargaining areas were fought with general lock-outs by DA to 
centralise and control bargaining (Swenson, 1991). To remedy this, in 1934 the mediation insti-
tution was given the right to link all bargaining areas into one mediation proposal that would join 
areas with agreements to those that did not reach agreement. In this way, one deciding vote cen-
tralised decision-making according to majority rule, which potentially conceals rejections in 
some bargaining areas (cf. FAOS, 2013) – thereby reducing the possibilities for defection. By 
these means, bargaining rounds become all-or-nothing decisions about the mediation proposal 
(Due et al., 1994).  
The mediator alone, however, is unfit to enforce pattern-setting given its neutrality. This is 
solved by LO-D and DA involvement in the linkage of bargaining areas. DA and LO coordinate 
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during negotiations and are in close contact with bargaining areas that go into mediation. Indeed, 
the final linked proposal by the mediator is carefully negotiated with the confederations. The role 
of DA is to keep bargaining areas that did not settle in line with upper limits of the norm, while 
LO-D ensures that none of its affiliates break the lower limits of the norm. DA holds considera-
ble power over its affiliates as it can veto any agreement in its executive committee. Since DI 
holds de facto majority here due to its size, it is very unlikely – but not impossible – that em-
ployer coordination breaks down. Conversely, LO-unions decide by membership ballots and it 
requires a majority and at least 25 percent of eligible voters to reject a proposal. Due et al. (1994) 
call the system ‘centralised decentralisation’ to underline the confederate coordination. The me-
diation system is de facto based on the ‘strategic alliance’ setting a norm that confederations de-
fend in the linked proposal (proposition 1), making defection almost impossible. As a counter-
factual we can say that if the mediator did not link agreement areas into one decision, employers 
would have to resort to general lock-outs because of singular conflicts, as they did before 1934 
(Swenson, 1991).  
In Sweden, a dual-mediation system exists which is formally biased towards sound wage de-
velopments in line with manufacturing but has weaker capabilities than its Danish counterpart 
(proposition 2). A crucial innovation of the IA in 1997 was the creation of independent chairs – 
opartiska ordföranda (OpO) – whose task is to monitor the first two months of bargaining and 
then mediate directly during the last month. The powers of OpOs rely on compelling parties into 
mediation and proposing settlements. Furthermore, since 2011 the option of public deliberations 
in case of disagreement and voluntary final-offer arbitration has existed. OpOs work in teams of 
two on each agreement and the group of OpOs coordinates proposals so that they are in line with 
sound wage developments. In this sense, an OpO is not neutral but has a clear mandate to ensure 
sound wage developments in manufacturing. Similar negotiation agreements subsequently sur-
faced in other industries and in 2000 a new National Mediation Office (NMO) – Medlingsinsti-
tutet – was established to replace the former förlikningsmannaexpedition that had existed since 
1906. The purpose of NMO was explicitly stated by law to ‘ensure sound wage developments’ 
by bringing wage developments in line with manufacturing and the new IA-regime. The NMO 
can compel parties that do not have negotiation agreements, which constitute roughly 40 percent 
of the labour market (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012). Typically, the NMO will do this when a seven-
day notification of industrial action has been given. Mediation will then commence with the op-
tion of postponing conflicts for 14 days. This makes NMO mediation much more acute as the 
threat of conflict is imminent. 
Involvement of confederations in Sweden is different from in Denmark. In fact, there has been 
no formal role for LO-S and SN in bargaining since SAF’s (later SN) withdrawal from bargain-
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ing in 1990. Nonetheless, bargaining coordination exists and SN especially has worked hard to 
informally invoke discipline by affiliates, but the ultimate sanction is ‘naming and shaming’. 
LO-unions coordinate around bargaining goals but do not have formal control over agreements 
either. Instead, contract ratification is the prerogative of individual bargaining parties with their 
own agreements and the most common decision-making body by far is the competent assembly. 
Union ballots are not used and mediators have no say in how the parties decide on mediation 
proposals. Moreover, there is no tradition for government intervention should industrial action 
occur. Thus, mediators will effectively guard the manufacturing norm, but they cannot affect the 
ratification procedure; defection is therefore made possible.  
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Figure 1: Danish bargaining and mediation process 
 
Figure 2: Swedish bargaining and mediation process
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Danish pattern bargaining and mediation in action  
How does the Danish mediation process help to solve collective action problems in pattern bar-
gaining? This section combines analysis of formal rules of mediation and negotiation procedures 
with interviews of representatives of social partners and mediators. Figure 1 illustrates the se-
quence of pattern bargaining and mediation in Denmark, which is based on a negotiation agree-
ment between LO-D and DA. The negotiation agreement stipulates a synchronised bargaining 
process by which all agreements expire at the same time and notifications of industrial action 
encompass the entire LO-D and DA area. The first three stages pertain to the federate level: 1) 
DI and CO-industri settle on the labour cost norm based on minimum wage increases and im-
provements on non-wage issues. The total percentage increase per agreement period constitutes 
the norm. 2) Concomitantly, the other bargaining areas negotiate on anything but cost-driving 
provisions to get as ready as possible while waiting for the cost norm. The incentive to do so 
ultimately depends on the bargaining climate with the social partners. In a positive bargaining 
climate, parties will try to solve common technical issues in their agreement because mediation 
proposals will almost never resolve them. In a negative climate, parties can obstruct anything 
precisely because they know that they will get the norm. 3.a) If the parties agree, the DA execu-
tive committee approve or reject the agreement – meaning that parties induce that breaking the 
norm is not an option. 3.b) If the parties do not agree, they are compelled to engage in mediation. 
4) The mediator and his team of mediators decide whether to engage the parties in direct me-
diation or allow them to continue on their own with given tasks and deadlines. Individual media-
tors propose settlements that conform to the cost norm of manufacturing, and according to medi-
ators, it is not uncommon to have the manufacturing agreement at hand when designing provi-
sions. As noted, this is due to confederate involvement in linkage whereby settlements are care-
fully controlled by LO-D and DA before any settlement is incorporated into the linked mediation 
proposal. 5) Should the mediator fail to bring the parties into agreement, the bargaining area is 
transferred to linkage and bilateral bargaining is de facto terminated. LO-D and DA identify the 
areas with and without agreement; the latter are given increases on provisions in accordance with 
the cost norm.  
According to mediators and confederate representatives, because of different agreement con-
structions, e.g. minimum wage systems (with additional company level bargaining), normal 
wage systems (without company level bargaining) and piece-rate systems, linkage is based on 
three preconditions. First, manufacturing needs to settle. Second, areas with normal wage – typi-
cally the transport agreement between DI (since 2007) and 3F/Transport – need to settle. The 
mediator requires some indication of how to translate the cost norm into normal wage agree-
ments. The transport agreement is crucial because it sets normal wage increases for other areas 
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such as food processing and cleaning. In order to compensate for the lack of company wage bar-
gaining, parties therefore estimate the scope of company wage increases in minimum wage areas. 
Third, LO-D and DA employ an agreed-upon set of equations to translate cost increases based on 
particular provisions and the composition of the labour force. The key stumbling block in Danish 
pattern bargaining is therefore the tension between the minimum wage and normal wage system. 
Bargaining rounds in 1991 and 1993 were successful, but in 1995 the pattern-setting role of 
manufacturing broke down as HTS-A (transport employers) and SiD/Transport settled first on a 
two-year agreement. The breakdown led to internal restructuring in DA, including a change of 
president, who pledged tighter coordination around manufacturing. 
6) Once publicised, the parties engage in their respective decision-making procedures. Em-
ployers in DA decide in an executive committee where DI holds 50 percent of the vote, making 
defection extremely difficult. Unions hold a nation-wide ballot with their members. Rejection of 
a proposal requires a majority. However, if less than 40 percent of eligible voters participate, 
then at least 25 percent of eligible voters are required to vote ‘no’ in order to reject the proposal. 
7) If rejected, encompassing industrial action commences due to the general mutual notification 
of strike and lock-out by LO-D and DA, respectively.  
The last private sector conflict in 1998 is indicative of the centralising effect of linkage on 
bargaining. The minimum wage system, which covers 85 percent of workers, is troublesome for 
industry-level ballots. In order to control labour costs, negotiators have to discount the additional 
cost increases stemming from company level bargaining. This means that industry level agree-
ments contain few cost-increasing improvements to leave room for local wage increases in the 
overall cost norm. When balloting, union members are naturally incognisant of their actual wage 
increase and might turn down what they believe to be ‘two birds in the bush’. The answer to this 
challenge has been to broaden the scope of agreements. In 1991, the occupational pension 
scheme, AMP, had already been introduced to give private sector workers similar rights to public 
sector workers. Moreover, agreements were made in 2004 on parental leave and in 2007 on con-
tinuous vocational training (CVT). In the absence of industry-level wage increases, non-wage 
issues provide union leaders (and their employer counterparts) with vital selling points for the 
ballot. Crucially, linkage in mediation provides LO-D with a strong lever to ensure proliferation 
of supply-side solidaristic issues to workers in all industries (Baccaro and Locke, 1998). Gov-
ernments have historically intervened after some weeks of work stoppage and normally the in-
tervention mimics the final mediation proposal, thus severely reducing feasibility of defection.  
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Swedish pattern bargaining and mediation in action 
This section combines analysis of formal rules on mediation and negotiation procedures with 
interviews with representatives of social partners and mediators in Sweden. It shows how defec-
tions are possible in contrast to Denmark. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of pattern bargaining 
and mediation in Sweden. 1) As noted, OpOs are crucial in establishing the manufacturing norm. 
During the first two months of bargaining, the parties are encouraged to settle on any technical 
issues and OpOs can urge parties to speed up if things are moving too slow. Meanwhile, OpOs 
have discussed the level of labour cost norm considering Swedish manufacturing and the econo-
my in general. During the last month, the OpO-teams are quick to zoom in on agreement periods, 
cost increases and distribution of cost increases. Mediators are informed that these variables will 
be affected by the concrete bargaining power of parties and, crucially, labour demand. But OpO 
will have their own view on the level of their proposal. Typically, only a couple of mediation 
proposals will be made, putting pressure on parties. This is facilitated by an internal hierarchy 
between agreements. Traditionally, the agreement between Teknikföretagen and IF Metall from 
LO-S goes first, setting the norm for the other agreement areas, which quickly follow suit. How-
ever, in 2010 Teknikföretagen went first with Unionen and Sveriges Ingenjörer (engineers). 
Conversely, IF Metall settled on a longer agreement, showing that even within manufacturing, 
defection is possible due to union fragmentation. 
2) When the manufacturing norm has been established, pattern followers can begin focusing 
on the cost-increasing provisions and the agreement length. Before that, issues of a more tech-
nical nature can be settled. 3.a) Should individual bargaining areas settle on their own, no media-
tion is necessary or compulsory. Thus, defection is possible at this stage but confederate coordi-
nation and naming and shaming apply. 3.b) If there is a bargaining impasse close to agreement 
expiration, there will typically be a notification of industrial action and the NMO convenes the 
parties. This only applies in areas with no independent negotiation agreement and mediation sys-
tem. 4) Teams of two to three mediators do a quick agenda-tidying to ensure that agreement pe-
riod and cost increases – most importantly wages – are in focus. Based on deliberations, media-
tors propose settlements that parties decide on. Similar to OpO mediation, only a few proposals 
are made to increase pressure on parties. 5.a) If the parties agree to the proposal, the agreement 
will be in line with the cost norm and the negotiators will use the NMO as a scapegoat for fol-
lowing the norm vis-à-vis constituencies. 5.b) If the parties are willing to go beyond the cost-
norm despite confederate coordination and naming and shaming, mediators of the NMO will 
retire from the process. In other words, the mediators will not be used as scapegoats for defection 
but cannot prevent defection either. 5.c) If parties cannot settle, industrial action will begin with-
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in the bargaining area. 6) A new agreement will result after industrial action based on the power 
relation of the parties. As a rule, government will not intervene to terminate work stoppages. 
Defections stem from the heritage of LO-S’s solidaristic wage bargaining. LO-S explicitly co-
ordinates around a low-wage strategy that should give supplementary nominal wage increases to 
low-wage workers, e.g. in retail, hotels and restaurants. These industries have frequently defect-
ed and created a low-wage norm that subsequent bargaining areas have copied. The mechanism 
for achieving this has on some occasions (2004 and 2007) been strike notifications by retail 
workers – Handels – around the Easter sales, a crucial time for retail employers who turn away 
from SN coordination and mediation proposals. The low-wage norm is based on the manufactur-
ing norm plus a so-called z-factor (räknasnurra). Wage differentials between industries become 
all the more important in Swedish pattern bargaining because of the control of wages in agree-
ments. While the Danish minimum wage system only stipulates a floor for company-level bar-
gaining, the Swedish agreements contain a variety of constructions – including fall-back wage 
guarantees, individual guarantees and wage pools – that to a larger extent control company-level 
bargaining (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012). Due to employer fragmentation and the focus on sound 
wage developments in mediation, any coordinated attempts of removing industry-level control 
have been thwarted. Conversely, coordination on supply-side solidaristic issues such as CVT has 
been unsuccessful whenever unions have pushed for it in bargaining rounds. The situation has 
led to tensions between LO-unions over the FI-platform versus the LO-S’s low wage strategy. In 
2011, Pappers (pulp and paper) left FI and the IA because of disagreement over whether the 
manufacturing norm should preclude solidaristic pay hikes for low-wage sectors. And in 2011 IF 
Metall did not join the LO-coordination because of the construction of the low-wage profile. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Pattern bargaining replaced peak-level bargaining as a viable coordinated alternative to complete 
decentralisation. Avoiding defections from the pattern set in manufacturing was crucial for the 
continued support of manufacturing employers and high-skilled manufacturing unions and thus 
the sustainability of coordinated bargaining. In turn, market-vulnerable unions would benefit 
from some degree of collectivism as uniform labour cost increases also apply to their bargaining 
areas. Both power resource theory and cross-class alliance theory offer us valuable insights into 
the coalitional character of the change from centralised bargaining to pattern bargaining. The 
institutional change was indeed promoted by cross-class alliances in manufacturing, but this alli-
ance was contingent upon strong unions and not necessarily designed by employers. However, 
these theories cannot tell us how strong alliances make coordination work. In line with Traxler et 
al. (2008), the analysis finds that pattern bargaining is about social control by a cross-class alli-
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ance in manufacturing, but contrary to these authors, the article shows that control is neither la-
tent nor non-intentional – it is institutionalised in mediation. Both Sweden and Denmark clearly 
show that mandatory mediation has made defections by sheltered sectors difficult in Sweden and 
almost impossible in Denmark by pegging mediation proposals to the manufacturing norm. If 
sheltered sectors want to defect, they have to go outside mediation and incur the costs of doing 
so. Mediation institutions of both countries are thus necessary for making coordination work in 
the absence of centralised bargaining.  
The importance of mediation is moreover shown by the fact that the capabilities of mediation 
to force sheltered sectors to agree on the norm are substantially different in the two countries. In 
Denmark, the mediation institution has the capacity to link agreement areas into one majoritarian 
union ballot which effectively brushes away potential defectors. Could manufacturing employers 
have achieved thus solely due to their size and concentration? Yes, but they would be forced to 
establish general lock-outs – as they did in the beginning of the 20th century before the media-
tion institution was given the capacity of linkage – if one bargaining area were not in line with 
the pattern. This would have been a recurring situation given the ballot results since 1990 (cf. 
FAOS, 2013). A necessary condition for linkage is that confederations stick to the manufacturing 
norm and the defection in 1995 by transportation shows how important this is. Conversely, the 
Swedish mediation has less power to force bargaining areas into agreement and rely much more 
on persuasion, naming and shaming and the role as scapegoat when attempting to bring potential 
defectors in line. Moreover, the Swedish employer confederation, SN, has no general lock-out 
competence, making defection by sheltered sectors more accessible. Consensual bargaining 
rounds, as in 1998, illustrate that actors can avoid defection despite weaker mediation but that 
this consensus probably will not prevail with the current mediation institutions and bargaining 
coalitions.    
The analysis suggests – paraphrasing Thelen (2012: 147) – that bargaining coordination had to 
change to persevere. In Sweden, actors enacted a layering process (Thelen, 2009) in which the 
new dual mediation system reintroduced wage moderation and introduced flexibility while re-
taining principles of collectivism and voluntarism (Teague, 2009). The big question is whether 
this is a stable institutional design or whether the recurrent defections in the name of solidaristic 
wage policy will promote new ruptures like the one in 2011, when Teknikföretagen momentarily 
left Industriavtalet. In Denmark, it was a process of conversion (Thelen, 2009) of the existing 
institutions. Through linkage, mediation brings industry-level bargaining areas in line with the 
manufacturing norm. Moreover, with less control of wages and working time in multi-employer 
agreements, the content of coordination revolves around broader scope in agreements. Recent 
studies (Palier and Thelen, 2010; Howell and Givan, 2011; Busemeyer, 2012; Baccaro and How-
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ell, 2011) have suggested that strong cross-class alliances in manufacturing can promote institu-
tional change with dualisation in the labour market. This study suggests that the strong role of 
manufacturing in Denmark will probably promote greater wage inequality but that this is some-
what compensated by supply-side solidarity (Baccaro and Locke, 1998). Moreover, coordinative 
effect of mediation in Denmark makes it possible to promote this because all bargaining areas 
will be included. Conversely, in Sweden the name of the game for unions continues to be dis-
tributive solidarity with other bargaining areas trying to challenge manufacturing 
(Medlingsinstitutet, 2009).  
The implication of this study is that the literature on institutional change and the welcome fo-
cus on incremental change through political coalitions (Thelen, 2012) need to pay closer atten-
tion (again) to the institutions of industrial relations. Busemeyer (2012) has recently argued that 
German employers are pivotal agents for institutional change due to their privileged role in the 
German polity. Similarly, collective bargaining institutions can put certain actors in privileged 
roles due to the institutional setting. Traxler (1996) has rightly argued that attention to statutory 
extension mechanisms and formal access to industrial action are key explanations for resilience 
of coordinated bargaining because they support multiemployer bargaining – even when union 
densities decline. Similarly, this study shows that institutional design of mediation institutions 
has had a significant effect on the processes and outcomes of bargaining coordination in Sweden 
and Denmark. In general, these institutions also influence whether unions or employers are piv-
otal actors of change.  As a corollary, institutions should not be reduced to mere reflections of 
material interests, power resources or coalitions but should be treated as manmade constraints 
with path-dependent effects (Parson, 2007).  
What will be the future for bargaining coordination in the two countries? In Sweden, the issue 
of defections in the name of solidaristic wage policies will continue to upset employers but the 
magnitude of defections might be so negligible that employers will grudgingly accept or ‘throw a 
fit’ix like Teknikföretagen did in 2011 to bring unions into line. The alternative of complete de-
centralisation of wage bargaining to company level would probably lead to more conflicts – de-
spite peace clauses – and pressure for wage increases. Swedish unions are still potent at the shop 
floor (Kjellberg, 2009). Also, there will be pushes by employers to loosen control in industry-
level agreements but these negotiations will not necessarily be unidirectional. Indeed, many bar-
gaining areas have oscillated between more and less control of wages (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012). 
In Denmark, there seems to be consensus about the bargaining system. The ‘losers’ of pattern 
bargaining are low-skilled workers that are not ensured wage increases in local bargaining, per-
haps leading to dualisation. Echoing Rawls’ maximin strategy, their conclusion seems to be that 
they will be better off overall with linkage and uniform cost increases together with supply-side 
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solidarity (Baccaro and Locke, 1998; Rawls, 1971). Moreover, the loss of self-regulation that 
linkage entails has only half-heartedly been opposed. In sum, the balance in Denmark tilts to-
wards wage moderation and flexibility with some loss of collectivism on wages and loss of vol-
untarism. Conversely, the balance in Sweden is somewhat murky with reintroduction of wage 
moderation and some flexibility while collectivism and voluntarism are continuously being de-
fended. 
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Paper 2:  
IN SEARCH OF CONTROL: CONCILIATION, ME-
DIATION AND ARBITRATION IN COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING OF WESTERN EUROPE 
 
Christian Lyhne Ibsen 
 
Abstract  
Across the Western advanced industrial democracies, third-party intervention into conflicts of 
interests between organised actors of the labour market has been a cornerstone in procuring la-
bour market peace in industrial economies throughout the 20th century and into the present. Each 
country has developed particular systems of third-party intervention – understood as conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration (CMA) – which have varying capabilities to intervene into collective 
bargaining. This has gone largely unnoticed in comparative research on collective bargaining 
systems. The purpose of the paper is to explain strong third-party intervention across 17 Western 
European countries using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) method. It 
looks at the formal strength of CMAs and attempts to deduce explanatory paths to strong CMA 
in collective bargaining. Two hypotheses are considered and extended: the neo-corporatist hy-
pothesis by Elvander that low governance capacity by unions is related to strong CMA, and the 
legal-tradition hypothesis by Valdés Dal-Ré that normal civil courts in labour matters are related 
to strong CMA. The analysis shows two causal paths to strong CMA: the Nordic and the Medi-
terranean. The former combines high union power, high governance capacity and absence of 
civil courts. The latter combines low governance capacity, high union power and weak regula-
tion of industrial action. None of the conditions were consistently necessary for strong CMA, 
although high union power is present in both causal paths. This supports the neo-corporatist hy-
pothesis by Elvander while we do not find support for Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypothesis. Looking 
closer at deviant cases and the Nordic path, it is suggested that control over collective bargaining 
– and not legal tradition – is the main mechanism behind strong CMA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Given the current labour market crisis in Europe, collective bargaining mechanisms that foster 
agreement seem more important than ever. Across the European continent, third-party interven-
tion into collective bargaining has been a cornerstone in fostering agreements and peace between 
capital and labour. Each country has in some way institutionalised voluntary or mandatory 
measures for conciliation, mediation or arbitration (CMA) to help parties of collective bargaining 
overcome stalemates by exchanging information and bids, putting pressure on them, thinking 
alternatively and proposing or awarding settlements. In this way, CMA constitutes a vital part of 
the collective bargaining machinery, which – despite eroding tendencies – still regulates over 
sixty percent of the labour market in Europe (Commission, 2012). It is therefore surprising that 
relatively few studies have investigated CMA comparatively. Often it is shelved as a second-
order institution overshadowed by more spectacular phenomena such as ‘generalised exchange’ 
(e.g. Marin, 1990), social pacts, bargaining centralisation and concentration (e.g. Traxler, 2004). 
Indeed, there are many single-case country studies that are usually by labour law scholars but 
remain descriptive (see Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003 for an overview). As a corollary, there is little theo-
risation about different institutional designs of CMA across Europe (Valdés Dal-Ré (2003); 
Stokke (1998) and Elvander (2002) are recent exceptions). 
This article argues that CMA is pivotal to collective bargaining as institutions for dispute reso-
lution (cf. Due et al., 1994; Stokke, 1998). Moreover, it is shown that European countries have 
bestowed very different powers to CMA and that this constitutes both an empirical and a theoret-
ical puzzle that has not yet been investigated systematically and comparatively. All over Europe, 
CMA is a more or less important element in dispute resolution systems for collective bargaining 
(Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). Some countries have rather old institutions for CMA, like Denmark (for-
ligsinstitutionen) and the UK (Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service), while other coun-
tries, such as Greece (Organismós Mesolávisis Ke Dietisías), have only recently established real 
CMA institutions. Yet other countries, like Sweden, have recently reformed their institutions 
(Medlingsinstitutet). At the supra-national level, both the European Union and the ILO have 
promoted CMA as a flexible alternative to costly labour conflicts that will not undermine the 
autonomy of social partners (ILO, 2007). Thus, in both collective and individual labour dispute 
resolution, alternatives to judicial processes are being institutionalised across Europe.  
The purpose of this article is thus to remedy the omission of CMA from comparative political 
studies and try to explain the strength of CMA as a third-party intervention into private sector 
collective bargaining across seventeen Western European countries. We use fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis (fsQCA), which allows for systematic comparison of cases in the search for 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions for strong CMA in collective bargaining. The structure of 
129 
 
the article is as follows. The first section presents the concept of CMA and two hypotheses re-
garding strong CMAs. Four conditions are included to explain strong CMA. The second section 
outlines the research methods and data selection. The third section contains the empirical analy-
sis, in which we use fsQCA to search for necessary and/or sufficient conditions for strong CMA. 
The fourth section discusses the empirical findings by looking more closely at cases. Finally, we 
conclude and draw implications of the study for future research.  
TWO HYPOTHESES ABOUT STRONG CMA 
Georg Simmel was one of the first social scientists to treat third-party intervention in his famous 
accounts on going from dyads to triads (Simmel, 1904). In Simmel’s account a triad would not 
be a stable social constellation/form unless the third party was neutral – like a mediator between 
two conflicting parties. The mediator’s function was thus one of peacemaking by facilitating 
linkages, information-sharing and bringing objectivity into conflict. From a societal point of 
view, there is a lot to gain from strong and effective CMA. First, costly labour conflict can be 
averted without loss of bargaining autonomy because collective bargaining is retained as the reg-
ulatory process. Second, costly litigation and lawyer fees can be avoided since CMA does not 
entail legal processes but are extensions of negotiations. Third, by retaining bargaining autono-
my, both procedural and substantive legitimacy of settlements might be increased (Scharpf, 
1997). Based on this view, strong and effective CMA should be pervasive in Western Europe 
due to the extensive use of collective bargaining as a regulatory process.     
How do we study this? The strength of CMA pertains to force of the intervention into bargain-
ing and can be conceptualised formally on two dimensions (Stokke, 1998). First, is third-party 
intervention voluntary or compulsory? Obviously, voluntary arrangements are weaker than com-
pulsory arrangements. Second, what is the nature of the intervention? Conciliation refers to ac-
tivities that are involved in bringing parties to the table, typically at a bargaining impasse. Con-
ciliatory activities include, for example, information sharing, deliberation and persuasion. Me-
diation also consists of these activities, but here the third party is able to propose settlements that 
parties should decide on. Finally, arbitration involves the possibility of making binding awards to 
the parties, i.e. giving the third party real decision-making power. Formal strength is weakest for 
conciliation and strongest for arbitration, while mediation takes the middle ground.  
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Table 1: Strong CMA 
 Agreement a result of parties w. 
third-party help 
Agreement a result of proposal 
by third party 
Agreement a result of third-
party decision 
Voluntary 
  
Voluntary conciliation Voluntary mediation Voluntary arbitration 
Compulsory  
 
Compulsory conciliation Compulsory mediation Compulsory arbitration 
 
Adding to these two dimensions are the capabilities given to conciliators and mediatorsx. The 
first is the capability to extend the bargaining process, either through a cooling-off period during 
which no industrial action is allowed (e.g. Italy) or as an extension of the notices given for indus-
trial action (e.g. Scandinavian countries) (Jacobs, 1993). The main function of this capability is 
to give the parties more time to reach an agreement but also to short-circuit threats of industrial 
action that might impede advances in the bargaining process (Kerr, 1954). Also, some third par-
ties are allowed to make new attempts at conciliation or mediation if the first attempts resulted in 
industrial action. Finally, interventions can be formally biased towards certain resolutions, e.g. 
aims to defend competitiveness, curb wage increases, support the weak side of labour (or em-
ployers) or split even. Clearly, these formal capabilities are not conceptually exhaustive of CMA, 
being a human activity with idiosyncrasies, styles and techniques that are, however, beyond the 
scope of this study.    
How do we explain formal strength of CMA? The works by Elvander (1974) and Valdés Dal-
Ré (2003) bring forth two different hypotheses that can be tested in comparative analysis. In a 
comparative study of Sweden and Denmark, Elvander (1974) found strong CMA when unions 
are uncoordinated or otherwise lacking governance capability in collective bargaining – a neo-
corporatist logic (Lembruch and Schmitter, 1982). Vertical coordination usually refers to intra-
industry relations of bargaining between different levels from confederate level, federate level 
and local/regional level to shop stewards. Low vertical coordination due to absence of compli-
ance mechanisms will render higher-level decisions less effective (Traxler, 2004). Horizontal 
coordination refers to inter-industry relations of bargaining. Coordination across unions repre-
senting different industries is often seen as key to avoiding unstable industrial relations environ-
ments where agreements in one industry can produce counter claims and compensatory bargain-
ing in another due to wage differentials. Thus, Elvander shows that strong CMA is instrumental 
in solving collective action problems in bargaining models (Traxler, 2004). While Stokke (1998) 
corroborated Elvander’s finding in a comparative study of Norway, Sweden and Denmark, the 
question remains whether this explanation is accurate and whether it can be generalised outside 
Scandinavia. 
Valdés Dal-Ré’s alternative explanation for strong CMA is based on the legal tradition in a 
country – an argument akin to the legal origin thesis on labour regulation (Botero et al., 2004) 
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but not concerned with economic outcomes. Accordingly, strong CMA originates from a legal 
tradition of labour court systems. Valdés Dal-Ré (2003) poses two interlinked hypotheses. We 
should expect strong CMA when 1) no special priority is given to industrial courts or labour 
courts vis-à-vis normal civil/common law courts and 2) social partners are not significantly in-
volved in the labour court system. Valdés Dal-Ré thus prioritises the labour law tradition of 
countries in explaining CMA. Underlying the two hypotheses is the familiar concept of volunta-
rism in industrial relations (Crouch, 1993). If there is a tradition for specialised industrial/labour 
courts with representation of social partners, i.e. high degree of self-regulation, then the legal 
tradition for strong intervention into collective bargaining should accordingly be weak and vice 
versaxi. Thus, there is familiarity with Elvander’s stress on governance, but the causal mecha-
nism is not about the control over the (potential) magnitude of industrial action but on the legal 
tradition in a country which is of a different nature and originxii (Crouch, 1993). 
We would argue that two conditions should be added these hypotheses. First, development of 
strong CMA should occur where collective bargaining in general and the threat of work stoppag-
es specifically have attained sufficient importance in a country, i.e. where unions are powerful. 
We should accordingly expect strong CMA when union density and bargaining coverage is 
highxiii. Unions primarily – but not exclusively – derive their power in collective bargaining from 
the capacity to withdraw labour from the workplaces, i.e. industrial action. In order to do so, they 
need members that are willing to stop working. In a similar vein, membership is the primary 
source of union legitimacy in collective bargaining as it can be taken as a sign of representative-
ness. In addition, bargaining coverage tells us the weight of collective bargaining in an economy 
and therefore the scope of industrial action across industries and sectors. In France, which is a 
notable exception because the French state recognises trade unions as representative, erga omnes 
provisions exist to increase coverage (Traxler, 2004). Sure enough, it is not the exercised strike 
that constitutes union power but the threat thereof.   
Second, if the access of social partners to industrial action is severely limited, then there is no 
need for strong CMA. Conversely, if there is liberal access to engage in industrial action, strong 
third-party intervention to prevent conflicts of interest from developing into work stoppages 
should be expected. The statutory/bilateral regulationxiv of industrial action both constrains and 
enables collective work stoppages, the strike and the lock-out being the best-known examples. 
Most notably, the peace obligation during the duration of a signed collective agreement suspends 
the right to industrial action and typically refers conflict resolution to labour courts as conflicts 
of rights (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003). In addition, some countries restrict industrial action by proce-
dural requirements regarding ballots among workers on the decision to go on strike. In the UK 
for example, balloting procedures together with the use of injunctions has severely restricted 
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union access to strikes (Dickens and Hall, 2003). Moreover, some countries require that the ap-
propriate authorities, e.g. CMA institutions and/or the bargaining counterpart with certain man-
datory notice periods, be notified of industrial action. Legal industrial action can also mean dif-
ferent things in different countries as certain practices are allowed or disallowed, e.g. political 
strikes, picketing, boycotts, blockades etc. (Warneck, 2007). Thus, the fewer types of actions 
allowed, the more restrictive the regulation of engaging in industrial action. 
 
Table 2: Conditions and set‐relationships to outcome 
Conditions Directional 
expectation 
Condition            Outcome 
 
GOVCAP Low governance capacity 
‘Elvander’ hypothesis  
Substitutability 
 
govcap            CMA 
UNPOW Strong unions  Compatibility UNPOW           CMA 
REGIND Weak regulation of industri-
al action  
Substitutability regind            CMA 
COURT Normal civil court system 
‘Valdés Dal-Ré’ hypothesis  
Compatibility COURT            CMA 
Note: Uppercase letters signify presence of condition, while lowercase letters signify absence.  
 
Table 2 summarises the conditions and hypothesised relations to strong CMA. Accordingly, we 
would not expect legal tradition or lack of governance capability to be related to strong CMA in 
the absence of powerful unions. Nor would we expect legal tradition or lack of governance capa-
bility to be related to strong CMA if regulation of industrial action is very strict.  
The omission of three conditions needs mentioning. First, higher levels of industrial conflict 
should lead to strong CMA. After all, this is the logic inherent in union power. The argument 
could also be reversed, however, as strong CMA might have a calming effect on strike levels, 
thereby confounding the relationship. Moreover, the quality and comparability of strike data is 
questionable, building on the different definitions, reporting and monitoring of strikes in differ-
ent countries. Second, dominance of left-wing parties could also have been included based on the 
logic that left-wing parties would favour weak CMA supportive of voluntarist collective bargain-
ing (e.g. Sweden). Historical evidence, however, does not necessarily support this hypothesis, 
with many Social Democratic governments opting for strong state intervention in collective bar-
gaining – often in generalised political exchanges (Marin, 1990; Elvander, 1974). Finally, the 
existence of independent central banks and anti-inflationary economic policies could have a dis-
ciplining effect on the wage-bargaining nexus away from wage-push inflation and industrial un-
rest of the past (Iversen, 1999). Absence of independent central banks and anti-inflationary eco-
nomic policies on social partners in bargaining could thus be other explanations for strong CMA. 
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However, as Hassel (2006) has shown, monetarism did not render control over collective bar-
gaining redundant.     
METHODS AND DATA  
The focus in this article is on CMA institutions for intervention into conflicts of rights in collec-
tive bargaining, – that is, not conflicts of rights which normally pertain to court systems (Valdés 
Dal-Ré, 2003). The focus is on institutions in the private sector since regulation of public sector 
collective bargaining is often restricted in various ways, adding to an already complex compara-
tive analysis (Stokke, 1998). Seventeen Western European countries (EU-15 plus Switzerland 
and Norway) are included in the analysis. This means that other advanced Western democracies 
such the US, Australia, New Zealand and Canada – all likely candidates to this universe of cases 
– have been omitted. In general, there is much evidence to suggest that European countries share 
important historical and cultural backgrounds that warrant comparison of these countries exclu-
sively (Crouch, 1993). This is especially true for industrial relations, where trade unions have 
gained a prominent role in the political economy, not just as workers representations at company 
level as in the US.  
We view the theoretical framework presented above in terms of set-relations, searching for 
sufficiency and necessity for strong CMA (Ragin, 2008). For example, if low governance capa-
bility is a sufficient condition for strong CMA, then all cases with low governance capability 
should also have strong CMA. Alternatively, if low governance capability is a necessary condi-
tion for strong CMA, then all cases with strong CMA should also have low governance capabil-
ity. The fsQCA was chosen for three reasons. First, the theoretical arguments are based on con-
junctural causation. For example, we do not expect low governance capability to be sufficient for 
strong CMA in the absence of high union power/bargaining coverage. FsQCA allows for con-
junctural causation in mid-sized N studies that would not be possible with interaction terms in 
conventional statistical analysis (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Second, it is very possible 
that more than one condition or combination of conditions is sufficient for strong CMA, e.g. both 
hypotheses could be right. FsQCA allows for equifinality, whereas with conventional statistical 
analysis we would get net effects of the given independent variables. Third, we don’t expect 
causal symmetry, i.e. that the conditions explaining strong CMA can be inversed to explain weak 
CMA. Such an analysis might require a whole different set of conditions. Taken together with 
the lack of temporal variation in institutions for CMA and the relatively small sample compared 
to explanatory conditions, fsQCA was preferred to conventional statistical analysis (see Da-
vidsson and Emmenegger, 2013).    
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FsQCA operates with fuzzy membership scores in the given conditions and outcome. In tradi-
tional ‘crisp sets’, cases are either fully in (=1) or fully out (=0) of a set, e.g. countries with 
strong CMA. With fuzzy sets, membership scores can vary in degrees of membership between 1 
and 0, with 0.5 as a qualitative anchor (threshold) for cases that are neither in nor out of a set, i.e. 
complete fuzziness (Ragin, 2008). For this analysis, fuzzy-set membership scores for all seven-
teen countries have been calibrated on the four conditions and the outcome. In the following sec-
tion we briefly present the calibration procedures and data used for each condition and the out-
come (raw data and calibrations can be seen in the appendix data sheet).   
Governance capability (GOVCAP) is based on two qualitative measures. The first relates to 
the concentration and centralisation of trade unions at both confederate and federate union levels. 
The centralisation index developed by Iversen (1999) and updated and reported in Visser (2011) 
measures both the vertical and horizontal concentration and authority in the union movement 
(ranging from 0–1). These are combined in a weighted average with a special indicator of con-
federate and federate veto power over decisions to go on strike, arguably an important measure 
for the Elvander hypothesis. The second measure is the wage coordination index (ranging from 
1–5), also taken from Visser (2011). The indicator ranges from economy-wide bargaining to 
fragmented company bargaining or no bargaining at all. Indicators of wage coordination are 
helpful in measuring the degree of fragmentation. Moreover, since union fragmentation corre-
lates strongly with employer fragmentation, we only need indicators for organisational fragmen-
tation of unions (Martin and Swank, 2008). A weighted average score is calculated between the 
two with qualitative fuzzy-set thresholds.  
Union power (UNPOW) is a weighted average of two quantitative measures (Visser, 2011). 
The first is the weighted average of overall union density with private sector union density, taken 
from Visser (2011). The second indicator is bargaining coverage in the private sector, also taken 
from Visser (2011). Where private sector figures were not available, the general coverage has 
been used. Where both are available, the average has been used.  
Regulation of industrial action (REGIND) is based on leximetric analysis on the presence or 
absence of various formal measures restricting industrial action. The most important is the pres-
ence of peace obligations during the duration of collective agreements. Moreover, we have cali-
brated the range of actions allowed during labour conflicts pertaining to collective bargaining. 
Cross-national studies by Warneck (2007), Jacobs (1993b) and EIRO (2006) were used as well 
as a host of national sources to corroborate the comparative studies (EIRO, 2006). A weighted 
average of the various regulatory measures is then calculated for each country. Legal tradition 
(COURT) is also based on leximetric analysis of labour court systems concerning the two as-
pects presented by Valdés Dal-Ré: the role of specialised industrial/labour courts vis-à-vis nor-
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mal courts and the involvement of social partner representatives in labour courts. The latter logi-
cally follows the former as representation is of secondary concern if specialised courts do not 
play an important role. In order to pass the 0.5 threshold, normal courts must have a privileged 
role (which they normally do not have in Western European labour market regulation). We have 
used data from the European Association of Labour Court Judges (EALCJ, 2013) and national 
expert accounts from EIRO/EMIRE (EIRO, 2013).  
Calibration of fuzzy-set scores of strong CMA – the outcome – is based on the formal rules for 
third-party intervention into collective bargaining. Calibration is based on national expert 
sources and comparative studies. We use the European Commission project on CMA edited by 
Valdés Dal-Ré (2003), an earlier Commission project by Jacobs (1993b) and the EIRO compara-
tive study (2006) of third-party intervention to calibrate. Three dimensions are calibrated. The 
first is whether a country has arbitration (the strongest variant), mediation (the intermediate) or 
conciliation (the weakest). The second is whether the intervention is mandatory or voluntary. 
The third is which competencies mediators and conciliators have at their disposal. Some coun-
tries have a mix of arbitration, mediation and conciliation, in which cases the strongest form pre-
vails. To avoid naïve formalistic calibration, the national expert accounts also contain infor-
mation about ‘dead letter’ CMA systems that are never used, in which case the fuzzy score is 
calibrated accordingly.  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In the raw data table below, the calibrated fuzzy-set membership scores are reported for the 17 
countries. Reading from left to right, the four conditions are reported in the first four columns 
and the outcome in the last column. As we are dealing with four conditions, we have 16 logically 
possible rows (2^4 = 16) based on absence and presence of a condition. Ragin (2008) notes that 
there is a correspondence between the rows of truth tables and the corners of the vector space 
defined by fuzzy sets. This basically means that the four conditions create a four-dimensional 
‘property space’ in which cases are assigned positions according to their fuzzy scores and that 
each corner of this space constitutes 1 and 0, respectively, for each condition. Assigning set 
membership scores, we find the corner to which a case belongs the most, i.e. whether the score is 
above 0.5 or not. The rows can therefore be understood as Weberian ‘ideal types’ (Ragin, 2008). 
Logically, a case can only have a membership score above 0.5 in one row or one ideal type. 
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Table 3: Fuzzy‐set scores for seventeen countries 
 GOVCAP UNPOW REGIND COURT CMA 
Germany 0.43 0.63 0.61 0 0.16 
Austria 0.98 0.89 0.63 0.8 0.32 
Switzerland 0.33 0.32 0.75 0.2 0.64 
Netherlands 0.71 0.71 0.63 1 0.2 
Belgium 0.4 0.91 0.17 0.4 0.68 
Luxembourg 0.14 0.61 0.41 0.2 0.68 
France 0.1 0.7 0.22 0 0.4 
Italy 0.25 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.68 
Greece 0.31 0.59 0.16 1 0.8 
Portugal 0.24 0.59 0.33 0.8 0.8 
Spain 0.31 0.63 0.43 0.6 1 
Great Britain 0 0.21 0.67 0 0.2 
Ireland 0.27 0.47 0.56 0 0.4 
Sweden 0.8 0.93 0.44 0 0.76 
Denmark 0.61 0.9 0.81 0 1 
Finland 0.80 0.94 0.59 0 0.72 
Norway 0.88 0.74 0.76 0 1 
 
We see that 11 countries out of 17 have strong CMAs, i.e. they have set membership scores in 
CMA above 0.5. Furthermore, looking at fuzzy-set scores in conditions, the countries at a glance 
seem to cluster around the ideal-typical typology that differentiates between the Nordic, Conti-
nental, Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean models (Crouch, 1993). Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden have similar scores when it comes to union power, governance capacity (except Fin-
land), strong regulation of industrial action (except Sweden) and specialised court systems. All 
Nordic countries have strong CMAs. The Continental countries – usually regarded as Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland and the Benelux countries – are, however, rather heterogeneous in both 
conditions and outcome. The Anglo-Saxon countries – UK and Ireland – have relatively weak 
union power, low governance capacity, strong regulation of industrial action (although Ireland is 
rather ‘fuzzy’) and specialised labour courts together with weak CMA. Finally, the Mediterrane-
an countries share high union power but low governance capacity, and weak regulation of indus-
trial action together with no specialised courts should yield strong CMAs according to our hy-
potheses. Indeed, all Mediterranean countries have strong CMAs, except France.  
The next step in the analysis is the search for necessary conditions for strong CMA. Con-
sistency of a necessary condition is given by the degree to which each case’s membership in the 
condition is equal to or greater than their membership in the outcome (Ragin, 2008). In accord-
ance with the conventions proposed by Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 143), we set the thresh-
old for consistency of necessity to 0.9. We also consider potential trivialness of necessary condi-
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tions and treat each condition (and its negation) independently. The fsQCA 2.5 software tests for 
necessity yield the results in the below table. 
 
Table 4: Test for necessity 
Conditions Consistency           Coverage 
GOVCAP 0.574713 0.793651 
govcap 0.673372 0.744703 
UNPOW 0.852490              0.769231 
unpow 0.418582              0.804788 
REGIND 0.626437              0.772137 
regind 0.701149              0.858148 
COURT                  0.394636              0.735714 
court                 0.743295              0.680702 
 
Table 4 shows that none of the conditions (or their negations) passes the 0.9 threshold for neces-
sity. Union power, however, comes close with a 0.85 consistency and a 0.77 coverage and is 
worth considering. On closer inspection, seven countries have lower memberships in the condi-
tion than in the outcome, thus violating the set-theoretic requirement for necessity. Moreover, we 
conducted an analysis of necessary conditions for the absence of strong CMA, and union power 
also has high consistency here. This would suggest that we are dealing with a trivial necessary 
condition, i.e. a condition that is present regardless of the outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 
2012). For example, Austria, Germany and the Netherlands have high membership in high union 
power but weak CMA. We therefore conclude that none of the conditions are necessary for the 
outcome and proceed to test for sufficiency.  
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Table 5: Truth table (standard analysis for sufficiency) 
GOVCAP UNPOW REGIND COURT No. of 
cases 
Cases/ 
remainders 
Consistency 
0 1 0 1 4 Italy, Greece, Portu-
gal, Spain 
0.973988 
0 0 1 0 3 Switzerland, UK, 
Ireland 
0.794118 
0 1 0 0 3 Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, France 
0.881874 
1 1 1 0 3 Denmark, Finland, 
Norway 
0.943396 
1 1 1 1 2 Austria, Netherlands 0.728938 
0 
 
1 1 0 1 Germany 0.883333 
1 1 
 
0 0 1 Sweden 0.941176 
0 0 0 0 0 Logical remainder 0.885196 
0 0 0 1 0 Logical remainder 0.958904 
0 0 1 1 0 Logical remainder 0.951613 
0 1 1 1 0 Logical remainder 0.957143 
1 0 0 0 0 Clustered remainder 0.916335 
1 0 0 1 0 Clustered remainder 0.952381 
1 0 1 0 0 Clustered remainder 0.91954 
1 0 1 1 0 Clustered remainder 0.948276 
1 1 0 1 0 Logical remainder 0.915058 
 
Table 5 above shows a so-called truth table in which each row represents the each logical com-
bination of conditions, that is, 2^4 = 16 rows. We find that there are nine logical remainders; i.e. 
no cases ‘belong’ to these rows. Four out of these, however, are ‘clustered remainders’ 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 154), i.e. combinations that we know do not exist in reality 
and can be excluded for logical minimisation. Combinations of high governance capacity and 
low union power can per definition not exist since governance capacity is built around high bar-
gaining coverage (Traxler, 2004).  It is possible, on the other hand, to have low governance ca-
pacity and high union power. Three solutions are produced by logical minimisation in the fsQCA 
2.5 software: the complex solution (no counterfactuals used), the intermediate solution (using 
only easy counterfactuals) and the most parsimonious solution (both easy and difficult counter-
factuals used). In accordance with standard fsQCA practice, only easy counterfactuals are used 
in the intermediate solution, when we have directional expectations about a condition and its set 
relation to an outcome (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). The directional expectations can be 
seen in table 2.   
Following standard practice, the cut-off consistency has been set to 0.8 (Ragin, 2008). Two 
rows, however, contain logical contradictions. In the combination 
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govcap*UNPOW*regind*court, which contains Belgium, France and Luxembourg, France is the 
only country with weak CMA. The row is nevertheless included in the logical minimisation as 
having strong CMA due to the relatively high consistency of 0.89. Instead, we will discuss 
France as a deviant case for reasons given below. The combination 
govcap*unpow*REGIND*court, which contains Switzerland, the UK and Ireland, is also contra-
dictory in that Switzerland has a strong CMA while the Anglo-Saxon countries do not. Follow-
ing a conservative strategy, this row has not been included for logical minimisation, even though 
its consistency is close to 0.8. Switzerland will be considered below. Finally, 
govcap*UNPOW*REGIND*court contains Germany but has a high consistency. As Germany 
does not have a strong CMA, it was not included for logical minimisation according to standard 
practice for handling simultaneous subset relations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 243). The 
logical minimisation using easy counterfactuals in line with directional expectations produces 
two causal paths to strong CMA, as seen in the table below. The complex and intermediate solu-
tions are identical while the parsimonious solution differs in a few waysxv. We focus on the for-
mer in line with the suggestion to use only easy counterfactuals.  
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Table 6: Complex/intermediate solution 
 Raw cover-
age 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency Cases covered 
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP             0.496168     0.227012     0.929982 Sweden, Finland, Denmark & Nor-
way 
regind*UNPOW*govcap      0.570881     0.301724     0.896241 France, Italy, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Greece, Portugal & Spain 
Solution coverage: 0.797893 
Solution consistency: 0.907407 
Uncovered cases with strong CMA: Switzerland 
 
The solution consistency is highly satisfactory – above 0.9 – while the coverage is also satisfac-
tory at 0.8. Only the first causal path includes court systems, but contrary to expectations it is in 
the absence of normal court systems, i.e. when specialised courts prevail, that strong CMA ex-
ists. And it is only in combination with strong union power and high governance capacity that 
absence of normal courts is a condition for strong CMA. Also surprisingly, i.e. contrary to El-
vander’s hypothesis, this path includes strong governance capacity. On the other hand, the sec-
ond causal path – low governance capacity, high union power and weak regulation of industrial 
action –fits well with the extended Elvander hypothesis. We see that low governance capacity is 
a sufficient condition for strong CMA but only in combination with strong union power and 
weak strike rules. Therefore, Elvander’s original contribution is nuanced by the analysis. Union 
power is present in both paths but as noted above, we do not consider it a truly necessary condi-
tion. The results seem to disconfirm Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypothesis 
On closer inspection, the cases seem to cluster geographically around the causal paths. The 
first path – the Nordic – includes Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway; i.e. all these countries 
have membership scores in this combination of conditions of above 0.5. The second path – the 
Mediterranean – includes France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg and Belgium. 
France is a deviant case for consistency as it has weak CMA. Moreover, we can see that Belgium 
and Luxembourg are geographically ‘off’. Surprisingly, the extended Elvander hypothesis fits 
better to Mediterranean countries than to the Nordic countries on which the hypothesis was orig-
inally formulated. The two causal paths explain 10 out of the 11 cases with strong CMA – all but 
Switzerland, which is a deviating case for coverage, or a false positive – according to our theo-
retical expectations (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 308-309). 
We also want to check the robustness of the solution. A solution is robust if the changes made 
do not dramatically change solution terms/paths or their consistency and coverage levels. It is 
also robust if new solution terms/paths are in subset relationships to the original solution 
terms/paths (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012: 285). Two procedures are recommended for 
checking robustness in fsQCA. First, recalibration of cases helps to see whether the solution will 
be affected by changes in membership scores. As fuzzy-set thresholds are inherently qualitative, 
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recalibration will detect whether the solution is robust to withstand alternative qualitative thresh-
olds, e.g. changing the 0.5 threshold. Second, changing the frequency and consistency threshold 
for inclusion in logical minimisation will help to see whether a different inclusion procedure 
affects solutions. We only recalibrated and changed the consistency level since changing fre-
quency levels is not advisable given the sample size of 17 countries; i.e. too much diversity 
compared to the sample size would be lost. The effects of recalibrations and the new consistency 
level for inclusion are reported in the table below. 
 
Table 7: Robustness test
Recalibration New solution terms Comment on robustness  
UNPOW: Germany from 
0.63 to 0.49; France from 0.7 
to 0.49 (due to recent erosion 
of union power) 
court*UNPOW 
regind*UNPOW*govcap 
 
Solution coverage: 0.83 
Solution consistency: 0.90 
Mediterranean path identical.   
Nordic path is changed to exclude high govern-
ance capacity. Still a superset of original Nordic 
path. Unique coverage of Nordic path increased 
by 0.03, which is irrelevant. Consistency of path 
drops by 0.007, which is also irrelevant. 
UNPOW: Greece and Portu-
gal from 0.59 to 0.49. Spain 
from 0.63 to 0.49 (due to low 
union density) 
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP            
COURT*regind*govcap     
court*regind*UNPOW       
 
Solution coverage: 0.81  
Solution consistency: 0.91 
Nordic path identical. 
Mediterranean path is changed to exclude union 
power but include normal court system. Supports 
Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypothesis.  Problematic for 
robustness. 
 
New path added: ~court*~regind*unpow – 
covers France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Swe-
den. Problematic for robustness 
Regind: Sweden from 0.44 to 
0.51 (due to existence of 
peace clause) 
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP re-
gind*UNPOW*govcap  
 
 
Unproblematic 
 
Solution coverage: 0.80 
Solution consistency: 0.91 
Regind: Finland from 0.59 to 
0.49 (due to similarity with 
Swedish conflict regulation)  
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP re-
gind*UNPOW*govcap  
 
 
Unproblematic 
 
Solution coverage: 0.80 
Solution consistency: 0.91 
CMA: Spain from 1 to 0.49 
(due to limited use of CMA 
in practice) 
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP re-
gind*UNPOW*govcap  
 
 
Unproblematic 
 
Solution coverage: 0.83 
Solution consistency: 0.90 
CMA: Switzerland from 0.64 
to 0.49 (due to theoretical 
expectations) 
court*UNPOW*GOVCAP re-
gind*UNPOW*govcap  
 
 
Unproblematic 
 
Solution coverage: 0.80 
Solution consistency: 0.91 
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We conducted six separate recalibrations in accordance with data and substantive knowledge 
about the cases. Effects of recalibrations are modest, suggesting a robust solution. Two recalibra-
tions, however, yielded different solution terms worth commenting on. Due to recent decades of 
declining union power in Germany and France, these cases were recalibrated to 0.49, i.e. more 
out than in strong union power (Visser, 2011). This changed the Nordic path to exclude high 
governance capacity, thus becoming court*UNPOW, which, however, is a superset of the origi-
nal path. The changes to solution consistency and coverage are moreover too small to be rele-
vant. In sum, the original solution was robust to this change. We also changed the union power 
of Greece, Portugal and Spain to 0.49 due to their low union densities. The Nordic path was 
identical, but the Mediterranean path now excludes union power while including COURT, thus 
supporting the Valdés Dal-Ré hypothesis. Moreover, a new path to strong CMA appears – 
court*regind*UNPOW – which covers France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Sweden. The subset 
relations between original and new solutions are not clear, which indicates that the original solu-
tion is not robust to recalibration of union power in the Mediterranean cases. The crucial qualita-
tive judgment becomes whether unions are deemed powerful because of bargaining coverage 
through extension mechanisms or because of union membership (Traxler, 2004). If one opts for 
the former, then Mediterranean countries should be calibrated above 0.5; if the latter, then they 
should be calibrated below 0.5. Given the mobilisation capacity of Mediterranean unions (Ferner 
and Hyman, 1998) – also of non-members – the former seems tenable.         
We also changed the consistency level to 0.9 for inclusion in logical minimisation. The Nordic 
path is identical while the Mediterranean path now includes court, in accordance with Valdés 
Dal-Ré’s hypothesis. The new path only covers Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The added 
value of a higher consistency threshold is naturally a ‘cleaner’ solution, understood as a high 
consistency of 0.94. In return, coverage is reduced to 0.67 as strong CMA in Belgium and Lux-
embourg is left uncovered while Switzerland remains uncovered. This begs the question whether 
a Continental path to strong CMA exists that is not covered by the conditions included in this 
analysis. Altogether, however, the effects of changing consistency level are not severe for the 
robustness of the original solution as the new paths are in subset relations to the original solution.    
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The following discussion will take a closer look at the cases and the mechanisms behind causal 
paths. We will first discuss deviant cases and then the possibilities of fusing the two paths 
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through within-case analysis of mechanisms behind relationships between conditions and out-
come. 
 
Figure 1: XY scatter plot of solution and outcome 
 
 
The XY scatter plot above depicts the set-relations between solution (X) and outcome (Y). Suffi-
ciency is established when membership in the condition(s) is equal to or smaller than member-
ship in the outcome; i.e. cases should stay above or on the diagonal in the scatter plot. In accord-
ance with Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 308-10) we can identify deviant cases for consisten-
cy (the southeast quadrant) and deviant cases for coverage (the northwest quadrant). Most cases 
do in fact stay above and close to the diagonal, although there are a few near misses and two 
truly deviant cases: France and Switzerland. France is a deviant case for consistency and should 
be compared with so-called typical cases, e.g. Spain or Italy, to establish which omitted condi-
tions might explain why France has a high membership in the causal path re-
gind*UNPOW*govcap but low membership in the outcome. Switzerland, on the other hand, is a 
deviant case for coverage and should be compared to irrelevant cases, e.g. Netherlands and the 
UK, to see which omitted conditions might explain Switzerland’s strong CMA.      
Rojot et al. (2005) give a threefold explanation of weak CMA in France. First, the 
prud’hommes system already includes conciliation procedures, making strong CMA seem re-
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dundant. Second, French law prohibits any contractual clauses specifying use of CMA that im-
pede the individual right to strike. Third, state labour inspectors can advise and conciliate in or-
der to prevent collective disputes from arising in the first place (Rojot et al., 2005). In contrast, 
the Mediterranean countries have set up CMA in a post-fascist attempt to ‘democratise’ collec-
tive bargaining and interest politics from its past (Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003; Lanza and Lavdas, 
2000). Moreover, recent reforms of CMA in Portugal and Greece were clearly aimed at curbing 
industrial unrest and possible wage developments in relation to EMU accession (EIRO, 2006).       
Switzerland can be compared to the Netherlands. In 1937, the Swiss tradition for consensual 
industrial relations was institutionalised with an agreement for the engineering and watch indus-
try. The agreement included a multi-stage mediation system and possibility of compulsory arbi-
tration reflecting the commitment to avoiding industrial unrest (Oesch, 2011). As Oesch remarks, 
unions and collective bargaining – although relatively weak – were tolerated as long as they con-
tributed to peaceful relations and as implementers of social and labour market policies. By con-
trast, the Netherlands since 1950 had an established tradition of corporatist control of wage set-
tlements, most notably through the Social-Economic Council and Foundation of Labour – insti-
tutions for tripartite interest mediation which made strong CMA redundant (Visser, 1998).  
The two exponents of liberal vs. coordinated market economies merit mentioning (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). In Great Britain, the historical tradition of voluntarism and gentlemen’s agree-
ments between union and employers seem to preclude any strong third-party interventionxvi. 
When industrial dispute was at a highpoint in the 1970s, the Thatcher government went for 
stronger regulation of industrial action instead of strengthening CMA, which supports collective 
bargaining instead of undermining it (Kilpatrick, 2003; Dickens and Hall, 2003). Also interesting 
is Germany’s weak CMA, which can be contrasted with the strong CMA of Scandinavian coun-
tries, all building on voluntarist self-regulation and a coordinated market economy (Zachert, 
2003). Germany actually had compulsory system of state arbitration during the Weimar Repub-
lic, but this was replaced by the weak CMA of today (Jacobi et al., 1998: 216). The traumas of 
the Weimar Republic most likely deterred German policymakers from suggesting strong inter-
vention into collective bargaining despite situations of industrial unrest, economic crisis and low 
governance capacity (Zachert, 2003: 178). Conversely, strong CMA in Scandinavia can be traced 
to economic crises with large-scale industrial unrest where low governance capacity induced 
policymakers to establish strong CMA.  
The within-case analysis seems to suggest that the underlying mechanism in our two paths to 
strong CMA is about social control of industrial relations. This begs the question of whether the 
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two paths could merge. Elvander argued that low governance capacity in Denmark was respon-
sible for strong CMA, and looking at the 1934 reform this was certainly the case; control over 
decentralised, strong unions was the main aim and high governance capacity came later (Due et 
al., 1994). Similar patterns existed in Norway in 1935 (Stokke, 1998). The same is true for the 
1997/2000 reform of Swedish CMA against the backdrop of industrial unrest and wage inflation 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Elvander (2002) thus suggested that Sweden’s reform of its mediation 
institutions could largely be explained by the apparent governance problems of Swedish social 
partners and the will of governments to steer bargaining without undermining it. The extended 
Elvander hypothesis is promising because it also covers Mediterranean countries. Recent reforms 
in Mediterranean countries have in part also been about control of collective bargaining (EIRO, 
2006). Conversely, other countries have resisted strong CMA either because it was not necessary 
since unions were under control or too weak, e.g. the Netherlands and Switzerland and the UK, 
or because the preference for non-intervention was stronger than the threat of adversarial indus-
trial relations, e.g. Germany and France. This puts union power and low governance capacity at 
the heart of explanations for strong CMA, in line with Elvander’s inference (1974) based Scan-
dinavian countries – all with strong unions where only governance capacity differed.  
CONCLUSION 
If the current crisis of collective bargaining is actually about resolving interest disputes when the 
economic pie is small, then surely institutions designed for just this should come to the forefront. 
As Simmel noted long ago (1904), CMA has the potential to solve bilateral conflicts – and this 
without imposing spectacular social pacts, rigid statutory provisions or depriving actors of bar-
gaining autonomy. Strong and effective CMA, ceteris paribus, could reinforce collective bar-
gaining as it resolves conflicts, potentially producing efficient and equitable solutions which en-
hance both procedural and substantive legitimacy of collective bargaining (Scharpf, 1997). Un-
derlying these benefits, however, is the exercise of control and thus power relations.   
The purpose of this article was to explain the existence of strong CMA in seventeen Western 
European countries using a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. In all seventeen countries 
investigated, CMA plays some role in collective bargaining, a regulatory process still vital to the 
European labour markets. And in eleven of these, we find rather strong CMA systems that are 
potentially pivotal in structuring bargaining processes and outcomes. What explains this differ-
ence? Four explanatory conditions related to strong CMA were identified: high union power, low 
governance capacity (the Elvander hypothesis), weak regulation of industrial action and absence 
of specialised labour courts (the Valdés Dal-Ré hypothesis). The analysis shows two causal paths 
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to strong CMA: the Nordic and the Mediterranean. The former combines union power, high gov-
ernance capacity and presence of specialised labour courts. The latter combines low governance 
capacity, high union power and weak regulation of industrial action. None of the conditions were 
consistently necessary for strong CMA, although union power is present in both causal paths. 
The solution terms had satisfactory consistency and coverage levels and withstood robustness 
tests. On the basis of these results, Elvander’s hypothesis was partly supported while Valdés Dal-
Ré’s was not. Within-case analysis furthermore shows that the two paths can potentially be 
fused, as shown, for example, by the historical processes in Nordic countries. Reforms to 
strengthen CMA in Nordic countries were consistently linked to periods or situations of low 
governance capacity despite the normally high governance capacity. On the basis on this, we 
conclude that the mechanism leading to strong CMA is about control over collective bargaining, 
and the impetus for institutionalising control has been high union power and low governance 
capacity – just as Elvander proposed. Traditions of court systems, however, are less important.       
Future research into CMA and collective bargaining should accordingly focus on the mecha-
nism of control. This study has highlighted the structural impetus – so-called remote factors 
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2006) – for wanting control over collective bargaining, i.e. union 
power and low governance capacity. The actual translation of this impetus into institution build-
ing and design, however, is political. In other words, political interests and coalitions – so-called 
proximate factors (Schneider and Wagemann, 2006) – leading to strong CMA should be investi-
gated. This could be done cross-nationally as in this study or longitudinally in process-tracing of 
reforms (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). There is also a need to investigate the impact of 
CMA on practice. Do formal institutions actually affect collective bargaining processes and out-
comes, and how? This has been done in national case studies but, as noted, less so in cross-
national comparative work.  
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Appendix 1: Data matrix for CMA – most recent (national and comparative sources) 
Country 
 L Arbitration A Score L & A Mediation M Conciliation C Capabilities CA 
Score 
M, C, 
CA 
Qualita-
tive 
calibra-
tion 
Link Co Vo  Bi  
Fuzzy 
calibra-
tion 
Co  Vo  Bi Co  Vo  Bi  No-tice  
Ex-
ten  Cool New 
Aim
s  
Fuzzy 
calibra-
tion 
Fuzzy-
score 
CMA 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.16 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.32 0.32 
Switzer-
land 0 0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.64 0.64 
Nether-
lands 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.2 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.4 0.8 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.68 0.68 
Luxem-
bourg 0 0 0.6 0 0.6 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.68 0.68 
France 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.4 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0.32 0.4 
Italy 0 0 0.6 0 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.68 0.68 
Greece 0 0.8 0 0 0.8 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.36 0.8 
Portugal 0 0.8 0.6 0 0.8 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.64 0.8 
Spain 0 0 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.4 0 0 0 0 0  0  0 0.64 0.8 
Great 
Britain 0 0 0.2 0 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0.2 
Ireland 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.32 0.4 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.76 0.76 
Denmark 1 0 0 0 1 0.8 0.4 0 0.6 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.8 1 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.72 0.72 
Norway 0 1 0 0 1 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0.72 1 
Co = Compulsory Statutory; Vo = Voluntary Statutory; Bi = Bilateral arrangements (typically voluntary by default as agreement on arrangement can be broken) – 
bargaining coverage considered; Notice = Notice obligation before industrial action; Exten = Extension of period for mediation and conciliation before indus-
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trial action; Cool = Cool-down period; New = New mediation/conciliation during industrial action; Aims = Independent aims for mediation/arbitration or based 
on aims of parties; L = linkage of different bargaining areas into a single decision.  
Calibration of CMA provisions is based on six-level fuzzy scores. Cell indicates max fuzzy score for CMA provisions – qualitative judgment of scores based on 
existence of arbitration, mediation and conciliation and their capabilities based on country analysis/reports (see sources).  
Fuzzy-set score is found by the union of scores for arbitration (L+A) OR mediation/conciliation with capabilities (M+C). This way the strongest link prevails in 
the score. 
 
Sources for CMA calibration: Comparative overview: (EIRO, 2006; Valdés Dal-Ré, 2003; Jacobs, 1993b). National sources: Germany (Dribbush and Stettes, 
2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austria (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 1993a; Fluder 
and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006; Delattre, 2003; EIRO, 2006; 
Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and Vincent, 2006), 
Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2003; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and Koukoules, 
2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernández, 2003), 
Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), Sweden (Berg, 
2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; Kristiansen, 
2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 2002; Stokke, 
2006). 
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Appendix 2: Data matrix for GOVCAP – averages 1960–2010 (Visser, 2011b)  
     
 
 
 
Country 
 
CENT 
(average) 
Cfveto 
(average) 
Unveto 
(average) 
Centralisation 
score 
Wcoord 
(average) 
fscentralisa fswcoord fscentr+fsw
coord 
Qualitative 
calibration 
Fuzzy-score 
GOVCAP 
Germany 0.44 0 2 0.46 4 0.2 0.9 0.43 0.43 
Austria 0.96 1.8 2 0.95 4.5 1 0.95 0.98 0.98 
Switzerland 0.32 0 1.6 0.35 3.7 0.07 0.86 0.33 0.33 
Netherlands 0.54 1.2 2 0.63 4.1 0.6 0.92 0.71 0.71 
Belgium 0.46 1 0.3 0.42 4.2 0.14 0.93 0.40 0.40 
Luxembourg 0.32 1 1 0.39 2.1 0.1 0.23 0.14 0.14 
France 0.21 0 0 0.14 2.2 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.10 
Italy 0.32 0.4 0.5 0.29 3 0.04 0.68 0.25 0.25 
Greece 0.33 0 0 0.22 4 0.02 0.9 0.31 0.31 
Portugal 0.32 0 0 0.21 3 0.02 0.68 0.24 0.24 
Spain 0.33 1 0 0.31 3.6 0.05 0.84 0.31 0.31 
Great Britain 0.1 0 0 0.07 1 0 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Ireland 0.41 0.3 0 0.3 3.1 0.05 0.71 0.27 0.27 
Sweden 0.54 1.7 2 0.67 4.1 0.74 0.92 0.80 0.80 
Denmark 0.53 1 1.8 0.59 4 0.47 0.9 0.61 0.61 
Finland 0.39 1.2 1 0.44 4 0.17 0.9 0.41 0.80* 
Norway 0.58 2 2 0.72 4.3 0.85 0.94 0.88 0.88 
      Thresholds: 
0.8;0.6;0.3 
Thresholds: 
4.5;2.5;1.5 
fscentrali-
sa/fswcoord: 
2/3  
 
CENT: Summary measure of centralisation of wage bargaining, taking into account both union authority and union concentration at multiple levels (derived from 
Iversen’s centralisation index). (0–1) = given by √[( Cfauthority*DEME*Hcf ) + (Affauthority*DEMI*Haff )], weighting the degree of authority or vertical 
coordination in the union movement with the degree of external and internal unity, and union co centration or horizontal coordination, taking into account 
multiple levels at which bargaining can take place and assuming a non-zero division of union authority over different levels (Visser, 2011a). Taking the square 
root serves to magnify the differences at the low end of this scale (cf. Iversen, 1999: 53).  
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Weighted with Cfveto (confederate veto on strike decisions) and Unveto (federate veto on strike decisions at company level). Weight in Centralisation score: 
CENT = 2/3, Cfveto+Unveto: 1/3. 
Wcoord: 5 = eco omy-wide bargaining, based on a) enforceable agreements between the central organisations of unions and employers affecting the entire econ-
omy or entire private sector, or on b) government imposition of a wage schedule, freeze, or ceiling. 4 = mixed industry and economy-wide bargaining: a) cen-
tral organisations negotiate non-enforceable central agreements (guidelines) and/or b) key unions and employers' associations set pattern for the entire econo-
my. 3 = industry bargaining with no or irregular pattern setting, limited involvement of central organisations, and limited freedoms for company bargaining. 2 
= mixed or alter ating industry- and firm-level bargaining, with weak enforceability of industry agreements. 1 = none of the above, fragmented bargaining, 
mostly at company level (Visser, 2011a).  
Fuzzy scores for each measure are calibrated using thresholds: [0.8; 0.6; 0.3] for Centralisation and [4.5; 2.5; 1.5] for Wcoord. Composite score ‘fscentrali-
sa/fswcoord’ is calculated with a 2/3 weight to fscentralisation.   
*Finland recalibrat d due to recurrent incomes policy measures (Salonius, 2003). Ireland was not recoded as the social partnership was of a relatively recent phe-
nomenon and has since eroded (Doherty, 2011).  
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Appendix 3: Data matrix for UNPOW – averages 1960–2010 for private sector (Visser, 2011b)  
Country Bargaining coverage  Union density Calibration of Bar-
gaining coverage 
Calibration of Union 
density 
Weighted average 
bargcov/density 
Fuzzy-score UN-
POW 
Germany 69.71 30.73 0.78 0.19 0.63 0.43 
Austria 97.2 33.7 0.97 0.66 0.89 0.98 
Switzerland 48.92 23.4 0.39 0.1 0.32 0.33 
Netherlands 79.71 26.45 0.89 0.16 0.71 0.71 
Belgium 92 43 0.96 0.76 0.91 0.40 
Luxembourg 59.4 43.3 0.59 0.68 0.61 0.14 
France 83 7.53 0.92 0.02 0.70 0.10 
Italy 84.52 37.32 0.93 0.41 0.80 0.25 
Greece 67.1 19.4 0.74 0.14 0.59 0.31 
Portugal 65.4 31.88 0.71 0.23 0.59 0.24 
Spain 73.47 16.14 0.83 0.03 0.63 0.31 
Great Britain 34.34 22.53 0.18 0.29 0.21 0.00 
Ireland 49.89 24.63 0.41 0.63 0.47 0.27 
Sweden 82.15 72.76 0.91 0.99 0.93 0.80 
Denmark 76.82 69.77 0.87 0.99 0.90 0.61 
Finland 83.8 69.45 0.92 0.98 0.94 0.80 
Norway 65.09 43.54 0.7 0.86 0.74 0.88 
   Thresholds:  
90; 55; 15 
Thresholds:  
60; 40; 20 
Weight coverage 3/4 
Weight density 1/4 
 
AdjCov: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, adjusted (0–100) = employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as a proportion of all wage and salary ear ers in 
employment with the right to bargaining, expressed as percentage, adjusted for the possibility that some sectors or occupations are excluded from the right to 
bargain (removing such groups from the employment count before dividing the number of covered employees over the total number of dependent workers in 
employment) (Visser, 2011a). 
CovPriv: Bargaining (or Union) Coverage, private or market sector (0–100) = employees in the private or market sector covered by wage bargai ing agreements 
as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment in the private or market sector (Visser, 2011a). 
Thresholds for fscov: [90; 55; 15]. UD: Union Density rate, net union membership as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in employment (Visser, 2011a). 
UDpriv: Union Density rate, net union membership as a proportion of all wage and salary earners in private employment (where available) (Visser, 2011a). Cali-
bration of ‘fsdensity’ using thresholds: [60; 40; 20]. Weight coverage vs. density: 3/4 vs. 1/4 
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Appendix 4: Data matrix for REGIND – most recent (national and comparative sources) 
Country 
block
ade 
boy-
cott 
go 
slow 
work to 
rule 
pick-
eting 
polit-
ical 
sym-
pathy warning
Immuni-
ty sys-
tem 
Actions com-
posite score 
P ac
e 
<10 
days = 1
Ball
ot 
Procedural 
rules score 
Fuzzy-score  
REGIND 
Germany 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 - 0.44 1 0 1 0.67 0.61 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 1.5 0 0 0.5 0.63 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 1 2 0 0 0.67 0.75 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 - 0.5 1 0 1 0.67 0.63 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 1 0.5 1 0 - 0.69 0 0 0 0 0.17 
Luxem-
bourg 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 - 0.63 1 0 0 0.33 0.41 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 - 0.88 0 0 0 0 0.22 
Italy 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.5 0 - 0.69 0.5 0 0 0.17 0.30 
Greece 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 - 0.63 0 0 0 0 0.16 
Portugal 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 - 0.5 0 0.8 0 0.27 0.33 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 - 0.94 0 0.8 0 0.27 0.43 
Great Brit-
ain 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0.67 0 1 1 0.67 0.67 
Ireland 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.44 0 0.8 1 0.6 0.56 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 - 0.38 0.6 0.8 0 0.47 0.44 
Denmark 1 1 0 0 1 0.5 1 0 - 0.44 0.8 1 1 0.93 0.81 
Finland 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 - 0.38 1 1 0 0.67 0.59 
Norway 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 - 0.25 1 0.8 1 0.93 0.76 
               
Weight proce-
dural rules 
score: 3/4 
Note high score = restrictive. ‘Action composite score’: unweighted average. ‘Procedural rules score’: unweighted average. ‘fsregulaction’: weighted average 
score of ‘action composite score’ and ‘procedural rules score’. ‘Procedural rules score’: weight 3/4. 
 
Sources for calibration of regulation of engaging in industrial action: Comp rative overview: (Warneck, 2007). National sources: Germany (Dribbush and Stettes, 
2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austri  (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 1993a; Fluder 
and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006; Delattre, 2003; EIRO, 2006; 
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Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and Vincent, 2006), 
Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2003; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and Koukoules, 
2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernández, 2003), 
Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), Sweden (Berg, 
2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; Kristiansen, 
2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 2002; Stokke, 
2006).   
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Appendix 5: Data matrix for COURT – most recent (national and comparative sources) 
 No specialised labour court No lay judges Fuzzy score
Germany 0.2 0.2 0 
Austria 1 0.2 0.8 
Switzerland 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Netherlands 1 0 1 
Belgium 0.6 0.2 0.4 
Luxembourg 0.2 0 0.2 
France 0.2 0.2 0 
Italy 0.6 0 0.6 
Greece 1 0 1 
Portugal 0.8 0 0.8 
Spain 0.6 0 0.6 
Great Britain 0.2 0.2 0 
Ireland 0.2 0.2 0 
Sweden 0.2 0.2 0 
Denmark 0.2 0.2 0 
Finland 0.2 0.2 0 
Norway 0.2 0.2 0 
Calibration:   1 = no specialised court; 0.6 = Integrated; 0 = Yes, specialised  
Judges: 0.2 = Lay judges; 0 = No lay judge (added to the court score) 
 
Sources for calibration of court system: Sources for CMA calibration: Comparative overview: (EIRO, 2013; EALCJ, 2013). National sources: Germany (Dribbush 
and Stettes, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Zachert, 2003), Austria (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Marhold, 2003; Strohmer, 2006), Switzerland (Jacobs, 
1993a; Fluder and Hotz-Hart, 1998), Netherlands (de Roo, 2003b; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; van het Kaar, 2006), Belgium (Chaidron, 2006; Delattre, 2003; 
EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), Luxembourg (de Roo, 2003a; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a), France (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jeammaud, 2003; Pernot and 
Vincent, 2006), Italy (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Grandi, 2 03; Senatori, 2006), Greece (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Karkioulafis, 2006; Yannakourou and 
Koukoules, 2003), Portugal (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Monteiro Fernandes, 2003), Spain (Amorós, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Rodríguez Fernán-
dez, 2003), Great Britain (Dickens, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kilpatrick, 2003), Ireland (Dobbins, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kerr, 2003), 
Sweden (Berg, 2006; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Eriksson, 2003; Stokke, 2002), Denmark (Due et al., 1993; EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Jørgensen, 2006; 
Kristiansen, 2003), Finland (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Kuusisto, 2006; Salonius, 2003) and Norway (EIRO, 2006; Jacobs, 1993a; Stokke, 1998; Stokke, 
2002; Stokke, 2006).   
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Paper 5:  
Three approaches to coordinated bargaining – a 
case for power-based explanations  
 
Christian Lyhne Ibsen 
 
Abstract  
This article reviews and discusses three different theoretical approaches to the study of coordi-
nated collective bargaining which posit three different causal mechanisms for coordination. Ra-
tional choice posits power relations based on resource-dependence; rationalist institutionalism 
posits rules of the game; and discursive institutionalism stresses shared meaning structures. It is 
argued that each approach is based on different views of coordination involving exercise of pow-
er where some actors make others do what they otherwise would not have done. Coordination 
could therefore have negative distributional consequences for coerced actors. The paper goes on 
to show examples of the three approaches from Sweden and Denmark which are regarded as 
crucial cases for ‘Sinatra-inference’: If theories of coordination stressing power and negative 
distributional consequences can make it in Sweden and Denmark, they can make it anywhere. 
The article accordingly rejects notions that coordination is purely cooperative and makes a case 
for placing power at the heart of coordination studies. This does not preclude elements of coop-
eration but it shows that cooperation is conditioned by power relations. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Coordination of collective bargaining across industries has arguably been one of the key issues 
in industrial relations research and comparative political economy in recent decades. Concepts 
like ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler, 1995) and ‘coordinated market economies’ (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001) underline the prevalence of coordination in research. The concept has on one 
hand been linked to the interdependence of bargaining units with concern for wage moderation 
and employment. On the other hand, it has been linked to ensuring that bargaining units do not 
drift completely apart due to concerns for solidarity by keeping a floor under wages. So, ‘when 
actors face a high degree of interdependence of their goals, then coordinated action generally 
makes all of them better off than self-interested behaviour’ (Traxler, 2003a: 195). By balancing 
efficiency with equity, coordinated collective bargaining is often regarded as a fundamental pil-
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lar in the European social model (Jepsen and Serrano Pascual, 2005). Moreover, empirical stud-
ies have previously suggested that coordinated bargaining is conducive to wage moderation and 
compressed wage structures and thus reduces inflation while avoiding inequality (Traxler and 
Brandl, 2012; Wallerstein, 1999; Calmfors and Driffil, 1988).        
The question is, however, whether all actors really are better off with coordinated bargaining? 
And if some actors are worse off, why do they accept current systems of bargaining coordina-
tion? The above quotation stresses the positive-sum nature of coordination in situations of high 
interdependence, but this could obscure power relations and uneven distributive consequences of 
coordination. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the current systems of coordinated 
bargaining entail winners and losers, e.g. from rising wage inequality (Baccaro and Howell, 
2011; Palier and Thelen, 2010; OECD, 2011). Accordingly, we need to ask about the practices 
and outcomes of coordination to critically explore coordination as a political practice with poten-
tial distributional consequences. In other words, we need a concept of power in studies of bar-
gaining coordination that identifies the causal mechanisms behind bargaining coordination.  
One strand of literature argues that bargaining coordination rest on the power relations be-
tween unions and employers. It is the resources available to actors that have an interest in coor-
dination vis-à-vis resources of actors that prefer no coordination which will determine the fate of 
coordination. Often these resources are market-based (e.g. an industry’s share of the economy) 
or organisational (e.g. union density). Another strand of literature stresses how institutions medi-
ate interests and that rules of the game conducive to coordination will be a strong explanation for 
its occurrence and sustainability. These institutions are often – but not exclusively – statutory 
supports for collective bargaining and are often used to explain variation of bargaining coordina-
tion across countries. Moreover, it is argued that institutions have distributional consequences for 
the actors, favouring some interests over others. Finally, some scholars claim that coordination 
can be explained by discourses – or meaning structures – that are inter-subjectively shared by 
bargaining parties and will lead them to coordinate across industries. Discourses define what is 
desirable and how to get it and as such can have a coercive effect by moulding the interests of 
actors. As defined here, the three approaches thus share an appreciation of power in coordina-
tion. However, they differ in their view of the causal mechanisms leading to and sustaining bar-
gaining coordination.    
The purpose of this paper is to review and discuss these three approaches to bargaining coor-
dination and to test their applicability in Swedish and Danish bargaining coordination. The paper 
contributes to studies of bargaining coordination in three areas. Firstly, it aims to rectify the liter-
ature’s often excessive focus on bargaining structure and levels as signs of coordination (e.g. 
Wallerstein and Golden, 2000). Structures and levels, while analytically very useful, take out the 
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political of coordination and cannot be the whole story (Thelen and Kume, 2006). We need to 
put power back into studies of coordination by asking the fundamental question: Whose interests 
prevail in coordination? Secondly and related, the focus on strategic interaction makes us deduce 
that coordination brings mutual benefits to all parties. But this might obscure mobilization of 
bias and ideological power (Lukes, 2005). Studies of coordination should be more sentient to 
these forms of power in order not to reify proposed mutual gains of coordination (Moe, 2005; 
Hyman, 1974). Thirdly, coordination and changes in coordination are often explained exclusive-
ly in rationalist terms using transformations of material structures, e.g. market internationaliza-
tion, structural occupational changes and transitions to flexible production systems, which reor-
der actors’ preference for coordination (Iversen, 1996). Conversely, little has been done on how 
actors made sense of these structural changes (Blyth, 2003). Such an appreciation entails a closer 
attention to the role of discourse and ideology in studies of bargaining coordination.  
The plan of the article is as follows. Firstly, the paper reviews and discusses approaches to 
bargaining coordination through the lens of cooperation or power. Three approaches are present-
ed: rational choice theory, rationalist institutionalism and discursive institutionalism. The ap-
proaches differ in their causal mechanisms behind coordination, and we will show that they also 
differ in their view on power. Secondly, to assess the applicability of the three approaches the 
paper shows examples from bargaining coordination in Sweden and Denmark. Both countries are 
heralded as consensual coordinated bargaining systems with mutual benefits for capital and la-
bour (Pontusson, 2011). As such, Sweden and Denmark are chosen as crucial cases for ap-
proaches claiming power over cooperation (Eckstein, 1975). Put differently, they are considered 
least-likely cases for coordination entailing coercion due to their consensual win-win reputation. 
This allows for so-called ‘Sinatra- inference’ (Gerring, 2007): If theories of coordination stress-
ing power exercise and negative distributional consequences can make it in Sweden and Den-
mark, they can make it anywhere.   
APPROACHES TO COORDINATED BARGAINING  
The paper includes approaches that attempt to explain the occurrence and sustainability of bar-
gaining coordination. The focus of the paper is not on all forms of coordination as convincingly 
outlined by Sisson & Marginson (2002). Traxler et al. (2008: 40) note that horizontal cross-
industry coordination is the most interesting variant of coordination because it potentially in-
volves disinterest by some sectors and therefore risk of collective action problems. We therefore 
focus on this form. In open economies, the name of the game in horizontal coordination is to 
align bargaining results across sectors around the exposed sector – typically manufacturing – 
which in turn produces wage moderation and positive effects on employment in general, i.e. a 
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potential positive-sum game. Horizontal coordination, however, faces important collective action 
problems due the risk of defection by opportunistic sheltered sectors that can pass on labour cost-
increases to consumers which in turn produces negative cost-externalities in the economy. Con-
versely, in sectors with low skill requirements and high supply of labour (perhaps due to labour 
migration), employers might be tempted to force down wages in an uncoordinated manner. Giv-
en these differing interests in coordination – the impossibility theorem (Arrow, 1951) – and op-
portunities to free-ride on wage-moderation (Olson, 1965) – it might be difficult to create and 
sustain coordination. The fundamental analytical challenge is therefore to explain how coordina-
tion is created and sustained (Traxler, 2003b). 
In the following, we will elaborate on the three approaches’ causal mechanisms for coordina-
tion and how they purport different views of power. Admittedly, the approaches are presented in 
a very stylized manner to bring out the differences. Researchers will typically not adhere to 
‘pure’ approaches but combine causal arguments. This makes it interesting to consider whether 
the approaches are competing or complementary explanations for bargaining coordination. We 
will consider this in the conclusion.    
 
Rational choice 
Rational choice theory is pervasive in social sciences and is used widely by industrial relations 
scholars, political scientist, sociologists while being at the ontological core for economists (El-
ster, 1989). Fundamental to the rational choice approach is that actors behave rationally to max-
imise their interests in accordance with their position in material structures (Parsons, 2007). In 
social processes actors interact strategically to realise their interests partly on the basis of actions 
made by others. It follows that the logic of action is instrumentality and what varies (and there-
fore explains coordination) are different positions in material structures and the nature of interac-
tion. How can we use rational choice to explain coordination? One of the best rational explana-
tions for coordination comes from cross-class alliance theory. We only take the theory’s logic of 
interest-constellation, although proponents of the theory clearly use institutionalist arguments. 
The theory claims that interest in coordination can basically be explained by skill requirements 
and product market competition (Swenson, 2002). This leads to three groups of actors with dif-
fering interests in coordination:  
 
1. In tight product markets with low skill requirements, ‘cartelist’ employers are interested in 
‘taking wages out of competition’ and unions want standardised rates. Coordination be-
tween bargaining units can achieve this.  
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2. In slack product markets with high skill requirements, ‘segmentalist’ companies want to 
pay above market-clearance to attract the best and brightest in decentralised agreements 
with occupational unions. Coordination between bargaining units is only desirable for this 
group if it constitutes a ceiling for others.  
3. Finally, in tight product markets with high skill requirements, ‘solidaristic’ companies 
want to have flexible wages but avoid high costs, thus leading them to prefer cross-
industry coordination to enforce ceilings on wages and costs. Unions in these markets will 
try to control unions in other sectors to avoid negative cost-externalities.   
 
In open economies, ‘solidaristic’ industries are typically exposed to international competition. 
Conversely, ‘segmentalist’ industries are typically sheltered domestic sectors in which economic 
rent can be shared by employers and unions due to low product competition. Finally, ‘cartelist’ 
industries can be either exposed or sheltered but in both instances, product markets are tight.  
Rational choice explains coordination across industries with the exposed sector exercising 
power over the sheltered sector. The initiative for bargaining coordination comes from the ex-
posed companies and their unions who compete in international markets and cannot externalise 
costs. There is an exercise of power because the sheltered sector parties accept coordination de-
spite their interest in free-riding on wage-moderation by other industries. The role of power is 
thus made explicit in rational choice accounts and others building on it (Swenson, 1991; Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). We suggest that social exchange theory (Molm, 1997) – and its affinities with 
power-dependence theory – underlies the power concept in rational choice accounts of coordina-
tion. At the heart of social exchange theory lays interdependencies between actors, A and B. A 
yields power over B, if B depends more on resources that A possesses, than A depends on re-
sources that B possesses (Molm, 1997: 31). Under solidarism, for example, employers depend on 
unions to enforce ceilings on wages thus giving power to unions in their relationship with em-
ployers (Swenson, 2002). Conversely, in times of high unemployment and capital mobility, mar-
kets can perform wage moderation, thus obliterating the dependence on unions (Traxler et al., 
2008).  
In cross-industry coordination, what matters is, therefore, the extent of interdependencies be-
tween bargaining units. This can be deduced from material structures, for example the openness 
of the economy, the weight of the exposed sectors for the economy and skill composition in la-
bour markets. In the absence of interdependencies – for example in a situation where home-
markets are substantially more important than exports – the need for coordination will diminish 
as sheltered sectors will not depend on wealth creation by the exposed sectors. Conversely, em-
ployers in exposed sectors will find little need for coordination if sheltered sectors are character-
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ised by very slack labour markets and low pressure on wages (Traxler et al., 2008: 37). The base 
of power to get sheltered sectors to comply, arise from the dependence of the sheltered sector on 
resources that the exposed sector possesses – or rather, the resources exposed companies produce 
through exports. Institutions, it should be noted, are viewed as instrumental for powerful actors 
to realise the benefits from coordination because they regularise coordination. However, institu-
tions do not independently have a causal impact as they are viewed as reflections of underlying 
resource-dependence (Parsons, 2007). 
In sum, rational choice approach suggests that strategies based on interdependencies in materi-
al structures – most notably product markets and labour markets – explain the creation and sus-
tainability of bargaining coordination. As a corollary, moves away from coordination should also 
be explained by structural changes and the rational power-contingent responses by capital and 
labour. Indeed, factors such as structural unemployment, capital mobility, product market dereg-
ulation, flexible production systems, to name a few, have been used as explanations for employ-
ers’ move to decentralise bargaining or pull-out of bargaining coordination (cf. Katz, 1993). But 
as many scholars have shown, these structural changes in markets have not resulted in ubiquitous 
convergence onto a ‘one size fits all’ bargaining model (Ferner and Hyman, 1998). Function 
doesn’t necessarily follow structure (Traxler, 2003a). Moreover, as already indicated in the 
cross-class alliance theory, organisational capacities of actors, i.e. man-made constraints, matter 
in the power relations between sectors and thus in coordination (Iversen, 1996). This brings us 
into the institutionalist approach and a different concept of power. 
 
Rationalist institutionalism 
Institutionalist arguments are based on ‘man-made’ or social constraints, such as rules, conven-
tions, and standard operating procedures with path-dependent effects on rational behaviour 
(North, 1990). Rationalist institutionalism maintains that interests are exogenously given by ma-
terial structures but that they are mediated by institutions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Institutions 
accordingly create incentives and disincentives for certain actions and can therefore solve collec-
tive action problems, such as defection in bargaining coordination (Traxler, 2003b). Moreover, 
institutions are path dependent, i.e. once institutions are created in a moment of indeterminacy – 
so called critical junctures (Thelen, 1999) – they are hard to change. This is important because it 
delineates institutionalism from the pure rational choice approach that often includes institutions 
but argue that they can be readily changed if they do not perform the functions they were set out 
to do (Parsons, 2007). Conversely, institutionalist arguments rest on the proposition that structur-
al changes will not determine changes in coordination. The sources of path dependency include 
205 
 
‘sunk costs’ of creating an institution, increasing returns of the institution and transaction costs 
of changing it (Thelen, 1999).     
Which institutions foster bargaining coordination? In this presentation, we only focus only on 
industrial relations institutions, while scholars from political economy often focus on institution-
al complementarities between coordination wage bargaining and other sets of institutions like 
skill development systems (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The obvious candidate is the bargaining 
structure itself (Clegg, 1976). As Clegg (1976) showed in his seminal comparative analysis of 
unions under collective bargaining, the internal organisation of class representation follows the 
external organisation of inter-class bargaining relations. In other words, the institutional level of 
bargaining determines the locus of power in unions and employer associations and once estab-
lished this is hard to change. As a corollary, fixing bargaining authority in centralised multi-
employer peak-level bargaining also means centralisation of power in confederations. Corporat-
ists (e.g. Lembruch and Schmitter, 1982) focus on how centralisation of actors into few organisa-
tions facilitates bargaining coordination due to the eradication of veto-points and internalisation 
of pay-hikes (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). Conversely, fragmented organisations lead to oppor-
tunism and collective action problems. Even after peak-level bargaining, the basic logic of cen-
tralisation vs. fragmentation obviously still holds sway (e.g. Traxler and Brandl, 2012). It is con-
centration of power into few organisations that effectively compress different interests into sin-
gular decisions. As Traxler et al. (2008) and Iversen (1996) for example note, mergers within 
manufacturing between high-skill and low-skill unions facilitate coordination because the new 
union gains organisational power over other unions. This is especially the case, if confederations 
provide forums for deliberation and perhaps even collective ratification of agreements.     
Another important set of institutions is statutory (Sisson, 1987). Supportive statutory institu-
tions for bargaining increase the likelihood of coordination by diminishing the opportunities or 
benefits of defection. Firstly, lax regulation of the right to strike might be conducive to employer 
preference for coordination. Secondly, peace obligations instil order and managerial prerogatives 
during agreements, thus reducing employers’ fear of shop-floor conflict and wage-drift. Thirdly, 
erga omnes clauses effectively support multi-employer bargaining and therefore reduce competi-
tion between regulatory modes, i.e. between companies covered by collective agreements vs. 
uncovered companies (Traxler, 2003b). Alternatively, union-led unemployment insurance – 
Ghent-systems – increases worker propensity to join unions which – ceteris paribus – increases 
bargaining coverage, which in turn reduces competition between regulatory modes (Traxler, 
2003b). Again, these institutions are all highly path-dependent – often seen as cornerstones in the 
European social model (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 1999).        
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A key dividing line in institutionalist approaches to coordination is whether institutions help 
actors realise mutual gains through cooperation or they cement unequal power relations (Moe, 
2005). The former is a benign view on institutions as solutions to collective action problems with 
positive sum outcomes, the varieties of capitalism approach often being seen as an example of 
this view, despite its reference to power (Hall & Soskice, 2001: 5; however see also Hall & The-
len, 2009). The latter is more aligned with the second-face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) 
in which non-decision and mobilisation of bias constitute the main mechanisms of coordination. 
The second-face of power stresses how institutions are essential for understanding power rela-
tions because they exclude certain issues from decision-making, most notably the decision to 
defect from coordination. As a result, coordination can actually be a covert exercise of power by 
taking the question of whether to coordinate or not out of bargaining altogether.  
Historical institutionalism has explicitly recognised how institutions constitute power unequal-
ly among actors (Thelen, 1999). Statutory frameworks for collective bargaining can thus facili-
tate or hinder power relations conducive to bargaining coordination. If strong unions are neces-
sary to force employers into their second best-option of bargaining coordination – as power re-
source theory (Korpi, 2006) and much IR-theory suggests (Sisson, 1987; Traxler 2003a) – then 
surely statutory frameworks supportive of unions, e.g. Ghent-systems and erga omnes clauses, 
matter. Conversely, unsupportive frameworks such as the restrictions on industrial action in Brit-
ain (Dickens and Hall, 2010) or the union-recognition procedure in the US (Kochan et al., 1994) 
will weaken unions and therefore enhance the incentive of employers to avoid unions. Arguably, 
strong unions do not follow from market structures alone, but to large extent from political mobi-
lisation in history and institutionalised opportunity structures that are path dependent and largely 
explain cross-national variation in coordination (Crouch, 1993; Hyman, 2001). Coalitions that 
created institutions and support them matter, but institutions have an independent effect on be-
haviour.  
Rationalist institutionalism has been the object of many criticisms (cf. Campbell, 2004). Re-
cently, institutionalist scholars have begun to question the issue of institutional change and 
shown that actors can change institutions of coordination from within (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005). This somehow breaks with a strict notion of path dependency and would suggest that ac-
tors are less determined by institutions. Moreover, some scholars question whether the axiom of 
exogenous interests is really maintained in rationalist institutionalism. Indeed, Thelen (1999) 
remarks that historical institutionalists differ from many rational choice accounts on exactly this 
point, arguing that ideational elements of institutions – not merely material structures – also 
shape interests, which in turn matters for coordination. This brings us to the final approach and a 
different causal mechanism behind coordination.   
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Discursive institutionalism 
Discursive institutionalism claims that ideas – understood generally as ‘man-made’ social struc-
tures of meaning – matter for bargaining coordination (Schmidt, 2008). Analytically, scholars 
employ normative and cognitive conceptions of ideas. The former views action according to a 
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989), while the latter views action according to a 
‘logic of causal narratives’ (March, 2010: 42). Normative ideas will define what is desirable and 
good, while cognitive ideas will define ways to think about how the world works. Parsons (2007) 
delineates the discursive approach from rationalist institutionalism by arguing that ideas are dis-
tinct from institutions because actors internalise them and act according to the meaning they 
convey (Weick, 1995). As Blyth (2003) has noted, ‘structures do not come with an instruction 
sheet’, that is, we need ideas to make sense of the material structures. Moreover, while ideas are 
social they are also robust, so, ‘…once an idea has taken hold … it’s almost impossible to eradi-
cate’. Acting contrary to something that is meaningful, makes little sense – just as acting contra-
ry to your interest makes little sense in rationalist accounts. 
What is institutional about this approach is that ideas are inter-subjectively recognised and 
therefore create common expectations about action and interaction which can deter defection – 
just like a rule would do (Schmidt, 2010). As such, they can be instilled formally in rules and 
procedures – but the formalisation is a reflection of the underlying meaning structure. Industrial 
Relations (IR) studies are also starting to use discursive approaches explicitly (e.g. Frege, 2005; 
Stringfellow, 2012) and they actually have done so for a long time, albeit under the slightly dif-
ferent heading of ideology (e.g. Hyman, 1974).      
Scandinavian political scientists have pointed out how discourses of how the economy works 
affect bargaining coordination (Pedersen, 1989). In what is called the ‘negotiation economy’, 
organised actors strategically interact conditioned by discourse that provides a common under-
standing of socio-economic problems (Pedersen, 2006: 248). Based on welfare economics, all 
political decisions, including collective bargaining, are measured and judged according to how it 
contributes positively to the economy at large. The discourse both defines what is desirable and 
ways to get it. Historically, the discourse arises from the small state/open economy trajectory 
(Katzenstein, 1985) that defines interdependencies and control of externalities as the key to suc-
cess. And it places great scope for government collectivisation of risks through the welfare state, 
while accepting ordered voluntarist industrial relations. In turn, it becomes extremely difficult 
for actors to ‘argue’ for policies that are opportunistic such as defection from coordination. It 
simply doesn’t make sense. In times of economic crisis, actors will investigate and eventually 
rally around new prescripts that can restore the economy through collective actions. This is why 
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centralised bargaining was replaced by a competitive pattern bargaining system that allowed for 
flexible wages and wage moderation while securing social standards and autonomous bargain-
ing. Negotiation (not markets), coordination (not unilateral action) and collective adaptation (not 
stasis) are the key regulatory processes through which society as a whole prospers (Pedersen, 
2006: 250).         
Culpepper’s (2008) account on changes in wage bargaining in Ireland and Italy is also exem-
plary of a cognitive discursive approach. It is, moreover, interesting because Culpepper wishes to 
retain a rationalist ontology. According to the study, the transition in Ireland to social partnership 
and the end of Scala Mobile-indexation in Italy was sparked by crucial common knowledge 
events, in which actors realised new ways of pursuing their exogenously given interests. This is 
what March (2010) calls high-tech learning through reflection using new causal narratives. By 
mimicking the logic of wage bargaining in small open-economies like Austria and Norway, Ire-
land could restore cost competitiveness and secure workers’ income. In Italy, credible inflation 
forecasts paved the way for coordinated industry-level bargaining. The events changed the pref-
erence-order of social partners on bargaining institutions because they were endowed with new 
common knowledge which resets mutual expectations to each other’s actions (Culpepper, 2008: 
8). It was a new way of thinking how the economy works that made actors realign to bargaining 
coordination and since the knowledge is inter-subjectively shared, it becomes very hard for indi-
vidual actors to argue against it – let alone defect from its logic.     
With the possible exception of Culpepper, the crucial point for discursive approaches is the 
construction of interests (Schmidt, 2010). In Lukes’ third-face of power, the question of interests 
becomes a question of power exercise. Accordingly, A exercises power over B by obscuring the 
real/objective interests of B (Lukes, 2005). In contrast to the mobilisation of bias in rationalist 
institutionalism – where interests are unalterable but excluded from decision-making – the third 
face of power shows that the most dominant form of power is one in which B holds subjective 
interests that are contrary to B’s objective real interests. This exercise is usually latent and is 
sometimes called ideological power resulting in ‘false consciousness’. Hereby, it radically de-
parts from some constructivists that argue that reality is entirely constructed. For Lukes, objec-
tive interests do exist but they can be manipulated. Ontology aside, the affinity between the dis-
cursive approach and the third face of power is that ideas become constitutive of actors that 
make sense of the situation through normative and cognitive structures. For example neo-liberal 
ideology (Campbell and Pedersen, 2001) and discourses of globalization (Fairclough, 2003) all 
have the potential of changing the conditions for coordination, by changing identities and thus 
interests of bargaining parties. As a case in point, the interests of low skill workers in sheltered 
sectors become aligned with high-skill workers in manufacturing due to the idea of competitive-
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ness through wage restraint – even though low skill workers in sheltered sectors gradually loose 
out due to higher skills premium (Baccaro and Howell, 2011).      
Wage restraint due to competitiveness – not equality – becomes the game in town and once the 
game changes, so do the players (Amable and Palombarini, 2009). In competitive coordination, 
cost increases in bargaining are aligned with the relevant competitors, usually manufacturing 
companies in neighbouring countries and sheltered sectors become pattern-followers. Moreover, 
bargaining competence is delegated to the company level through framework agreements to in-
crease flexibility (Sisson & Marginson, 2002). Because collective bargaining is free – especially 
in countries with voluntarist traditions – coordination across industries around this cost norm is 
better achieved if all bargaining units realise or internalise the rationality of moderation due to 
interdependencies. Thus, after the demise of hierarchical centralised bargaining, self-regulation 
by actors is necessary (Dean, 1999). Arguably, the materiality of interdependencies is very real 
when companies shed labour due to cost increases under tight product markets. Nonetheless, it is 
the framing of this materiality (Campbell, 2004) due to indeterminacy of structures (Parsons, 
2007) and the resulting balance between wage moderation, flexibility, equality and voluntarism 
that matters for a discursive approach. There are many ways of coordinating bargaining which 
calls for closer attention to the details of coordination techniques because we here find the actual 
power exercises (Dean, 1999).  
Table 1 summarises the three approaches and their main theoretical dimensions regarding bar-
gaining coordination. On this basis, we now turn to examples of the approaches from Sweden 
and Denmark.   
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Table 1: Approaches to bargaining coordination 
 Rational choice 
 
Rationalist  institutionalism Discursive institutionalism 
Logic of interac-
tion 
Logic of instrumentality  Logic of instrumentality  Logic of appropriateness and 
causal narratives 
Structuring logic 
of interaction 
Material resource distribution 
and interaction situation 
Rules and standard operating 
procedures that form mutual 
expectations for interaction 
Cognitive and normative mean-
ing structures that form mutual 
expectations for interaction 
Interest formation Exogenous – based on material 
structures 
Exogenous – based on material 
structures but constrained by 
institutions 
Endogenous – based on institu-
tionalized ideas that are consti-
tutive of actors 
Coordination 
mechanism and 
form of power 
Structure of interests and inter-
action – defection made unvia-
ble due to resource interdepend-
ence  
Incentive structure and mobili-
sation of bias - institutional 
design sanctions defection, 
rewards cooperation and takes 
defection off the table 
Definition of the benefits from 
coordination and causal narra-
tive on how to achieve it  
Explanation for 
defection and 
change 
Material resource structures 
change making it opportune to 
defect from existing coordina-
tion. Can give rise to new pat-
terns of coordination.    
Material structures change 
which changes the coalitions 
underlying institutions. 
Defection not sanctioned severe-
ly.  
Counter discourses strong, 
causal narrative not shared 
among actors, i.e. weak internal-
isation of discourse. Reinterpre-
tation of institutions  
 
COORDINATION IN SWEDEN AND DENMARK 
Sweden and Denmark are often highlighted as highly coordinated market economies – coordi-
nated bargaining being one important arena for coordination – which have produced efficient and 
egalitarian outcomes. Both countries have, however, experienced significant changes to their 
bargaining systems going from centralised peak-level bargaining in the 1950s to 1970s to coor-
dinated industry-level bargaining from the 1990s. Coordination is nevertheless ubiquitous and 
seemingly consensual – both horizontally and vertically. Bargaining coverage is still high of 
around 75 % in Denmark (DA, 2013; Larsen et al., 2010) and 88 % in Sweden (Medlingsinsti-
tutet, 2012) and there is continued – although slightly decreasing – income equality (OECD, 
2011). They are therefore ‘least-likely’ cases for theories that stress power exercise and uneven 
distribution in coordination.  
How does coordination look like in Sweden and Denmark? Both countries have converged on-
to a pattern-bargaining system in which coordination is based on manufacturing setting a labour 
cost norm, usually a percentage increase, which other industries subsequently follow. However, 
in Sweden numerous industries have defected from the pattern set by manufacturing by settling 
on a higher percentage labour cost increase (see tables 2 and 3 below). This has not happened in 
Denmark. While Sweden by no means experienced a breakdown of coordination, defections con-
stitute an interesting puzzle to which our approaches can be applied.     
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Table 2: Patter‐setters and defectors in Denmark 1990‐2012 
 Pattern-setter Defectors Result 
1991 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
1993 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
1995 Transport Manufacturing Two-year agreements in 
transport and construction. 
Three-year agreement in 
manufacturing  
1998 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Encompassing strike and 
governmental intervention 
2000 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2004 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2007 Manufacturing - Synchronised approval 
2010 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
2012 Manufacturing 
(Transport) 
- Synchronised approval 
Various sources17.Note: Transport in parentheses means that this agreement takes out higher wage increases due to the normal 
wage system – no local wage increases – and that it sets the pattern for the approximately 15 % of the private sector labour market 
with this wage system.  
 
Table 3: Pattern‐setters and defectors in Sweden 1990‐2012 
 Pattern-setter Defectors Result 
1991 Tripartite Rehnberg Group Transport Approved 
1993 Retail Transport Partial strike: Transport 
1995 Paper and pulp Various industries Breakdown in coordination 
1998 Manufacturing (IA agreements) - Approved 
2001 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Retail  
Hotel and Restaurants 
Approved 
2004 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Food processing 
Retail 
Hotel and Restaurants 
Maintenance 
Approved 
2007 Manufacturing (IA agreements) Retail 
Hotel and Restaurants  
Approved 
2010 Manufacturing (IA agreements) 
Salaried workers and academics first 
Retail 
Paper and pulp 
Partial strike: Paper and 
pulp 
Unsynchronised agreements 
2012 Manufacturing (IA agreements) - Approved 
Various sources18 
 
The comparison begins by describing the material structures of both countries in brief. Hereby, it 
is acknowledged that material structures clearly matter – but that they are indeterminate with 
reference to the different bargaining processes in Sweden and Denmark. We argue that institu-
tions and ideas enter this indeterminacy to coerce certain actors into specific forms and outcomes 
of coordination. In other words, we wish to stress that the approaches can be complementary.  
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Rational choice  
According to the first approach material structures of the countries should be able to account for 
differences in bargaining coordination. Material structures in Sweden and Denmark are, howev-
er, very similar. According to World Bank figures (2013) manufacturing share of GDP is around 
20 % in 2011 in both countries while the employment share of manufacturing has dropped since 
1980 from around 30 % to around 15 % in 2011. Both have made transitions into flexible pro-
duction systems (Kristensen and Lilja, 2012) and employment is increasing in the service sector. 
Moreover, export shares of GDP increased from around 30 % in 1980 to over 50 % in 2011, i.e. 
increasing economic openness but also independencies. Swedish manufacturing companies have 
traditionally been very large, competing in global markets with increasingly tight profit margins, 
e.g. in automotive, whereas the somewhat smaller Danish companies have produced for niche 
markets (Kristensen and Lilja, 2012). Indeed here we see a difference, but it would make us ex-
pect stronger coordination in Sweden than in Denmark. Both countries have large welfare states, 
relatively high taxation and high female labour participation rates together with generally high 
employment rates. The transition to low-inflation economic policies came in the 1980s in Den-
mark, while Sweden waited until the 1990s (Iversen and Pontusson, 2000). Union densities re-
main relatively high – around 65-70 % – despite recent changes to the Ghent-systems (Kjellberg, 
2009; Due et al., 2010). Employer density (both public and private sector) is also high – although 
Danish employers are less organised than their Swedish counterparts, 71 % and 86 %, respec-
tively (DA, 2013; Medlingsinstitutet, 2012). In recent years, the tradition for union-labour party 
links has formally weakened in Sweden and Denmark; however, informal links are still strong. 
Despite these similarities Swedish bargaining coordination has, as noted, failed significantly 
more times than the Danish. This indicates indeterminacy: why do similar structures lead to dif-
ferent coordination outcomes? 
 
Rationalist institutionalism  
Rationalist institutionalism gives us the following explanations for this apparent difference. 
Firstly, we find significant differences in organisational structures of unions and employers. In 
1991-1992 Danish Industries (DI) – a new super confederation of industry – was created in 
Denmark which now represents 60 % of employment within the Danish Confederation of Em-
ployers (DA). The move culminated the 1989 reorganisation of DA which reduced the number of 
employer associations from 150 to 50. In 2013, there are only 13 employer associations in DA – 
signifying great concentration. Similarly, in 1992, CO-industri – a bargaining cartel with unified 
decision-making – was formed between metalworking unions and other manufacturing unions. 
Hereby, a strong cross-class alliance in manufacturing – with concentrated actors on both sides – 
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was born (Due et al., 1994; Scheuer, 1993).  Swedish employer associations in manufacturing, 
conversely, did not merge. Clearly, Teknikföretagen – representing metalworking – has a privi-
leged role due to its size, but it is dwarfed by its Danish counterpart DI – and only represents 
approximately 16 percent of Svensk Näringsliv – SN. Moreover, SN has 49 affiliates signifying 
more fragmentation. On the union side, a new bargaining cooperation called Facken inom Indus-
trin (FI) joined the SACO union for engineers (Sveriges Ingenjörer), TCO union for salaried 
workers (Unionen –former SIF) with LO-unions for manual workers. This certainly strengthened 
cross-confederation coordination but did not create a bargaining cartel – like CO-industri in 
Denmark. Greater concentration of decision-making power in Denmark could explain fewer de-
fections from coordination in Denmark compared to Sweden.  
Secondly, we need to consider differences in agreement ratification procedures. In Denmark, 
DA ratifies agreements in an executive meeting in which DI holds a de facto majority vote. It 
therefore has veto-power over other bargaining units. Such procedures are non-existent in SN 
and defections can only be sanctioned by naming-and-shaming and symbolic fines. On the union 
side, neither LO-Sweden nor LO-Denmark holds veto-powers over agreements. However, the 
powers of mediation systems significantly alter this. In Denmark, the mediation institution – for-
ligsinstitutionen – is competent to link agreement areas into singular union ballots, i.e. even bar-
gaining units that have not reached agreements will receive a common proposed settlement that 
mimics the dominant agreement, that is, the DI and CO-industri agreements. Hereby, potential 
defectors that we see in Sweden are effectively reigned-in by a majoritarian vote. Conversely, 
Swedish mediators – Opartiska Ordföranda and Medlingsinstitutet – have no such tool. Even 
though mediators are formally restricted to proposing settlements in line with the manufacturing 
agreements, each agreement is ratified or turned down by competent assemblies of the direct 
bargaining parties. Defection is therefore possible, albeit conditioned by naming-and-shaming 
and rather symbolic fines in SN. So, different institutions distribute decision-making power une-
qually.        
The two institutional examples shed light on different conditions for coordination and poten-
tially explain defections. Swedish collective bargaining in turn comes out more voluntarist, in 
that the direct parties to agreements can decide their own fate, i.e. coercion is weaker in Sweden 
than in Denmark. In Denmark, coercion is strong since smaller bargaining areas are reigned-in 
by the ballot procedure and mediation linkage of agreements. Together with a more concentrated 
bargaining structure, opposing interests to the specific form of coordination are excluded from 
decision-making. While these institutional differences would suggest that Swedish coordination 
is chaotic and the Danish is stable, this is too simplistic. Swedish bargaining since the chaotic 
1980s has actually experienced relative stability, save for the mentioned defections. More often 
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than not bargaining areas actually follow the manufacturing norm in Sweden – and this despite 
defections being institutionally possible and despite the possibility of taking out higher wage 
increases. Indeed, many union officials from low wage industries explicitly argue in favour of 
wage moderation based on the manufacturing norm even though this entails gradually growing 
wage differentials. The article now turns to the discursive approach to investigate the indetermi-
nacy that rationalist accounts leave.  
 
Discursive institutionalism 
Two examples will be included for this approach: 1) the macro causal narratives about interna-
tional competitiveness and the need for coordination based on wage moderation, and 2) the mi-
cro techniques in coordination which tell us about specific balances between wage moderation, 
flexibility, equality and voluntarism.  
As Swenson (1991) and Due et al. (1994) have shown for Sweden and Denmark, the key idea 
in collective bargaining coordination, is the primacy of exports for the economy and therefore 
interdependencies between the exposed and sheltered sectors. This is based on two logics: First-
ly, the welfare state and home-markets are dependent on wealth generation from exports – as 
reflected in high export shares of GDP. Secondly, cost-increases in sheltered sectors will spill-
over into higher costs for exposed sectors, i.e. negative externalities. This analysis demands 
cross-sectoral coordination between private sectors and between the private and public sectors. 
Such ideas were formally announced in the ‘Common Declaration’ of 1987 in Denmark, in 
which union pledged to wage moderation in return for real wage stability, higher employment 
and increased private savings through occupational pension schemes (Due et al., 1994). Coupled 
with low-inflation economic policies, the cross-sectoral coordination resulted in the current bar-
gaining system in which manufacturing goes first and mediation settlements sweeps up non-
agreeing areas. The big issue becomes the level at which the economy at large will remain com-
petitive. So called campaign institutions, like think tanks, politico-economic secretariats of social 
partners and government economic councils  have been set up to analyse  and discuss economic 
conditions in order to get the levels for coordination right by comparing labour cost develop-
ments of neighbouring countries (Pedersen, 2006). Notably in Denmark, the tripartite committee, 
Statistikudvalg, produce reports on the economic scope for wage increases before each bargain-
ing round. Common causal narratives and common knowledge create mutual expectations for 
bargaining (Culpepper, 2008).    
Similar trends can be detected in Sweden. Various reports analysed the ‘Swedish problem’ in 
the 1980s, in part zooming in on low governance capacity in wage bargaining (Blyth, 2002; 
Ahlén, 1989). Incomes policies were attempted (Elvander, 1989) but without compliance, com-
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pensatory wage claims at company level hollowed-out their effectiveness. The breakthrough 
came with the Rehnberg commission in 1991 which brings the parties together through struc-
tured mediation with the purpose of wage moderation based on the so called Edin-norm. Hereby, 
Swedish wage developments were aligned with foreign competitors. The analysis of structural 
unemployment, wage rigidities and wage-spirals due to union-rivalry was first accepted in the 
metalworking unions and then in other manufacturing unions. They formed a bargaining cooper-
ation on the backdrop of a chaotic bargaining round in 1995 to propose the institutionalisation of 
pattern-bargaining around manufacturing. In 1997, employers in manufacturing signed the ‘In-
dustrial Agreement’ which set a procedural framework for bargaining and a declared goal of 
competitive wage developments. Concomitantly, a group of impartial chairs – Opartiska Ord-
föranda – were placed in charge to mediate in bargaining on the basis of their own analysis of the 
economic situation. As in Denmark, the name of the game is now to get the level for coordina-
tion right by comparing labour cost developments of neighbouring countries.     
We now turn to how actors translate common ideas of competitive bargaining coordination in-
to specific techniques. Firstly, coordination can be based on either nominal or percentage in-
creases – the latter gradually increasing wage differentials while the former reduce them. This 
choice is obviously non-trivial. Secondly, coordination can be based on various metrics, ranging 
from productivity increases, inflation forecasts, unemployment forecasts, profit forecasts or a 
combination. This goes to show that coordination is neither determined by material structures but 
a techno-political issue with distributive consequences. Again, the importance of campaign insti-
tutions in setting the frame for bargaining coordination becomes pivotal by defining the scope 
for cost increases. This is not a mechanical procedure. For example, the relevant competitors are 
chosen, i.e. who are we comparing ourselves with? In 2010, Danish trade unions argued for in-
clusion of Chinese wage developments on grounds that Danish companies were in direct compe-
tition with China. Chinese percentage wage increases were higher than the German. By decon-
textualizing bargaining and setting it in relation to other bargaining systems, actors can frame 
coordination according to their interests (Fairclough, 2003).  
In Sweden, the role of counter-discourses is illuminating (Schmidt, 2010). For example, Swe-
dish service sector unions are repeatedly challenging the primacy of manufacturing as pattern-
setter. They argue that services are also exposed to international competition and by far outnum-
ber employment in manufacturing hence meriting the pattern-setting role (Medlingsinstitutet, 
2009). Such counter-discourse is non-existent in Denmark – partly because DI also covers many 
service sector companies. For Swedish low skilled LO-unions, discourses of solidaristic wage 
policies and wage levelling also challenge the manufacturing primacy. In 2012, this led IF Metall 
to leave the LO-bargaining platform due to disagreements with low skill unions over the design 
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of a common low wage claim. In Denmark, such solidaristic counter-discourse does not exist, 
even though low skilled workers in e.g. retail, cleaning and food-processing are clearly losing 
out in company level wage deals. This difference is accentuated by the level of control in indus-
try-level agreements: 85 % of Danish agreements are merely minimum wage agreements com-
pared to the widespread use of various fall-back and individual guarantees together with wage 
pools in Swedish agreements (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012; DA, 2013)  
The difference between discourses on low wage in Sweden and Denmark brings the issue of 
real interests that Lukes (2005: 154) using Connolly (1972: 472) proposes. Real interests are 
defined when… ‘x is more in A’s interest than y, if A were he to experience the result of both x 
and y, would choose x as the result he would rather have for himself’. The problem is that ‘x’ 
might not exist in reality, and we need counterfactual analysis through comparison to realise ac-
tual power exercise. We use KLEMS data (2009a; 2009b) on average wage ratios between low 
skill workers in retail/hotels/restaurants and transport, respectively, vis-à-vis high-skill manufac-
turing workers to illustrate subjective versus real interests. During the 1970s until the late 1980s 
wage differences were stable or shrinking. However, since decentralisation and use of frame-
work agreements of wages, differentials have soared in Denmark while only increasing modestly 
in Sweden.         
 
Figure 1: Denmark 
 
Source: KLEMS (2009a) 
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Figure 2: Sweden 
 
Source: KLEMS (2009b) 
 
Under the current system of bargaining coordination, why do Danish low skill workers unions, 
despite relatively high union densities, accept relatively larger wage differentials compared to 
their Swedish colleagues? Structuralist accounts will stress that they have no choice due to e.g. 
low demand for low skill workers and labour migration pressing wages down. Surely, this might 
be true, but are structural differences between Sweden and Denmark really that significant? An 
alternative explanation could be the following: Arguably, acceptance of growing wage differen-
tials in both countries is legitimised through collective memories of the ‘bad old days’ (March, 
2010): We need wage moderation and flexibility to ensure that the foot-loose inflation, loss of 
competitiveness and high unemployment of the 1980s and early 1990s will not return. In Den-
mark, the discursive battles about the primacy of manufacturing are thwarted by ‘heavy institu-
tionalisation’ of bias through the creation of DI on one hand, and the linkage of agreement areas 
by the mediation institution. Combined with loose framework agreements at industry-level, wage 
differentiation is hard to escape both institutionally and discursively for low wage unions. In 
Sweden, however, counter-discourses of wage solidarity and distributive equality are still alive 
and kicking and institutions allow defections by low-wage unions due to a relatively fragmented 
bargaining structure and relatively weak mediation institutions. Moreover, unions hold onto 
more controls over wages in industry level agreements by fall-back guarantees and designated 
wage pools to ensure even distribution in local wage bargaining (Medlingsinstitutet, 2012).  
Against the backdrop of material structures, the rationalist and discursive institutionalisms can 
therefore complement each other, by showing how meaning structures frame interests in material 
structures and how this framing serve some actors better than others (Carstensen, 2010). And we 
can indicate how the formalisation of these meaning structures in concrete institutions produces 
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power-relations and mobilisation of bias with negative distributive consequences for some ac-
tors.      
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The article has reviewed and discussed three different theoretical approaches to the study of co-
ordinated collective bargaining which posit three different causal mechanisms for coordination. 
Rational choice posited power relations based on resource-dependence; rationalist institutional-
ism posited rules of the game and mobilisation of bias; and discursive institutionalism posits 
shared meaning structures and moulding of interests. It was thus argued that each approach is 
based on different views of coordination involving exercise of power where some actors make 
others do what they otherwise would not have done. Looking at examples from Sweden and 
Denmark, the overall conclusion is that approaches stressing power bargaining coordination are 
accurate. This allows for a ‘Sinatra-inference’: if these theories can make it in consensual and 
egalitarian countries, they can (probably) make it anywhere. The article accordingly rejects no-
tions that coordination is purely cooperative and follows Traxler et al. (2008) who put power at 
the heart of coordination studies – a proposition that can be transferred beyond collective bar-
gaining. This does not preclude elements of cooperation in coordination, but it shows that coop-
eration is conditioned by power relations.  
Moreover, we asked whether the three approaches are competing or complementary to each 
other. Firstly, rational choice and rationalist institutionalism share the logic of instrumentality 
and exogenous interests in bargaining coordination, but the latter introduces mediating institu-
tions and – as argued by for example Moe (2005) – mobilisation of bias. Indeterminacy of mate-
rial structures as well as path dependency of institutions is another layer to the explanation of 
bargaining coordination which rational choice is inapt to explain. This warrants institutionalist 
explanations. Nevertheless, as a point of departure, rational choice makes a useful contribution to 
understanding ideal typical interest configurations between bargaining actors. Secondly, at the 
outset, rationalist and discursive institutionalisms are ontologically incompatible due to their 
diverging views on interest formation and thus concepts of power. If the assumption of exoge-
nous interests, however, is relaxed and we accept that interests depend on how actors ‘…filter, 
interpret and act – or not – upon the constraints they face’ (Murray et al., 2010: 327), then we 
do not have to discard strategic behaviour based on material structures. Instead, we need to ap-
preciate the normative and cognitive processes inherent in strategies leading to coordination.  
Although we stress the power effect of discourses, discourses about coordination should not be 
viewed too deterministically. Similarly to the approach by Carstensen (2010), we see signs in 
Sweden and Denmark of how the ideas of wage moderation, flexibility, solidarity and volunta-
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rism are being moulded by unions and employers’ associations that are under continuing pres-
sure from structural changes in markets and technology. Flexibility is framed both as something 
that collective bargaining now allows but also controls. Wage moderation is framed as a win-win 
solution that increases competitiveness and employment, although it will gradually increase 
wage differentials. Solidarity in Denmark is no longer equal wage for all work but equal wage 
for similar jobs and equal opportunity (Baccaro and Locke, 1998; Pontusson, 2011). Finally, 
voluntarism is no longer merely non-interference by the state (Kahn-Freund, 1954) but also bar-
gaining autonomy vis-à-vis manufacturing. This dynamic interpretation of recent developments 
goes beyond bargaining structures and levels and puts power back into studies of coordination by 
asking the fundamental question: Whose interests prevail in coordinated bargaining?    
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Resumé (dansk) 
Denne afhandling består af fem artikler, hvis formål er at forstå relationerne mellem institutioner, 
processer og resultater af koordinerede kollektive overenskomstforhandlinger mellem arbejds-
markedets parter. Afhandlingen undersøger især betydningen af intervention ved tredjepart i 
overenskomstforhandlinger. Artiklerne har delvis overlappende analyseniveauer, data og forsk-
ningsdesign, og tilsammen udforsker og forklarer de, hvordan konfigurationer af institutioner er 
oprettet og reproduceres over tid, og hvordan de påvirker overenskomstforhandlingers processer 
og resultater. 
På trods af stigende pres på overenskomstsystemer de seneste fire årtier udgør overenskomst-
forhandlinger fortsat den dominerende måde at regulere arbejdsmarkedet på i Europa. Cirka 60 
procent af de ansatte i EU får stadig deres løn, arbejdstid, ferie mv. fastsat ved kollektive over-
enskomster mellem fagforeninger og arbejdsgiverforeninger. 
På den ene side fastsætter overenskomstforhandlinger et minimum for løn og arbejdsvilkår, og 
overenskomstforhandlinger kan derfor med rette betragtes som en central del af den europæiske 
sociale model. Gennem kollektiv repræsentation og overenskomstforhandlinger er arbejdstagere 
alt andet lige bedre beskyttet mod nogle af de sociale risici, som arbejdsmarkedet medfører. 
På den anden side kan overenskomstforhandlinger være gavnlige for arbejdsgiverne. Internati-
onalisering af markeder har øget behovet for koordinering på tværs af brancher på grund af 
makroøkonomiske hensyn til prisstabilitet og beskæftigelse. Integration af produktmarkeder be-
tyder, at omkostningsniveauet inden for ét land ikke må overstige niveauet i konkurrerende lan-
de. Dette medfører, at aktørerne vil prøve at moderere omkostningsudviklingen på tværs af bran-
cher, der således anvender kollektive overenskomster som et loft for arbejdskraftomkostninger. 
Som sådan giver koordinerede overenskomstforhandlinger et dobbeltløfte om at reducere soci-
ale risici for arbejdstagerne og kontrollere omkostninger for arbejdsgiverne. 
Hvis overenskomstforhandlinger som reguleringsproces afhænger af parternes evne til at indgå 
aftaler, bliver institutioner, som muliggør dette, afgørende. Overalt i den vestlige verden findes 
der institutioner for mægling eller voldgift ved tredjepart (forkortet til CMA fra engelsk), som 
hjælper fagforeninger og arbejdsgivere med at nå til enighed. Disse institutioner er dog ofte ble-
vet overset i studier af, hvordan overenskomstforhandlinger foregår og udvikler sig. 
Afhandlingen forsøger at bidrage til forskningen ved at udforske betingelserne for og betyd-
ningen af tredjepartsindgreb i overenskomstforhandlingerne. Det gør den med udgangspunkt i 
sociologi og politologi samt ved at skrive sig ind i studierne af arbejdsmarkedsrelationer og 
komparativ politisk økonomi. Det primære empiriske fokus er på de koordinerede overenskomst-
forhandlinger i Sverige og Danmark – lande som begge skiller sig ud ved at have høj økonomisk 
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effektivitet og høje niveauer af social lighed. Ved brug af sammenlignende case-metode identifi-
cerer afhandlingen imidlertid vigtige forskelle i overenskomstforhandlingernes processer og re-
sultater, som kan forklares med små men dog væsentlige forskelle i Sveriges og Danmarks mæg-
lingsinstitutioner. Desuden viser undersøgelsen, at der bag tilsyneladende succesfulde kompro-
miser i de to lande har været betydelige magtkampe, der næsten førte til sammenbrud af over-
enskomstsystemerne. 
Den første artikel sammenligner overenskomstsystemerne i Sverige og Danmark siden decen-
traliseringen af forhandlinger fra hovedorganisationsniveau til forbundsniveau. Det historisk-
komparative casestudie viser, at hovedorganisationsforhandlinger er blevet erstattet med et ’pat-
tern-bargaining’-system baseret på alliancer imellem parterne i den konkurrenceudsatte fremstil-
lingssektor. I modsætning til den konventionelle litteratur på området understreger artiklen be-
tydningen af mæglingsinstitutioner for disse institutionelle forandringer. Ved at knytte mæg-
lingsforslag til forhandlingsresultatet i fremstillingssektoren har mæglingsinstitutionerne i begge 
lande en nødvendig rolle i løsningen af et kollektivt handlingsproblem i ’pattern-bargaining’-
systemet. Landenes evne til at gøre dette adskiller sig imidlertid, hvilket afspejles i hyppigere 
afvigelser fra fremstillingsindustriens resultat i Sverige. Afvigelserne i Sverige synes derudover 
at være drevet af fagbevægelsens fortsatte insisteren på lønsolidaritet, hvorimod danske fagfor-
eninger har flyttet deres fokus over mod såkaldt udbudssolidaritet, f.eks. ved lige adgang til ud-
dannelse. 
Den første artikel finder således et tæt forhold mellem forhandlingsstrukturer, mæglingsinsti-
tutioner og koordinering af overenskomstforhandlinger på forbundsniveau i Sverige og Dan-
mark. Kernen i dette forhold er ønsket om kontrol over overenskomstforhandlinger.  
Den anden artikel udforsker ønsket om kontrol på tværs af flere lande. Artiklen tager udgangs-
punkt i observationen af, at alle vesteuropæiske lande har udviklet særlige systemer for tredje-
partsintervention, som giver forskellige muligheder for at gribe ind i overenskomstforhandlinger. 
Formålet med artiklen er at forklare, hvorfor nogle lande har stærk CMA på tværs af 17 vesteu-
ropæiske lande. Til dette formål anvendes den såkaldte ’fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Ana-
lyse’-metode (fsQCA). Analysen ser på den formelle styrke ved CMA og forsøger at udlede ’år-
sagsstier’ til stærk CMA i overenskomstforhandlinger. To hypoteser testes: Den neo-korporative 
hypotese af Elvander, som hævder, at lav styringskapacitet hos fagforeninger er relateret til en 
stærk CMA på grund af ønsket om kontrol over overenskomstforhandlinger; og domstolstraditi-
ons-hypotesen af Valdés Dal-Ré, som fremfører, at normale civile domstole i arbejdsmarkeds-
spørgsmål generelt er relateret til en stærk CMA på grund af juridiske traditioner. Ved hjælp af 
fsQCA påvises to årsagsstier til stærke CMA – den nordiske sti og Middelhavsstien. Ser man 
nærmere på historikken bag afvigende cases samt cases i den nordiske sti, viser det sig imidler-
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tid, at kontrol over kollektive overenskomstforhandlinger – og ikke domstolstraditioner – er den 
vigtigste mekanisme bag stærk CMA. Samlet støtter resultaterne dermed den neo-korporative 
hypotese af Elvander, hvorimod Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypotese ikke kan støttes. 
De følgende to artikler retter fokus mod, hvordan forhandlingsinstitutioner påvirker resultater 
af overenskomstforhandlinger. Den tredje artikel undersøger, hvordan den økonomiske krise 
blev håndteret i 2010-overenskomstforhandlingerne for den toneangivende fremstillingssektor i 
Sverige og Danmark. Artiklen analyserer og sammenligner overenskomstforhandlingerne fra 
dagsordenfastsættelse til underskrivelse af aftaler, og peger på væsentlige forskelle i forhand-
lingsstrukturer, processer og resultater. I det hele taget synes krisen at have haft ringe effekt på 
det danske aftalesystem på grund af en stærk centralisering af arbejdsgiversiden, gennem DI, og 
den koordinerende effekt ved forligsinstitutionen. Omvendt sætter overenskomstforhandlingerne 
i Sverige spørgsmålstegn ved levedygtigheden af det svenske aftalesystem. Fagforeningskoordi-
nationen i industrien brød sammen, da funktionærfagforeninger indgik aftaler, før LO-
fagforeningerne. Men endnu vigtigere var det, at Teknikföretagen – den største arbejdsgiverfor-
ening i industrien – opsagde Industriavtalet efter 2010-forhandlingerne. Dermed blev de svenske 
arbejdsmarkedsparter igen tvunget til at justere procedurerne i aftalesystemet. 
Den fjerde artikel viser, hvordan overenskomstforhandlinger bidrager til udviklingen af så-
kaldt flexicurity – dvs. kombinationer af fleksibilitet og social sikkerhed. Overenskomstforhand-
linger er ofte blevet overset i studier af flexicurity, på trods af den fortsatte udbredelse af denne 
form for regulering i mange europæiske lande. Ved at sammenligne overenskomstaftaler i den 
grafiske branche og elektrikerbranchen i Danmark, Spanien og Storbritannien undersøger artik-
len, om der er en positiv sammenhæng mellem kollektive forhandlinger og udvikling af balancer 
mellem fleksibilitet og sikkerhed. Analysen viser, at danske overenskomster bidrager betydeligt 
til flexicurity, hvilket var forventet. I Storbritannien bidrager aftaler også væsentligt til balancer 
mellem fleksibilitet og sikkerhed på trods af det gængse synspunkt, at arbejdsgiverne er fjendtli-
ge over for fagforeninger og overenskomstforhandlinger. I Spanien skyldes det beskedne bidrag 
til flexicurity dominans af lovgivning på arbejdsmarkedet, men selv her ser vi et bidrag, der er 
bemærkelsesværdigt. Imod forventningerne bidrager kollektive aftaler således også til flexicurity 
i Storbritannien og Spanien. Denne overordnede konklusion giver stærke beviser for det påståede 
bidrag fra kollektive forhandlinger til flexicurity. 
Den sidste og femte artikel træder et skridt tilbage og vurderer begrebet ’koordinerede over-
enskomstforhandlinger’ fra tre forskellige teoretiske tilgange, som hver især bygger på forskelli-
ge kausale mekanismer. ’Rational choice’-tilgangen bygger sin forklaring på magtrelationer ba-
seret på ressource-afhængighed. ’Rationalistisk institutionalisme’ bygger på proceduremæssige 
regler for forhandlinger. Og ’diskursiv institutionalisme’ forklarer koordinering med aktørernes 
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fælles meningsstrukturer. Artiklen argumenterer for, at tilgangene bygger på forskellige opfattel-
ser af koordinering, som alle indebærer magtudøvelse, hvor nogle aktører får andre aktører til at 
gøre noget, de ellers ikke ville have gjort. Koordinerede overenskomstforhandlinger kan derfor 
have negative fordelingsmæssige konsekvenser for nogle aktører. Artiklen giver derefter empiri-
ske eksempler på de tre tilgange fra Sverige og Danmark, der betragtes som kritisk cases for en 
’Sinatra-følgeslutning’: Hvis teorier om koordinering, der understreger magtrelationer og negati-
ve fordelingsmæssige konsekvenser, kan klare sig i Sverige og Danmark, kan de klare sig over-
alt. 
Afhandlingen støtter generelt det synspunkt, at kollektive overenskomstforhandlinger kan bi-
drage til positive resultater for arbejdsgivere og arbejdstagere. Men den peger også på de kræ-
vende institutionelle forudsætninger, der er nødvendige for at opretholde overenskomstforhand-
linger i dynamiske markeder. Desuden understreger afhandlingen, at kollektive overenskomst-
forhandlinger institutionaliserer magtrelationerne mellem aktørerne, og at institutioner derfor kan 
have fordelingsmæssige konsekvenser for disse aktører. I sidste ende vil strategiske aktørers fort-
satte støtte til overenskomstforhandlinger afhænge af, hvordan konflikterne mellem disse aktører 
løses. Afhandlingen påviser, at mæglingsinstitutioner kan spille en vigtig rolle heri – og at de 
uden tvivl har gjort det i Sverige og Danmark. 
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Summary (English)  
This dissertation consists of five papers which aim to understand the relationships between insti-
tutions, processes and outcomes of coordinated collective bargaining between organisations for 
workers and employers. Especially, the dissertation investigates the role of third party interven-
tion for collective bargaining. The papers have partly overlapping hypotheses, levels of analysis, 
data and research designs. Together they explore and explain how configurations of institutions 
are created and sustained over time and how they influence bargaining processes and outcomes. 
While under severe pressure during the recent four decades, collective bargaining still consti-
tutes the main regulatory process by which labour markets are governed in Europe. Approxi-
mately 60 percent of the employees in Europe still have their wages, working time, holidays etc. 
determined by collective agreements between trade unions and employer associations.   
On one hand, collective bargaining puts a floor under terms and conditions of employment and 
collective bargaining is therefore rightly regarded as a centrepiece of the European Social Model. 
Through collective representation and bargaining, workers are arguably better protected from 
some of the social risks that labour markets entail.  
On the other hand, collective bargaining can be beneficial for employers. Internationalisation 
of economies has increased the need for coordination across industries due to macro-economic 
concerns for price stability and employment. Integration of product markets means that cost-
levels within a country must not exceed the competitors in other countries. This gives impetus 
for actors to moderate wages across industries using collective agreement as a ceiling for labour 
costs.  
As such, coordinated collective bargaining holds the dual-promise of reducing social risks for 
workers and containing costs for employers.       
If collective bargaining as a regulatory process hinges upon the ability of parties to reach 
agreements, institutions that facilitate this should be pivotal. All over the Western world, institu-
tions for conciliation, mediation or arbitration by third parties exist to help unions and employers 
settle in bargaining. These institutions have, however, often been neglected in studies of how 
collective bargaining is evolving and sustained.  
To remedy this omission, the dissertation explores the conditions for and the role of third party 
intervention into collective bargaining. It does so by drawing on the disciplines of political sci-
ence and sociology while engaging with the fields of industrial relations and comparative politi-
cal economy. The primary empirical focus is on the highly coordinated collective bargaining 
systems of Sweden and Denmark which both stand out concerning high economic efficiency and 
high levels of social equity. Using comparative case method, important differences in bargaining 
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and mediation institutions are, however, identified that can explain subtle but important differ-
ences in bargaining process and outcomes. Moreover, the studies show that behind seemingly 
successful compromises of the two countries were significant power struggles and near-
breakdowns of collective bargaining.  
The first paper compares coordinated collective bargaining in Sweden and Denmark since the 
decentralisation of bargaining from peak-level confederations to primarily industry-level bar-
gaining. The historical-comparative case study shows that confederate bargaining has been re-
placed with a pattern bargaining system based on cross-class alliances in the exposed manufac-
turing sector. In contrast to conventional literature, the paper stresses the importance of media-
tion institutions in institutional change. By pegging settlements to the pattern, mediation institu-
tions of both countries have a necessary role in solving collective action problems in pattern bar-
gaining. Their capabilities, however, differ which is reflected in more frequent defections in 
Sweden. Defections in Sweden, moreover, appear to be driven by continuing union claims for 
distributive wage solidarity, whereas Danish unions have refocused on supply-side solidarity like 
equal access to education and training. 
The first paper thus finds an intimate link between bargaining structures, mediation institutions 
and coordination of industry-level bargaining in Sweden and Denmark. At the core of this rela-
tionship is the preoccupation about control over collective bargaining. The second paper ex-
plores this relationship across more countries. It departs from the observation that all Western 
European countries have developed particular systems of third party intervention – understood as 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration (CMA) – which have varying capabilities to intervene 
into collective bargaining. The purpose of the paper is to explain strong CMA across 17 West-
ern-European countries using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) method. It 
looks at the formal strength of CMAs and attempts to deduce explanatory paths to strong CMA 
in collective bargaining. Two hypotheses are considered and extended; the neo-corporatist hy-
pothesis by Elvander who claims that low governance capacity by unions is related to strong 
CMA because of preoccupations about control over bargaining; and the court-tradition hypothe-
sis by Valdés Dal-Ré who maintains that normal civil courts in labour matters are related to 
strong CMA due to legal traditions. The analysis shows two causal paths to strong CMA – the 
Nordic and the Mediterranean. Within-case analyses of deviant cases and cases in the Nordic 
path suggest that control over collective bargaining – and not court-tradition – is the main mech-
anism behind strong CMA. Overall the findings therefore support the neo-corporatist hypothesis 
by Elvander while we do not find support for Valdés Dal-Ré’s hypothesis.  
The following two paper turns to how bargaining institutions influence the outcomes of collec-
tive bargaining. The third paper investigates how the economic crisis was handled in the 2010 
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collective bargaining rounds in the pattern-setting manufacturing sectors of Sweden and Den-
mark. It analyses and compares the bargaining rounds from agenda-setting to signing of agree-
ments, pointing to the significant differences in bargaining structures, processes and outcomes. 
On the whole, the crisis seems to have had little effect on the Danish bargaining system due to a 
strong centralization on the employer side through the Confederation of Danish Industries and 
the coordination of bargaining areas by Denmark’s mediation institution. Conversely, the bar-
gaining round in Sweden puts a question-mark over the viability of the whole Swedish bargain-
ing system. Union coordination was shattered when the white-collar unions broke ranks and con-
cluded agreements before the LO unions. But more importantly, Teknikföretagen – the biggest 
employers’ federation – quit the Industrial Agreement after the negotiations and, once again, 
Swedish social partners were forced to readjust the procedural framework for collective bargain-
ing. 
The fourth paper shows how collective bargaining contributes to the development of so called 
flexicurity – combinations of labour market flexibility with social security. Collective bargaining 
is often neglected in studies of flexicurity, despite the continued resilience of this form of regula-
tion in many European countries. The paper compares sector-level bargaining and flexicurity in 
the printing and electrical contracting industries of Denmark, Spain and the UK to assess wheth-
er there is a positive link between collective bargaining and development of balances between 
flexibility and security. The findings show that Danish agreements contribute significantly to 
flexicurity which is in line with expectations. In the UK, agreements contribute significantly to 
balances between flexibility and security, despite conventional views that employers are hostile 
towards unions and collective bargaining. In Spain, due to the heavy influence of legislation the 
contribution is more modest but nevertheless also notable. So, somewhat against conventional 
expectations, agreements also contribute to flexicurity in the UK and Spain. This overall finding 
gives strong evidence for the proposed link.  
The final paper takes a step back and reviews the concept of bargaining coordination from 
three different theoretical approaches which underline different causal mechanisms leading to 
coordination. Rational choice posits power relations based on resource-dependence; rationalist 
institutionalism posits rules of the game; and discursive institutionalism stresses shared meaning 
structures. It is argued that each approach is based on different views of coordination involving 
exercise of power where some actors make others do what they otherwise would not have done. 
Coordination could therefore have negative distributional consequences for coerced actors. The 
paper goes on to show examples of the three approaches from Sweden and Denmark which are 
regarded as crucial cases for ‘Sinatra-inference’: If theories of coordination stressing power ex-
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ercise and negative distributional consequences can make it in Sweden and Denmark, they can 
make it anywhere. 
The dissertation generally supports the view that collective bargaining as a regulatory process 
can achieve positive results for both employers and employees. However, it also identifies the 
demanding institutional preconditions needed to sustain collective bargaining under volatile 
markets and technological change. Furthermore, the dissertation stresses that collective bargain-
ing institutionalises power-relations among actors and that the specific details of institutions will 
have distributive consequences. Ultimately, the continued support for bargaining by strategic 
actors resides in how well conflicts between these actors are resolved. This dissertation shows 
that mediation institutions can play an important role herein – and that they certainly have done 
so in Sweden and Denmark.      
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Appendix   
 
List of interviews for ‘Did mediation save coordinated bargaining’, Bargain-
ing in the crisis’ and ‘Cooperation or power’ 
 
No. 
 
Name & position of 
respondents  
Organisation Country Industry Time  
1 Kirsten Weber (head of 
section) 
Ministry of Employment Denmark N/A 11 June 2010 
2 Anders Levy (head of 
section) 
Ministry of Employment Denmark N/A 11 June 2010 
3 Allan Andersen (barga-
ining secretary) 
3F Transport group Denmark Transport 17 January 
2011 
4 Jørgen Aarestrup Jensen 
(bargaining secretary and 
vice chairman) 
3F Transport group Denmark Transport 17 January 
2011 
5 Bjarne Nielsen (vice 
chairman) 
HK/Privat Denmark Manufacturing/ 
Private services 
18 January 
2011 
6 Jan Villadsen (chairman) 3F Transport group Denmark Transport 25 January 
2011 
7 Asbjørn Jensen (chief 
mediator) 
Forligsinstitutionen –  Medi-
ation Institution 
Denmark N/A 16 February 
2011 
8 Torsten Hesselbjerg 
(mediator) 
Forligsinstitutionen –  Medi-
ation Institution 
Denmark N/A 8 March 2011 
9 Birger Stein Christensen 
(chief secretary) 
Forligsinstitutionen –  Medi-
ation Institution 
Denmark N/A 14 March 2011 
10 Kaspar Linkis (mediator) Forligsinstitutionen – Media-
tion Institution 
Denmark N/A 14 March 2011 
11 Ole Stig Andersen (medi-
ator) 
Forligsinstitutionen – Media-
tion Institution 
Denmark N/A 16 March 2011 
12 Jørn Neergaard Larsen 
(CEO) 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 
– Confederation of Danish 
Employers 
Denmark Private sector 23 March 2011 
13 Keld Burmølle (director) Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 
– Confederation of Danish 
Employers 
Denmark Private sector 29 March 2011 
14 Pernille Knudsen (direc-
tor) 
Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening 
– Confederation of Danish 
Employers 
Denmark Private sector 31 March 2011 
15 Jan Kæraa (chief econo- Landsorganisationen i Dan- Denmark Private and public 6 April 2011 
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mist) mark – Danish Confederation 
of Trade Unions 
sector 
16 Lisbeth Jensen (mediator) Forligsinstitutionen – Media-
tion Institution 
Denmark N/A 6 April 2011 
17 Bent Østerborg (media-
tor) 
Forligsinstitutionen – Media-
tion Institution 
Denmark N/A 7 April 2011 
18 Kim Graugaard (director) DI – Confederation of Dan-
ish Industries 
Denmark Manufacturing/ 
Private sector 
11 April 2011 
19 Kim Graugaard (director) DI – Confederation of Dan-
ish Industries 
Denmark Manufacturing/ 
Private sector 
29 October 
2011 
20 Thorkild E. Jensen 
(chairman) 
Dansk Metal – Danish Met-
alworkers’ Union 
Denmark Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
13 January 
2011 
21 Thorkild E. Jensen 
(chairman) 
Dansk Metal – Danish Met-
alworkers’ Union 
Denmark Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
11 April 2011 
22 Thorkild E. Jensen 
(chairman) 
Dansk Metal – Danish Met-
alworkers’ Union 
Denmark Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
22 June 2011 
23 Thorkild E. Jensen 
(chairman) 
Dansk Metal – Danish Met-
alworkers’ Union 
Denmark Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
29 July 2011 
24 Børge Frederiksen 
(chairman for 3F manu-
facturing) 
3F Manufacturing group Denmark Manufacturing 31 May 2011 
25 Børge Frederiksen 
(chairman for 3F manu-
facturing) 
3F Manufacturing group Denmark Manufacturing 13 January 
2012 
26 Knud Erik Linius (direc-
tor) 
DI – Confederation of Dan-
ish Industries 
Denmark Manufacturing/ 
Private sector 
21 June 2011 
27 Simon Tøgern (chairman)  HK/Privat Denmark Manufacturing/ 
Private services 
7 September 
2012 
28 Peter Hougård  (chair-
man) 
3F Construction Denmark Construction 26 September 
2012 
29 Jørgen Hoppe (chairman) HK Handel Denmark Retail 2 October 2012 
30 Laurits Rønn (director) Dansk Erhverv – The Danish 
Chamber of Commerce 
Denmark Retail 5 October 2012 
31 Peter Stenholm (director) Dansk Byggeri – The Danish 
Construction Association 
Denmark Construction 28 November 
2012 
32 Kim Simonsen (chair-
man) 
HK/Danmark Denmark Private and public 
sector 
12 November 
2012 
33 Claus Jensen (chairman) Dansk Metal – Danish Met-
alworkers’ Union 
Denmark Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
28 February 
2012 
34 Gunnar Björklund (medi- Opartiska Ordföranda/ Sweden  Primarily manufactu- 21 February 
 
 
234
No. 
 
Name & position of 
respondents  
Organisation Country Industry Time  
ator) Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
ring 2011 
35 Gunnar Högberg (media-
tor) 
Opartiska Ordföranda/ 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden  Primarily manufactu-
ring 
21 February 
2011 
36 Gun Sofia Rautiala (me-
diator) 
Opartiska Ordföranda/ 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden  Primarily manufactu-
ring 
22 February 
2011 
37 Göte Larsson (mediator) Opartiska Ordföranda/ 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden  Primarily manufactu-
ring 
22 February 
2011 
38 Jan Sjölin (mediator) Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden  N/A 22 February 
2011 
39 Lars Josefson (mediator) Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden N/A 23 February 
2011 
40 Anders Lindström (medi-
ator) 
Opartiska Ordföranda/ 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden Primarily manufactu-
ring 
23 February 
2011 
41 Claes Stråth (chief me-
diator) 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden N/A 23 February 
2011 
42 Claes Stråth (chief me-
diator) 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden N/A 1 October 2012 
43 Gunilla Runquist (media-
tor)  
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden N/A 24 February 
2011 
44 Bengt KÅ Johansson 
(mediator) 
Medlingsinstitutet – National 
Mediation Office 
Sweden N/A 24 February 
2011 
45 Benne Lantz (mediator) Opartiska Ordföranda 
 
Sweden Manufacturing 7 April 2011 
46 Anders Weihe (chief 
negotiator) 
Teknikföretagen Sweden Manufacturing 25 March 2011 
(conducted by 
Søren Kaj 
Andersen) 
47 John Wahlstedt (lawyer) Teknikföretagen Sweden Manufacturing 25 March 2011 
(conducted by 
Søren Kaj 
Andersen) 
48 Roger Nilsson (lawyer) IF Metall Sweden Metalworking/ 
Manufacturing 
25 March 2011 
(conducted by 
Søren Kaj 
Andersen) 
49 Veli-Pekka Säikkälä IF Metall Sweden Metalworking/ 25 March 2011 
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(chief negotiator) Manufacturing (conducted by 
Søren Kaj 
Andersen) 
50 Veli-Pekka Säikkälä 
(chief negotiator) 
IF Metall  Sweden Metalworing/ 
Manufacturing 
26 April 2011 
51 Gerald Lindberg (second 
chairman)  
Livsmedels Arbetarförbundet Sweden Food processing 26 April 2011 
52 Tomas Undin (director) Teknikföretagen  Sweden Manufacturing 27 April 2011 
53 Camilla Frankelius 
(chairman) 
Sveriges Injeniörarna Sweden Private and private 
sector 
27 April 2011 
54 Ulf Sedelius (chairman) Finansforbundet Sweden Finance 28 April 2011 
55 Sverker Rudeberg (direc-
tor) 
Svensk Näringsliv – the 
Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise 
Sweden  Private sector 28 April 2011 
56 Per Hidesten (director) Skogsindustrierna (now 
Industriarbetsgivarna)   
Sweden Wood- and forestry 28 April 2011 
57 Tommy Andersson 
(chairman) 
GS Facket - The Swedish 
union of forestry, wood and 
graphical workers 
Sweden Wood- and forestry, 
graphical industry  
28 April 2011 
58 Göran Nilsson (chief 
secretary) 
Facken inom Industri Sweden Manufactuing 29 April 2011 
59 Per Bardh (bargaining 
secretary) 
Landsorganisationen i Sveri-
ge - The Swedish Trade 
Union Confederation 
Sweden Private and public 
sector 
29 April 2011 
60 Niklas Hjert (chairman) Unionen Sweden Public and private 
services 
17 June 2011 
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61 Andrew Brown (corpo-
rate affairs director) 
British Print Industries Fed-
eration  
UK 
 
Print 
 
10 September 
2008 
62 Tony Burke (assistant 
general secretary) 
UNITE the Union UK Print 
 
19 August 2008 
63 Alex Meikle (head of 
employee relations)  
Electrical Contractors’ Asso-
ciation - ECA 
UK Electrical contracting 
 
9 September 
2008 
64 Steven Brawley (employ-
ee relations advisor) 
Electrical Contractors’ Asso-
ciation - ECA 
UK Electrical contracting 
 
9 September 
2008 
65 Tom Hardacre (lead 
officer of construction) 
UNITE the Union UK Electrical contracting 
 
19 September 
2008 
66 Neal Evans (research 
officer) 
UNITE the Union UK Electrical contracting 
 
10 September 
2008 
67 Bjarne Nielsen (vice-
director) 
HK Privat Denmark 
 
Print 
 
18 September 
2008 
68 Lars Bram (director)  Grafisk Arbejdsgiverforen-
ing 
Denmark Print 
 
1 September 
2008 
69 Peter Andersen (negotia-
tion secretary) 
Fælles Fagligt Forbund - 3F Denmark Print 
 
3 September 
2008 
70 Jørgen Juul Rasmussen 
(director)  
Dansk Elforbund - DEF Denmark Electrical contracting 
 
11 September 
2008 
71 Ole Tue Hansen (union 
secretary)  
Dansk Elforbund - DEF Denmark Electrical contracting 
 
17 September 
2008 
72 Jens-Olav Pedersen (vice-
director)   
Dansk Elforbund - DEF Denmark Electrical contracting 
 
17 September 
2008 
73 Thorkild Bang (vice-
director)  
Tekniq Denmark Electrical contracting 24 September 
2008 
74 Bent Lindgren (national 
officer) 
Tekniq Denmark Electrical contracting 24 September 
2008 
75 Joaquina Rodriguez  
(general secretary) 
Comisiones Obreras  - 
CCOO. Federación de 
Comunicación y Transporte 
Spain 
 
Print 
 
26 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
76 José Ramón Castañon 
(general secretary)  
Unión General de 
Trabajadores – UGT.  
Federación de Servicios 
Spain Print 
 
29. September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
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land) 
77 Jesús Alarcón Fernandez 
(general secretary) 
Asociación Empresarios 
Artes Graficás Madrid - 
AGM 
Spain Print 
 
29 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
78 José Luis Vicente (direc-
tor of the juridical de-
partment) 
Confemetal  Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
national level 
26 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
 
79 Jesús Ramos (secretary of 
union action) 
Comisiones Obreras – 
CCOO. Federación 
Minerometalúrgica 
Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
national level 
29 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
80 Antonio Torres (coordi-
nator of union action)  
Comisiones Obreras – 
CCOO. Federación de Metal 
(Madrid) 
Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
province level, Ma-
drid 
30 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
81 Raquel Marquez (assis-
tant) 
Comisiones Obreras – 
CCOO. Federación de Metal 
(Madrid) 
Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
province level, Ma-
drid 
30 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
82 Clemente de la Casa 
(political secretary) 
Unión General de 
Trabajadores – UGT. 
Federación de Metal, 
Construcción y Afines 
Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
province level, Ma-
drid 
30 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
83 Sánchez Fresneda (asses-
sor) 
Asociación de Empresarios 
del Metal de Madrid – 
AECIM  
Spain Electrical Contract-
ing (Metal)  
 
province level, Ma-
drid 
30 September 
2008 
(conducted by 
Mikkel Mai-
land) 
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1.  I’m indebted to Thomas A. Kochan, Jesper Due and Jørgen Steen Madsen for their sharing their respective accounts of IR as a field of 
study.  
2.  Neo-marxist scholars have criticized the strategic choice model for underestimating the potential and significance of social mobilisation in 
industrial relations: Hyman R. (1994) Theory and Industrial Relations. British Journal of Industrial Relations 32: 165-180.   
3.  Coser (1956) on the other hand, argues that labour conflicts release the inherent tensions between employers and employees and therefore 
have a social function. Suppressing these tensions could have catastrophically consequences. Nevertheless, it would be absurd to suggest 
that the purpose of third party intervention is release of tension through industrial action. 
4.  To Mads, Anders, Anders, Martin and Kristian: OK, jeg indrømmer nu blankt, at gravide mænd er svære at finde i virkeligheden.   
5. Due et al. Den Danske Model: En Historisk Sociologisk Analyse af det Kollektive Aftalesystem; FAOS. Resume af overenskomstforhand-
lingerne 2012.  Copenhagen, FAOS; C. L. Ibsen, S. K. Andersen, J. Due, and J. S. Madsen, "Bargaining in the crisis - a comparison of the 
2010 collective bargaining round in the Danish and Swedish manufacturing sectors," Transfer 17, no. 3 (2011); S. Scheuer, "Leaders and 
Laggards: Who Goes First in Bargaining Rounds?," in Scandinavia in a New Europe, ed. T. P. Boje and S. E. O. Hort. (Oslo: Scandinavian 
University Press, 1993). 
6. Elvander, N. “The New Swedish Regime for Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Perspective”; A. Kjellberg, 
"Sweden: Restoring the Model?," in Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, ed. Ferner.A. and Hyman.R. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Business, 1998); Yearbooks from Medlingsinstitutet; Torgeir Stokke, Lønnsforhandlinger og konfliktløsning 
7. The Herfindahl (H) index is given by H =Σin (pi2), where pi is the proportion of total membership organised by the manufacturing employ-
er associations and n is the total number of employer associations. By discounting the weight of smaller associations (achieved through the 
squaring method), the Herfindahl index conveys an idea of the actual degree of the concentration of employer associations in manufactu-
ring. Scores range from 0 to 1. Total concentration = 1, i.e. a situation of only one employers association.   
8. DI comprises many service sector companies – hence the larger share of employment.  
9. I’m grateful to Kathleen Thelen for pointing this out.  
10. Arbitrators might also have these capabilities but they are of less consequence as binding awards change the bargaining dynamic fundamen-
tally.   
11. Note here that this causal symmetry applies to this condition.  
12. Note also that the explanation is related to legal-origin distinctions between civil law and common law countries as we would expect the 
former to place greater emphasis on statutory regulation while not for the latter. However, this seems to run counter to the argument of 
Valdés Dal-Ré. 
13. While criticised by many as being too crude (Traxler, 2004), union density figures are sine qua non the most used indicator for union power. 
14. Countries differ as to whether regulation of industrial action is statutory or bilateral, i.e. between the social partners, for example through 
basic procedural agreements concerning how to resolve conflicts in collective bargaining.  
15. The parsimonious solution includes two paths: regind + GOVCAP*court. Solution coverage: 0.86 and solution consistency: 0.87 
16. Although the ACAS is indeed very active in conciliation. 
17.  Due et al. Den Danske Model: En Historisk Sociologisk Analyse af det Kollektive Aftalesystem; FAOS.Resume af overenskomstforhand-
lingerne 2012.  Copenhagen, FAOS; C. L. Ibsen, S. K. Andersen, J. Due, and J. S. Madsen, "Bargaining in the crisis - a comparison of the 
2010 collective bargaining round in the Danish and Swedish manufacturing sectors," Transfer 17, no. 3 (2011); S. Scheuer, "Leaders and 
Laggards: Who Goes First in Bargaining Rounds?," in Scandinavia in a New Europe, ed. T. P. Boje and S. E. O. Hort. (Oslo: Scandinavian 
University Press, 1993). 
18.  Elvander, N. “The New Swedish Regime for Collective Bargaining and Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Perspective”; A. Kjellberg, 
"Sweden: Restoring the Model?," in Changing Industrial Relations in Europe, ed. Ferner.A. and Hyman.R. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell 
Business, 1998); Yearbooks from Medlingsinstitutet; Torgeir Stokke, Lønnsforhandlinger og konfliktløsning 
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